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This study, based upon Jean Piaget's historicodevelopinental 
method of examining knowledge, was concerned with the establishment 
of parallels between literature as collective social knowledge and the 
cognitive development of the individual.
Changes in the conceptions of literature's nature were isola­
ted and identified as they developed from the period of English Neo- 
classicism in the seventeenth century to the period of Romanticism in 
the nineteenth century to the period of Anglo-American New Criticism 
in the twentieth century. It was found that in each literary period 
one particular approach to literature dominated, whereby one element 
oriented all literary concerns: for the Neoclassical period, the prag­
matic approach with the audience as central; for the Romantic period, 
the expressive approach with the ppet as the outstanding element; and 
for the period of New Criticism, the objective with the work itself 
dictating all literary assumptions.
Application of Fiagetian constructs to the evolution of liter­
ary concepts established parallels between collective literary thought 
and individual cognition: first, the static, limited conceptions of the
Neoclassicists, who saw literature as a product, an imitation which fur­
nished instruction and pleasure for the edification of the reader, found 
parallels with the phenomenistic and egocentric characteristics of the 
pre—operational child; next, the equilibrated state that the Romantics
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reached in their view of literature as both a product and a process, an 
organic expression of the poet's mind and feelings, found parallels with 
the equilibrial properties of field extension, mobility, and stability, 
properties characteristic of the concrete-operational cognizer; and, last, 
the speculative instruments of the New Critics, which showed literature 
as a process, an autonomous organic structure of semantic and syntactic 
relationships, found parallels with the double reversibility central to 
the INRC group of four transformations, which Piaget uses as a model to 
adolescent thought.
This study demonstrates that critical concepts at a certain period 
of literary history show characteristics that are representative of a 
certain maturity and that this stage of collective thought is analyzable 
with that found in an individual cognizer at the same stage of maturity.
It also shows that this research has implications for both the English 
curriculum and the study and instruction of literature at high school and 
college levels.
CHAPTER I
AN OVERVIEÏ^ OF THE STUDY
Introduction and Need for the Study 
In 373 B.C. Plato denounced poetry. Calling it false, trivial, 
and useless, he banished the poet from his ideal state- For centuries 
thereafter men reckoned with this indictment and endeavored to establish 
literature's value and justify its existence- But today the situation is 
quite different- Literature no longer needs its champion. On the con­
trary, it enjoys a place of prominence in twentieth-century culture, se­
cure as a part of the curriculum of every American boy and girl from the 
first grade through the twelfth, and for some young people through the 
early part of college- Curriculum-wise its requirement as subject matter 
for twelve years more than justifies its value. Nevertheless, there is 
a problem in terms of the emphasis that literature receives in the class­
room and the poverty of the pay-off, in terms of the shocking discrepancy 
between the number of class hours spent in its study and the few students 
who emerge from a twelve—year exposure as "readers," ones with a real 
understanding of the art form and a true aesthetic sense,
One national study, which investigated English programs in 168 of 
the "better" high schools across the nation, finding that literature "on 
an overall average occupied 52-2 percent of the emphasis in instruction," 
attributes this failure to the "superficial" nature of the instructional 
methods employed by teachers in these schools- Dr. James R- Squire,
Executive Secretary of The National Council of Teachers of English, direc­
tor of the study, comments :
Our real quarrel is with the incessant superficiality of much 
classroom study of literature— with, if you will, the evasion of 
literature represented in too many classrooms. Despite a decade 
of recommendations to the contrary, many teachers continue to 
teach the dates and places as if these and not the literary works 
were the essence of our subject; an over—reliance on history 
and geography, a preoccupation with the Elizabethan stage, a con­
cern with definition and memory work (the Petrachian [sic] sonnet, 
the heroic couplet, the accepted definition of figures of speech)—  
these clutter the minds of too many teachers and students alike. 
Intelligently used to serve the interest of literary study, they 
can provide needed tools and understanding. Forced to center stage, 
they only divert attention. And center stage they too often occupy. 
Far more frequently than the classroom in which young people were 
learning to analyze a single text with insight and ability, we 
found this emphasis on the superficial.^
In view of its findings, this study, headed by Dr. Squire, along 
with others who have conducted research in the past decade,2 has express­
ed a need for more effective literary instruction in the English class­
room, instruction that will lead students to the heart of a literary 
selection, where they can become involved in experiences of identification 
and reaction.
Ijames R. Squire, "The National Study of High School English 
Programs: Implications for Colleges and Universities," College English,
27 (liay 1966): 614, 619. ..    ®----
^Louise Rosenblatt, "Literature: The Reader's Role," in The
Subjects in the Curriculum, ed. by Frank L. Steeves (Indianapolis:
Odyssey Press, 1968), pp. 41-42; Walter J. Ong, "Literature, Threat, and 
Conquest," College English 27 (May 1966): 620-21; Robert C. Slack, "A 
Report on Project English," English Journal 53 (December 1964): 685; Roger 
K. Applebee, "National Study of High School English Programs: A Record
of English Teaching Today," English Journal 55 (March 1966): 275.
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In response to the need for more effective instruction in liter­
ature, it is the purpose of this chapter to present a plan for a "histor- 
icodevelopmental"^ view of literature, one theoretically rooted in the 
method of Jean Piaget, the method whereby he examines the nature of know­
ledge.
Piaget in applying his strategy investigates the historical changes 
in the nature and conception of a particular knowledge form; then, by em­
ploying his psychological model of cognitive development, he attempts to 
find parallels between the collective thought of the knowledge form and 
the individual thought of the child. He postulates, moreover, that 
"knowledge undergoes a long period of evolution in the individual as well 
as in society," and believes that
the study of this development at both levels might yield insight 
into the most mature (or at least latest) forms of collective and 
individual knowledge. Por these reasons, both the genetic (or de­
velopmental) study of the child, and the historical study of know­
ledge, are relevant for problems of epistemology.̂
So strong is Piaget’s belief in this proposition that it has led him to
investigate numerous disciplines— physics, biology, mathematics, sociology,
and psychology^— and he is convinced that since his method is empirically
based and its area is limited, it can furnish insights into subject matter
and individual cognizer alike- "The issues," he feels, "should no longer
be left solely for the speculation of philosophers but should be treated
in a more objective manner.
3john H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget 
(New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1963), p. 256.
Herbert Ginsburg and Sylvia Opper, Piaget's Theory of Intellectual 
Development (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 209.
^Flavell, p. 252. ^Ginsburg and Opper, p. 209.
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Adopting Piaget's strategy of examining knowledge forms, this re­
search will examine literature as a knowledge form, and in so doing, will 
bring together three disciplines: literature, psychology, and biology.
The first two will be related developmentally; the third will provide the 
theoretical frame.
Statement of the Problem 
and Purpose of the Study
Stemming from an expressed need for more effective instructional 
methods in literature is the problem to be investigated. In essence, it 
concerns the historical changes in the concept of literature from the 
period of English Neoclassicism (1600—1800) to the period of New Criti­
cism (1930-60), considering the relationship of this "evolution across a 
number of adult minds [those of critic-writersl" to the Piagetian notion 
of cognitive changes in the "evolution within a single immature [mind]."?
Such a problem— one which puts literature in a historical frame 
and compares it with the individual and his cognitive development— raises 
certain questions: (1) How specifically has the concept of literature
changed from English Neoclassic times to those of Anglo-American New Criti­
cism so that the characteristics that define it in one age mark it as 
different in the next? (2) How can these differences be accounted for?
(3) ïihat issues have been at stake in the past among literary critics as 
to the nature and value of literature? (4) What are the present-day issues 
that concern critics and divide them into camps? and (5) How do the his­
torical changes in the conception of literature relate to the cognitive 
development of the individual? These questions deal with scope and com­
parison. Scope relates to the first part of the problem— the historical
^Flavell, p. 252.
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changes in the conception of literature— and includes the first four 
questions. Comparison, on the other hand, relates to the second part of 
. the problem— the relationship that a historical view of literature bears 
to the cognitive development of the individual— and includes the last 
question.
The scope questions and, in turn, the first part of the problem 
will be answered by analyzing the following kinds of primary and secondary 
sources: specific selections of literature found in books and criticism 
found in books; journals; and conference reports. The comparison question, 
relating to the second part of the problem, will also be answered by ana­
lyzing primary and secondary sources found in books.
Further, the research-problem statement provides the basis for the 
major purpose of this investigation. This’three-fold purpose purports to . 
do the following: (1) to gain an understanding of the historical changes
in the conception of English literature since Neoclassic times, whereby 
the parallels that exist between the periods of development in literary 
criticism and those in individual cognitive development can be pointed 
out; (2) to draw conclusions concerning these parallels; and (3) to dis­
cuss the implications that the conclusions have for the instruction of 
literature. A related purpose is to offer a secondary-level approach to 
literature study based on Piaget’s INRC matrix of higher-thought processes, 
an approach that might prove fruitful in classroom instruction at high— 
school and college levels.
Tools of Analysis
To accon^lish the purpose of this investigation, an analysis of 
the historical changes in the conception of English and American literature
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will be conducted. Undoubtedly, such an analysis will prove most valid
if empirically based. To obtain such a base, this study turns to Jean
Piaget’s historicodevelopmental method by which he has investigated the
knowledge in various disciplines. As an explanation of this method,
Flavell provides an illuminating description:
Piaget will take a concept from a given scientific field, e.g. 
the concept of force in physics . . . and analyze how its scien­
tific meaning has changed from Greek or pre-Greek times to the 
present. He then attempts to show crucial parallels between 
historical and ontogenetic evolutions of this concept: for ex­
ample, in both evolutions there is a progressive shedding of 
egocentric adhérences, rooted in personal experience of bodily 
effort, in favor of an objective conception which is indepen­
dent of self. The subject of his historicodevelopmental analysis 
may be broader than a single concept, such as force; that is, it 
may subtend a group of interrelated concepts of even a whole field 
of knowledge, e.g., historical changes in the nature and conception 
of mathematics . . .  But whatever the content, the general strategy 
is to apply the constructs of his developmental theory (progress­
ive equilibration, egocentrism, décentration, and reversibility, 
etc.) to the historical process, the latter construed as an evo­
lution across a number of adult minds at least partially analys­
able in the same terms as the evolution within a single immature 
one.®
To attempt with literature what Piaget has accomplished with other 
knowledge forms seems a reasonable undertaking, one that may offer infor­
mation of pragmatic worth. Be that as it may, however, adapting Piaget’s 
paradigm to the examination of literature will mean a ". • . critical 
examination of past and present epistemological analyses"^ of English 
and American literature— from English Neoclassicism to the period of 
Anglo-American New Criticism— followed by an analysis which employs 
Piaget’s cognitive developmental model. This study, therefore, is doubly 
indebted to Piaget: first, for a method to proceed historically, and
second, for a model to serve as an instrument for comparison.
^Ibid. ®Ibid., p. 258.
Relative to the tools of analysis the following data sources will 
be analyzed: primary source materials will be drawn from the writings of
Jean Piaget in order to procure information related to the Piagetian 
models, both the historicodevelopmental and the model of cognitive de­
velopment; similarly, secondary—source materials will come from writings 
of psychologists, several of who have either studied with Piaget or have 
participated in the tradition of the Festschrift— a "progress report on 
enterprises initiated by the teacher [Piaget, in this case]."10 Specific 
titles to be used in this investigation are as follows: Jean Piaget:
Genetic Epistemology. Introduction â 1 ^4pist^mologie g^n^tigue. The Lang­
uage and Thought of the Child, The Origins of Intelligence in Children,
Play. Dreams and Imitation in Childhood. Psychology :df Intelligence. Struc­
turalism» and To Understand is to Invent; The Future of Education; Barbel 
Inhelder and Jean Piaget: The GroTjth of Logical Thinking from Childhood
to Adolescence; David Elklnd and John H. Flavell: Studies in Cognitive
Development: Essays in Honor of Jean Piaget; John H. Flavell: The De­
velopmental Psychology of Jean Piaget; Hans Furth: Piaget and Knowledge;
Theoretical Foundations; Herbert Ginsburg and Sylvia Opper; Piaget^s 
Theory of Intellectual Development; An Introduction; Henry W. Î-Iaier:
Three Theories of Child Development; Mary Ann Spencer Pulaski: Understand­
ing Piaget; An Introduction to Children’s Cognitive Development.
By using Piaget’s developmental model as the tool for comparison and 
applying it to the preceding data sources, it should be possible to demon­
strate that critical concepts at a certain period of literary history show
l^David Elkind and John H- Flavell, Studies in Cognitive Develop­
ment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. x.
8
characteristics that- are representative of a certain maturity and that 
this stage of maturity in collective thought is analyzable with that found 
in an individual cognizer at the same stage of maturity. In other words, 
it should be possible to point out that literary concepts of Neoclassic 
scholars were "in a state of relative egocentrism and phenomenism"^^ and 
that this state of subjectivity became increasingly objective with the 
encounter of subsequent scholars whose views dominated the more advanced 
periods of Romanticism and New Criticism.
A further observation should be made regarding the tools of analy­
sis— namely, that the comparison between the "collective minds" of literary 
criticism and that of the individual will begin with the pre-operational 
stage and proceed through the formal. (This is Piaget’s method.) The 
sensorimotor period will not be used, since thought, other than a practi­
cal intelligence similar to that of animals, is not present at that level, 
beginning rather when language appears at the pre-operational stage. 
Similarly, theoretical and evaluative activities of English criticism did 
not formally, begin until the seventeenth century, although rudiments of 
criticism did exist earlier.
It should also be possible by applying the developmental model as 
a comparative measure to demonstrate the validity of the hypotheses as 
explained in the following section.
Historical Model and Hypotheses 
Broadly, the historical model for this study is that of literary 
evolution. Literary evolution is the intrinsic study of literature and 
as such is "concerned with the processes underlying the production of
^^Flavell, p. 256.
literature rather than with the particular products." It deals with two 
aspects of literature: "the forms and species that make up literary
morphology; or with modifications in the spirit and functions of litera­
ture, which it is the province of literary criticism to consider.
This research will touch briefly on the evolution of literature as it was 
conceived by the ancients; the emphasis, however, will center on the 
conceptions of literature (based as they were on classical postulations) 
as they evolved from the period of English Neoclassicism to that of Anglo- 
American New Criticism.
More specifically, the study will be based on a model of critical
theories suggested by Meyer Howard Abrams in his book The Mirror and the
Lamp*^^ "The division of theories presented in this text is one among
many possibilities, adopted because it is relatively simple," so Preminger
comments in his encyclopedia on poetics. He then goes on to explain:
[and] because it stresses the notable extent to which later ap­
proaches to poetry were expansions . . .  of Greek and Roman 
prototypes; and [also] because it defines in a provisional way 
certain large-scale shifts of emphasis during 2,500 years of 
Western speculation about the identity of poetry, its kinds and 
their relative status . . . and the criteria by which poems are 
to be evaluated. But like all general schemes, this one must be 
supplemented and qualified in numerous ways before it can do jus­
tice to the diversity of individual points of view.^4
But before delineating the ways in which this scheme will be modi­
fied, it is advisable to explain the Abrams* model of critical theories.
^^Richard Preen Moulton, The Modern Study of Literature (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1915), p. 109.
H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp : Romantic Theory and the 
Critical Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 3-29.
^^Alex Preminger, Frank J, Wamke, and 0. B. Hardison, Jr., eds., 
Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1965), p. 639.
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In recognizing that literature is an artifact, a man-made product, this 
model considers the following contingencies: the work of art, the creator, 
the milieu, and the audience. For "a poem is produced by a poet, takes 
its subject matter from the universe of men, things, events, and is ad­
dressed to an audience of hearers or readers," and
... .although these four elements play some part in the all-in 
elusive accounts ox poetry, they do not play an equal part.
Commonly a critic takes one of these elements or relations as 
cardinal, and refers the poem either to the external world, or 
to the audience, or to the poet as preponderantly the 'source 
and end and test of art'; or alternatively, he considers the 
poem as a self-sufficient entity, best regarded in theoretical 
isolation from the causal factors in the universe from which 
the poem derives its materials, or the tastes, convictions, 
and responses of the audience to which it appeals, or the 
character, intentions, thoughts, and feelings of the poet who 
brings it into being. These varied orientations give us, in 
a preliminary way, four broad types of poetic theory, which 
may be labeled mimetic, pragmatic, expressive, and objective.
(Italics mine.)13
Utilizing this model, the following outline will direct the re­
search;
I. Mimetic Theory (Introductory) —  The Ancients (4th century B. C.): 
early Greek philosophers, the fountainhead of criticism— criti­
cism oriented toward the universe
A. Plato —  dialectical approach to poetry
B. Aristotle —  analytical approach to poetry
II. Pragmatic Theory —  The Neoclassicists (17th to the 19th century) —  
criticism oriented toward the audience
A. Sir Philip Sidney -- poetry as an imitation of the ideal with
an Inspirational value
B. John Dryden —  poetry as an imitation of human nature with a
value of instruction and pleasure
C. Samuel Johnson —  poetry as an imitation of general nature with
a value of instruction and pleasure
^^Ibid., pp. 639-40.
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III- Expressive Theory —  The Romantics (19th century) -- criticism 
oriented toward the poet
A- William Wordsworth —  poetry as a psychological experience in 
the mind of the poet, as a concrete, sensuous illustration 
of both a fact and a relationship which provides pleasure 
and shows its universal importance
B. Samuel Taylor Coleridge —  poetry as Imagination, a psychologi­
cal event, a fusing and synthesizing power in the mind of the 
poet which provides pleasure in the parts as well as the whole
IV. Objective Theory —  The New Critics (20th century) —  criticism 
oriented toward the poem
A. I. A. Richards —  poetry as applied psychology with a value
of knowledge
B. John Crowe Ransom —  poetry as a totality of logical structures.
and local texture with a value of knowledge
C- Allen Tate —  poetry as a totality of multiple tensions in equi­
librium with a value of knowledge
D. Cleanth Brooks —  poetry as a totality of ambiguities, ironies, 
and paradoxes with a value of knowledge
This outline alters the model to the extent that the mimetic theory, 
wherein the critics’ views are basically in terms of the universe, will 
serve as a necessary introduction to the theories that follow, those that 
provide a frame for the history proper (pragmatic, expressive, and objec­
tive) * The pragmatic theory, then, representative of the Neoclassic 
period, the first period in the evolution (1600—1800), becomes intelligible, 
as a theory oriented toward the audience or reader when the theories that 
the ancients held concerning literature are made clear in the introductory 
material of the mimetic. Similarly, this material illuminates the ex­
pressive theory, representative of the Romantic period (the 1800’s) and 
the objective theory, representative of the period of New Criticism 
(1930-60). This scheme of theories, then, as adapted to the purposes of 
this study, whereby the mimetic theory serves as background for the other
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three theories, identifies the major approaches taken by critics to the 
quiddity of literature during approximately three centuries and a half 
of English and American criticisms.
To reiterate, the historical process in this paper will formally 
begin with the literary thought that began in Neoclassic times. To be 
sure, English literature was well established by this time, having come 
up from antiquityÿ medievalism, and the Renaissance. But it was not until 
Neoclassic times that men began to question the nature and function of 
literature to the extent that a critical, temper could emerge in any dis­
tinct sense. Thus, since a basic theme of this investigation is the con­
ception of literature in a historical context, the selection of the speci­
fic time when the fundamentals of modem criticism were first established 
in English literature is of central concern. Moreover, the restriction 
of place— the bounds of seventeenth-century England— is necessary since 
American criticism, with which this history culminates, like American 
literature, has its roots in that of English theory.
The final consideration of this section is the hypotheses, the 
theories germane to the study. It is possible, from the major purpose of 
the investigation, to form hypotheses capable of disproof or verification:
(1) Literature— from the period of English Neoclassicism to the 
period of Anglo-American New Criticism— when put in a histori­
cal perspective will show advances in the way it has been con­
ceived by literary critics that parallel advances in the cog­
nitive development of the individual.
(2) Literature— from the period of English Neoclassicism to the 
period of Anglo-American New Criticism— when considered from 
a historicodevelopmental point of view will furnish implica­
tions for its instruction.
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A, Data Collection
Historical research, ntilike other types of scientific research, 
must "deal with data . . .  already in e x i s t e n c e . F o r  this reason the 
historian must use discretion in the evaluation and selection of his data. 
His first step in evaluation, then, is to recognize the differences be­
tween primary sources, which are "data provided by actual witnesses to the 
incident in question," and secondary sources, "sources in which a middleman 
has come between the original witness and the present consumer." Conse­
quently, "reliable historians rely as much as possible on primary sources, 
using secondary sources only as hypotheses to bridge the gap between the 
various pieces of primary evidence.
Still there is another view. Secondary sources are sometimes to 
be preferred. Because secondary sources can be compared with one another 
on a particular point, the historian by evaluating the various stances can 
come nearer the truth than he might be able to from examining one single 
primary source.
For instance, we frequently listen to news commentators for an 
orientation message from the President, for commentators because 
of their backgrounds frequently are able to synthesize the signi­
ficant factors in the situation and present a much clearer pic­
ture than can be obtained from a first-hand report.IB
B. • Data Interpretation
While collecting his data, the historian simultaneously carries 
on its evaluation. The process entails the following steps: (1) Taking
Walter R. Borg and Meredith D. Gall, Educational Research: An
Introduction (New York: David McKay Co., 1971), p. 190.
l^George J, Mouly, The Science of Educational Research (New York; 
American Book Co., 1963), p. 208.
^^Ibid., p. 209.
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notes— a procedure which Implies the processes of selection, condensation, 
and paraphrase; (2) comparison of data; (3) reformulation of data; and
(4) judgment of data. This mental process of comparison, combination, and 
selection is called "synthetic operations,and these operations, in turn, 
include the adoption of a tentative hypothesis, whereby the historian may 
select his material and shape his interpretations. But care must be taken 
at all times to guard against the Procrustean tenptation to select and 
manipulate material that can be interpreted in light of the preliminary 
hypothesis.
The historical procedure which will be used in the data interpreta­
tion of this study's hypotheses is final synthesis, the four elements of 
which are interpretation— discovery of cause and effect relations to ex­
plain human events or assertion of value judgments on the part of the his­
torian; emphasis— achieved by repetition and order; arrangement— "the group­
ing of evidence . . and inference— "reasoning or informed invention. . .
used to fill gaps in the record or to supply connections between bits or 
classes of evidence.
Review of the Literature 
"An essential aspect of a research project is the review of the re­
lated l i t e r a t u r e . "21 This Investigation will examine and make use of 
numerous sources in its historical investigation of literature— its changes 
in conception since the period of English Neoclassicism. The principal 
data for the study are primary sources, most of which are deposited in the
19R. J. Shafer, A Guide to the Historical Method (Homewood, 111: 
Dorsey Press, 1969), p. 143.
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.University of Oklahoma library and the Southeastern Oklahoma State Univer­
sity library. Two sources were obtained by loan: one from the Columbia
University library, the other from the Oklahoma State University library.
The sources consist of books of literary criticism by eminent critics and 
critic-teachers; annual reports of conferences on literature study; and 
articles from prestigious literary journals. A specific listing follows; 
but before noting titles, it is profitable to point out that sources of 
information for this type of research are legion. Therefore, for the pur­
poses of this section, the list will be limited to those sources which 
will provide the bulk of information, although many sources other than the 
ones listed herewith will be used and will appear in the bibliography.
Books of literary criticism include: J. W. H. Atkins,. English
Literary Criticism: The Renascence and English Literary Criticism: 17th
and 18th Centuries; M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory
and the Critical Tradition; Ernest Bembaum, A Guide Through the Romantic 
Movement ; Cleanth Brooks, The Well-Wrought Um: Studies in the Structure
of Poetry; David Daiches, Critical Approaches to Literature; Richard Foster, 
The Hew Romantics: A Reappraisal of the New Criticism; Murray Krieger, The
New Apologists for Foetry; John Crowe Ransom, The New Criticism; I. A. 
Richards, Frinciples of Literary Criticism; Allen Tate, On the Limits of 
Poetry; George Watson, The Literary Critics: A Study of English Descriptive
Criticism; René Wellek, Concepts of Criticism.
Literary journals that contain articles used in this research in­
clude College English. English Journal, and Sewanee Review.
Also used in this study is one unpublished report on literary study 
produced by the Curriculum Study Center in English, Florida State Univer­
sity, 1963.
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A number o£ secondary sources are volumes that consist of specific 
essays on criticism collected and introduced and discussed by the editor 
or editors. Notable examples of these are W. J- Bate, Criticism; The 
Major Texts: Daniel G. Hoffman and Samuel Hynes, English Literary Criticism: 
Romantic and Victorian; Walter Sutton and Richard Foster, Modern Criticism; 
Theory and Practice.
One final source that merits attention is Anthology of Children *s 
Literature, edited by Edna Johnson, Evelyn R. Sickels, and Frances Clarke 
Sayers. This volume will be referred to extensively in terms of one im­
plication this research has for the instruction of literature.
Definition of Terms 
The title for the research study is "A Historicodevelopmental 
View of Literature: From Sidney to the New Critics." The concepts as
they occur in the title are defined as follows:
(1) Historicodevelopmental View
This view employs Jean Piaget's method of examining a knowledge 
form. Piaget investigates the changes in the nature and conception of a 
knowledge form from its genesis to contemporary times. These historical 
changes he views as collective knowledge that has evolved through the 
centuries. Employing his psychological model of development, he then 
draws parallels between stages of collective thought in the history of 
the knowledge form and the stages of cognitive development in the indi­
vidual. The term historicodevelopmental is the term that John Flavell, 
in his text The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, applies to
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Piaget's strategy and one which he substitutes for Piaget's term "histori- 
99co-critique. **
(2) Literature
As a term in the title, literature refers to those works that are 
confined to imaginary treatment, such as drama, epic, poetry, and fiction, 
as opposed to the utilitarian type of literature, such as history or 
philosophy or biography# Another definition describes it as imaginative 
literature, or works in which the aesthetic function is dominant#
(3) From Sidney to the New Critics
(a) Sidney refers to Sir Philip Sidney, English Neoclassic
critic-writer, whose An Apology for Poetry (1595) was one of the most 
significant pieces of criticism of the period, in that it was the first 
attempt in English literature to justify literature in face of medieval 
prejudice and the Puritan attack on drama as an immoral influence and 
provocateur of debauchery#
(b) New Critics is the term applied in the strict sense
• • . to the criticism written by John Crowe Pansom, Allen Tate,
R. P# Blackmur, Robert Penn Warren, and Cleanth Brooks, and it is 
derived from Ransom's book The ;New Criticism# published in 1941, 
which discussed the movement in America in the 1930's which 
paralleled movements in England led by critics like T. S. Eliot,
I. A, Richards, and William Empson# Generally the term is applied,
however, to the whole body of contemporary criticism which 'centers
its attention in the work of art as an object in itself; finds in 
it a special kind of language opposed to— or at least different 
from— the languages of science or philosophy; and examines it 
through a process of close analysis# The New Critics constitute 
the school in contemporary criticism which most completely employs 
the objective theory of art#23
Jean Piaget, Introduction a l 'epistAiologie genetique# 3 vols. 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), Vol. 1: La pensee mathé­
matique, pp. 15—16#
^%filliam Flint Thrall and Addison Hibbard, A Handbook to Literature, 
rev. ed#, rev# and enl# by C# Hugh Holman (New York: Odyssey Press, 1960), p#
314#
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Most of the terms used in the text will be self-explanatory, or 
explained as they occur. But there will be recurrent terms that it is 
advisable to now define:
(1) Poetry
Poetry is a. general term that will be used synonymously with that 
of literature. It was used by the ancients in reference to the epic, tra­
gedy, comedy and the lyric, and as a term goes back to the Greek word 
which signifies that which is imagined or created. It was used in this 
all-inclusive sense throughout the Renaissance, the periods of Neoclassi— 
cism and Romanticism, and even today carries this broad definition.
(2) Nature
As a term in literature nature has multiple meanings. For the 
purpose of this study, it will be used largely to denote the criteria by 
which literature is discussed— that is, its essence?— imitation of expres­
sion or structure; its content and form; and its function and value. Oc­
casionally, it will be used as a synonym of the word reason; and some­
times as a synonym of universe.
(3) Conception
As a term used in the statement of the problem and as one Implicit 
in the hypotheses, conception refers to literary criticism and literary 
theory, since it represents the mode of discussion which critics through 
the centuries have used to express their ideas and theories concerning the 
literary form and its nature.
Limitations of the Study
This study will be limited in the following ways:
(1) Both research of the history of literary criticism and its
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subsequent discussion will be limited as follows: They will focus on the
period of Neoclassicism in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, on the period of Romanticism in England in the nineteenth cen­
tury, and on the period of New Criticism, which began in England in the 
first decade of the twentieth century and shifted to the United States in 
the thirties. However, in order to provide a background for understand­
ing modem English and Anglo-American criticism, research and discussion 
will begin with the developments of criticism in antiquity; moreover, in 
order to bridge the gap between the close of Romanticism and the period 
of New Criticism, the critical activities that took place during that 
time will be summarized.
(2) The content will have the following restrictions:
(a) No writers and critics other than English and American 
will be emphasized.
(b) None but those most representative among the critics 
will be included,
(c) Literary genres and particular selections of literature 
will not receive emphasis; although they will be referred 
to as discussion and illustration demand.
(d) Biblical and medieval literary development will not be 
discussed, other than in passing, since they played but 
a minor role in modem literary development,
(3) The academic level to which this research addresses itself is
that of high school and college.
Organization of the Study 
The dissertation will be organized into the following six chapters, 
each of which bears its respective title:
Chapter
I. An Overview of the Study
II, The Evolution of Literature: From English Neoclassicism to the New
Criticism
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III. A Eeview of Jean Piaget’s Theories on Cognitive Development
iV. A Comparison between the Cognitive Thought of the Individual 
and English and Anglo-American Literary Thought
V. Moving from Perception to Thinking in Literature: A Cognitive
■Approach to Literature through Piaget’s INRC Matrix
VI. Summary, Conclusions, and Implications
CHAPTER II
THE EVOLUTION OF LITERATURE: FROM ENGLISH
NEOCLASSICISM TO THE NEW CRITICISM
Literature evolves in two ways: through those who write it and
those who speculate on it, each significantly affecting the other. And 
more often than not the two activities are pursued by the same individual, 
so that historically there have been in each age poets who speculate on 
the nature and value of literature and critics who exercise their creative 
powers. But double—agent or no, the question "What is literature?" is of 
first importance in a literature’s evolution and is primarily the business 
of the critic. It is he who probes deeply into the nature of literature 
and furnishes what he believes to be the answers for his time. Thus, it 
is through a knowledge of his concepts of literature and the concepts of 
those who either precede or follow him that the changes in literature’s 
nature during a particular time span may be inferred. But to account for 
the changes presents a problem for the historian. M. H. Abrams considers 
his task a difficult one, difficult for two reasons: For one thing, the
answers to the questions about literature do not agree; and, for another, 
the theories of many of these critics are so diverse that they can scarcely 
be compared; they are, in fact, incommensurable with one another, since 
they have no common denominator as a basis of discourse. But Abrams in 
his text The Mirror and the Lamp suggests a way of surmounting the problem:
21
22
The more promising method [he states] is to adopt an analytic 
scheme which avoids imposing its own philosophy, by utilizing 
those key distinctions which are already common to the largest 
number of theories to be compared, and then to apply the scheme 
warily, in constant readiness to introduce such further distinc­
tions as seem to be needed for the purpose in hand.
The "key distinctions" to which Abrams points are ones common to most
literary theories— namely, "the work, the artistic product itself"; "the
artist," the creator of the selection; "the universe," or the subject as
it exists in reality ("people and actions, ideas and feelings, material
things and events . . and "the audience; the listeners, spectators,
or readers to whom the work is addressed. . .
Each distinction, he further suggests, is a part of most compre­
hensive theories and is taken into account by them. However, one dis­
tinction is usually emphasized more than another, and when the emphasis 
falls more on that particular element than it does on the other three, 
that distinction colors the theory— thereby orienting it.
That is, a critic tends to derive from one of these terms his 
principal categories for defining, classifying, and analyzing 
a work of art, as well as the major criteria by which he judges 
its value. Application of this analytic scheme, therefore, will 
sort attempts to explain the nature and worth of a work of art 
into four broad classes. Three will explain the work of art 
principally by relating it to another thing: the universe, the
audience, or the artist. The fourth will explain the work by 
considering it in isolation, as an autonomous whole, whose sig­
nificance and value are determined without any reference beyond 
itself.2
And these orientations— universe, audience, artist, and work— allow for 
four broad types of literary theory which Abrams specifies as mimetic, 
pragmatic, expressive, and objective.
H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the
Critical Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 5-6.
^Ibid., pp. 6-7.
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For the purpose of this study, that is, to view literature his­
torically and observe how conceptions of its nature have changed from 
the Heoclassic period (the period in which English criticism has its in­
ception) to the period of New Criticism, Abrams' scheme will be applied 
— "warily," as he admonishes— adapting it to the needs of this history. 
Accordingly, it will follow that one of the four literary theories with 
its essential attribute will serve as the center from which a discussion 
of the literary views of a particular time-period can proceed. Chrono­
logically, the mimetic, as the most primitive theory, will come first in 
the evolution; positioned,thus, it will.serve as a necessary introduction 
to the history, necessary because as a theory oriented by the universe, 
it views literature as an imitation of the natural world (character, ac­
tions, events, etc.), the view held by such early Greeks as Plato and 
Aristotle, whose critical thinking has colored all literary speculation 
since their time.
Second in time is the pragmatic theory; it also sees literature 
as imitation, but now an imitation for a distinct purpose: for the in­
struction of the audience, the readers and listeners to whom it is ad­
dressed. Thus, literature’s role becomes pragmatic and the pragmatic 
theory, "ordering the aim of the artist'and the character of the work to 
the nature, the needs, and the springs of pleasure in the audience, 
characterizes by far the greatest part of criticism from the time of 
Horace through the eighteenth century."^
Next, the expressive theory, the predominant theory of the nine­
teenth century, has its seeds in the concepts of the Greek philosopher 
Longinus and puts the artist at the center of things, with literature seen
^Ibid., pp. 20-21.
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as the product of his creative force. But more than a product, it is a 
process which embodies his deepest felt thoughts and emotions.
And last is the objective theory, a theory which views litera­
ture as an entity within itself, an autonomous process independent of any 
externals, and which became the "reigning mode of literary criticism"^ in 
twentieth—century America between the thirties and sixties.
These four theories, as one supplants the other, offer one way to 
view the changes in the conception of literature as these changes pertain 
to English literature and to American literature of the twentieth-century.
The Mimetic Theory
Any understanding of English literature— its history and evolu­
tion— and in turn American literature, presupposes an understanding of 
literature as conceived by antiquity. For with Plato (427—347 B.C.) 
and then Aristotle (384—322 B. C.) criticism had its real beginning. To 
them alone goes the acclaim for having pointed the way to later ages: 
first, to the Hellenistic rhetoricians (323—30 B. C.), with their empha­
sis on words and syntax, an emphasis which anticipated the intrinsic ap­
proach of twentieth—century writer-critics; next, to the Roman poet Horace 
(65—8 B. C.), who was the first pragmatist and was to be a distinct in­
fluence on the Neoclassicists of seventeenth— and eighteenth-century Eng­
land; and then, to Longinus some five hundred years later, the first to 
submit an affective theory of literature— that subscribed to by nineteenth- 
century expressionism, and, last, to the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century 
Italian Humanist?, who were instrumental in passing on the classical tra­
dition to Renaissance and Neoclassical England. But, more particularly, 
these early Greeks were the first to deal critically with the term mimesis,
^Ibid., p. 28.
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defining it as an Imitation and legislating it as the place to begin in 
dealing with the nature of literature. So great is their influence, in 
fact, that up until the nineteenth century, mimesis played a dominant role 
in literary theory, even though "through most of the eighteenth century, 
the tenet that art is an imitation seemed almost too obvious to need iter­
ation or p r o o f . T h u s  for centuries the theory of the poetic process has 
been based on literature's tendency to imitate nature.
Plato's theory of the imitation of nature, however, was politically 
founded rather than aesthetically. He had no interest in literature or the 
poet per se; his concern, negatively preoccupied as it was, was not in 
literature as an art form but in literature and the poet as, first, a men­
ace to his ideal republic, in that literature as an imitation of the con­
crete world is thrice removed from truth and as such can influence young 
leaders to pattern themselves after low and disreputable characters; and, 
second, as a threat to philosophy, the valid teacher for his state, since 
philosophy derives from and calls on reason, whereas literature, to its 
detriment, both originates from emotions and initiates them.
bike Plato, Aristotle also subscribed to the mimetic theory, in 
which the poet uses nature as his model to imitate. His theory aestheti­
cally grounded, is "inductive and analytical," and rather than reducing
literature to the one standard— the general idea of the **good, the beauti—
6ful, and the true," as did Plato, Aristotle considered not its moral na­
ture but rather its physical. He regarded literature as he did any phe­
nomenon and broke it down into its parts. Indeed, the poet imitates na­
ture, but that in nature which he imitates is not man's character, as
^Ibid., p. 11.
®Hoyt Trowbridge, "Aristotle and the 'New Criticism,*" Sewanee Re- 
view 52 (October—December, 1944): 537, 538.
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with Plato, but man’s actions. This stance gave him in his system of 
classification three things to consider: the object of imitation, the
medium of imitation, and the manner. Although all types of literature 
with which in his time he was acquainted (tragedy, comedy, the epic, and 
the dithyramb [a lyric form most closely related to the ode and character­
ized by wild, excited, passionate language])came under his surveill­
ance, tragedy was the form he emphasized and plot became the "soul of . . . 
tragedy.”^ He approbated to plot this primacy because it gives tragedy 
its form and is the element, he felt, that marks the poet as creator. 
Therefore, beginning with the question of literature’s quiddity, he ar­
rived at his generalization that literature is an Imitation of nature that 
affords a peculiar pleasure; and, because it is a probable impossibility 
it more nearly speaks truth than an improbable possibility, thus giving 
it value as a knowledge form; moreover, because it shows great men re­
duced to adversity by the flaw common to all men’s natures, it affords 
catharsis with a subsequent release of feelings. These two reasons— the 
truth that literature speaks and the emotional release that it furnishes—  
answered the dilemma initiated by Plato over 2,500 years ago, when he in­
dicted literature as false, useless, and trivial, and which brought on 
apologies and defenses of poetry^ for centuries to come.
Sir Philip Sidney's An Apology for Poetry (1595) is just such a 
defense, and with its emergence in the late Renaissance as the first 
classic of English criticism, this work shows poet—critics, with Sidney
^Aristotle Poetics in Criticism: The Major Texts, ed. by Walter
Jackson Bate (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1952), p. 23,
®As pointed out in Chapter I, poetry is a general term, inter­
changeable in meaning with the term literature.
27
as a notable example, looking at literature in a new way. Of course,
the concept that art is imitation . . . [still] played an 
important part in neoclassic aesthetics; but closer in­
spection shows that it did not in most theories play the 
dominant part. Art, it was commonly said, is an imitation—  
but an imitation which is only instrumental toward produc­
ing effects upon an audience.9
The focus, therefore, had shifted from the mimetic theory of literature 
with the universe as the point of emphasis to the pragmatic theory in 
which the literary product takes on significance in terms of the ser­
vice it renders its readers. This theory was to predominate in English 
literature from early Neoclassic times through two centuries. But with 
the arrival oh the literary scene of Wordsworth's Preface to the Lyrical 
Ballads (1790), the expressive theory of literature took over and the 
poet commanded the spotlight. In its preeminence, however, were the 
seeds of its dissolution, and by the first quarter of the twentieth cen­
tury a new theory— the objective— had supplanted the expressive and had 
become firmly entrenched as the chief mode of Anglo-American criticism, 
mainly under the banner of the New Criticism, a criticism that saw the 
work as a heterocosm, as "an organism in action."
And throughout this evolution of theories the critic—writers of 
each age, bound by the influence of their time and the respective 
theory that oriented them, attempted to define literature. Armed with 
the statement, or statements, of its defining qualities— that is what 
each believed the very essence of literature to be, whether an imitation 
or an expression, or a structure— they then delineated its nature and
9Abrams, p; 14.
^^John Crowe Ransom, Beating the Bushes (New York: New Directions,
1952). p. 175.
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evaluated its worth in terms of two interrelated criteria: content and
form and function and value. And it is these characteristics— the defi­
nition of literature, its content'and form, and its function and value—  
which will serve as the framework for comparing the views these critics 
held concerning literature and for ascertaining the changes in conception 
as they occurred.
The Pragmatic Approach-— Neoclassical Period 
The Neoclassicists— Sir Philip Sidney (1554-1586),John Dryden 
(1631-1700), and Samuel Johnson (1709—1784)— saw form and content as sepa­
rate concepts. The poet, in their view, decides what he will say and then 
discovers a way to say it. Embracing the pragmatic position as they did, 
they believed that the audience is of first concern and the writer should 
bend his efforts toward reconstituting the reader in a moral fashion; hence 
the content should be drawn from such aspects of the world that will serve 
as a model of good and evil and the form should be of such delight and of 
such power that the reader will be moved by the lesson and govern his life 
accordingly. For each of them, then, the function of literature by ne­
cessity follows, as does its value. Within these general boundaries, of 
course, each critic approached the nature of literature in his own way, 
defining literature as he saw it, designating its content and form, and 
assigning it function and value as a corollary.
Sir Philip Sidney's definition of literature is set out in his An 
Apology for Poetry— an apology to answer Puritan hostility against any form
Sidney, although he lived and wrote during the last half of the 
Renaissance, is included here with seventeenth-century Neoclassicists be­
cause his An Apology for Poetry (1595), the one work that establishes him 
as a critic, expresses views that are neoclassic in tradition at a time when 
the pragmatic approach was establishing itself as the predominating theory 
in English literature.
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of art, based as It was on the Platonic indictment of poetry's false and
dangerous nature. As worded it is typically classical in concept:
Poesy [ he says ] . . . is an art of imitation, for so Aristotle 
termeth it in his word Mimesis. that is to say, a representing, 
counterfeiting, or figuring forth— to speak metaphorically, a 
speaking picture: with this end to teach and delight.^2
Although, out of context Sidney's view of poetry as imitation is like 
that of Aristotle, his view, as it emerges in the treatise, comes nearer 
to an ideal imitation than a representation of the concrete world. Where­
as Aristotle viewed the poet's model of imitation as a world of "things 
as they were or are, or things as they are said or thought to be, or 
things as they ought to be,"^^ and believed that the poet arrives at the 
universal through the particular by "[taking ] a philosophical view of 
things as they are." Sidney, on the other hand, concerned himself exclu­
sively with '"things as they ought to be,'" disregarding "' things as they 
were or are'" or as they are reported, and saw poetry as a product of di­
vine inspiration, giving "glimpses of an ideal and perfect w o r l d . H i s  
world is indeed a "golden" world and moves men to seek after virtue and 
depart from evil. And this "golden" world, not "brazen"— as is the world 
of actuality—
. . . can present ideal heroes so vividly that one will wish to 
imitate their virtues. [ Or ] it can present a/world in which virtue 
always triumphs and vice is always punished.
12Sir Philip Sidney, An Apology for Poetry,. in Criticism: The
Major Texts, ed. by Walter Jackson Bate (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co.,
1952), p. 85.
13Aristotle, p. 36.
14J. W. H. Atkins, English Literary Criticism: The Renascence
(London: Methuen and Co., 1947), p. 118.
, c . . .  .............
David Daiches, Critical Approaches to Literature (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice—Hall, 1955), p. 68.
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Thus, the content of Sidney's universe is ideal and furnishes 
the materials with which the poet works to fashion a world so vividly 
that thé reader is moved to imitate it. Bût no reader, so David Daiches 
comments, "is going to be 'moved' to imitate that world in his own behav­
ior unless it be presented with such life and passion that he finds it 
irresistible." In other words, "the delight which the reader has in read­
ing of this ideal world and in responding to its vitality depends not only 
on content but also on form and s t y l e , a l be i t  the two are separated.
And if this world, where goodness prevails and evil receives its just re­
wards, is one of poetic justice, then, poetry teaches by presenting it and 
is, as Horace told Roman readers more than a thousand years earlier in his 
Art of Poetry, both dulce et utile, dulce meaning, of course, that its 
sweetness derives from the inspiration that it gives man to realize his 
divine destiny. Most assuredly, therefore, with such views on content and 
form, Sidney subscribed to the function of poetry as being that of didactic 
instruction.
It would follow, then, that if poetry's function is to teach moral 
values, its inestimable value is that of the supreme knowledge form, ex­
ceeding history and even philosophy as knowledge. Aristotle had already 
made clear that poetry surpasses history by being more philosophical in 
that "not being tied down to actual specific happenings," as history is, 
it is able "to concentrate more on the general pattern and general meaning 
of things." But Sidney went a step further. He maintained that it exceeds 
the value that philosophy has as a teacher. "If [it] is 'more philosophi­
cal' than history, it is more effective than philosophy because it gives
^^Ibid., p. 66.
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17concrete body to the general truth it is disclosing." Sidney writes:
For in outward things, to a man that had never seen an elephant or 
a rhinoceros, who should tell him most exquisitely all their shapes, 
colour, bigness, and particular marks. . . might well make the 
hearer able to repeat by rote, all he had heard, yet should never 
satisfy his inward conceits with being witness to itself of a true 
lively, knowledge.
But, Sidney explains, should that same man see the animal "illuminated or 
figured forth by the speaking picture of Poesy," he would not need a word- 
ish description "to a judicial comprehending of it. . . In short,
memorizing exactly and then repeating by rote the description of an object 
can never give so clear an idea of it as a single picture. Poetry, then, 
by evoking the concrete experience within the general truth gives deeper 
insights and "insinuates knowledge more thoroughly into the heart." And 
this general truth that poetry presents gives imaginative writing a forma­
tive, educational value that no other discipline can match. And, accord­
ing to Bate, in making this claim for poetry, Sidney
. . .  reverted to the basic classical conviction that the knowledge 
which is of the greatest value, the knowledge which is most truly 
known and possessed, is that which has entered into one so completely 
that it has really enlarged one's way of feeling and thinking. 1®
But perhaps the greatest value that poetry possesses is its unique 
ability to offer man a better world. Indeed, the world that the poet 
creates is superior to "the real one and is presented in such a way that 
the reader is stimulated to try and imitate it in his own practice.
For it gives him "ideal heroes . . .  vividly portrayed" as a model for 
his own behavior. Like Aeneas, he too can "be found in excellency fruit­
ful": in all circumstances— " in storms,. . , in sports, . . .  in war, . . .
in peace," in victory or in defeat; in actions to strangers, friends.
^^Walter Jackson Bate, ed.. Criticism: The Major Texts (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1952), p. 80.
^^Sidney, p. 89. ^^Bate, p. 80. ^^Daiches, p. 59.
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enemies, family; and in his own inward and "outward g o v er n m en t .T h us  by 
imitation, he can make of himself a more forthright person. Also by vi­
cariously entering this ideal world, he is uplifted from the ugliness of 
the real world. He can, moreover, enjoy poetic justice, where the wicked 
are always punished and the virtuous, rewarded. Or he can see "a world 
in which evil, whether it triumphs or not, is made to appear so ugly that 
the reader will in future always wish to avoid it.”
In his Apology, then, Sidney vindicated the quality of the world
created by poets against the charges of the Puritans by showing it as an
"alternative to reality, one in every way superior.” For Sidney, perhaps,
this was literature's ultimate worth, one that surpassed all others. And
it is worth noting that "while Sidney was replying to a Puritan attack on
poetry, he . . .  was a Puritan himself. He was also . . .  a neo-Platonist,
a humanist, and a poet. His defense of poetry [is] a noble attempt to com-
23bine all three positions."
Like Horace, he was typically pragmatic. He saw poetry as dulce
et utile, but the blend of sweetness and delight was a consequence of poe­
try’s instructive value, that is, "the moral effect was the terminal aim."^^ 
Whereas,
Aristotle’s Poetics had been a declaration of independence for poetry 
as well as a justification of it; Sidney is content to achieve the 
latter at the expense of the former. And if— with some justice— we 
think Sidney’s position naive, we might remember that from his day to 
ours the vast majority of readers of imaginative literature have taken 
substantially his view and generally applied it with less cunning and 
sensitivity.25
A later Neoclassicist who also subscribed to the pragmatic theory- 
viewing literature as a form of instruction— was John Dryden, traditionally
21Sidney, p. 95. ^^Daiches, p. 69. ^^xbid., pp. 58, 70.
24 ’ 2SAbrams, p. 16. Daiches, p. 72.
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considered the father of English Criticism. Though he was a pragmatist, 
unlike Sidney, he was not preoccupied with vindicating literature's 
worth— an understandable attitude in view of the respectable standing 
that literature, with the exception of drama, had acquired for itself by 
this time. More practical than theoretical^ Dryden tended rather to dis­
cuss specific matters, usually matters of technique and method.
This casual and personal method of writing criticism is most
aptly illustrated in the one work considered his "only formal work of
c rit i ci s m, t he  Essay of Dramatic Poetry. As revealed in the Essay,
Dryden begins his investigation with the nature of literature. And to
apprehend its nature, he defines it as an imitation, the predominant aim
of which is to delight and instruct. More specifically, however, the
definition which appears in this work describes a play as
a just and lively image of human nature, representing its passions 
and humours, and the changes of fortune„to which it is subject, for 
the delight and instruction of mankind.
With this definition, then, Dryden identifies his idea of the true nature 
of literature. It is an imitation of the concrete world. However, the 
world he sees as the object of imitation is not the "golden" world of 
Sidney, where its ideal heroes—-portrayed so vividly that they move the 
audience to imitate their virtues— people a world in which good always 
triumphs and evil is put down. Rather, he sees literature's model of imi­
tation as human nature, every aspect of its emotional and mental state, 
its ups and downs, its "changes of fortune." And this definition, with 
its model of imitation, wherein human nature is seen as reacting to the 
experiences of life, describes essentially the nature of poetry.
^^George Watson, The Literary Critics:. A Study of English De­
scriptive Criticism (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 37.
John Dryden, An Essay of Dramatic Foetry,in Criticism: The Major
Texts, ed. by Walter Jackson Bate (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952), p. 132.
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But this definition does more than sustain the Aristotelian • 
theory of mimesis. It incorporates Horace’s dictum that poetry is sweet 
and also instructive, and with this double purpose, indicates the con­
sciousness on Dryden’s part of literature’s content and form, even though 
he sees them as separate entities. The content, of course-— being the con­
crete world— is composed of Aristotle’s ’’things as they were or are.”
But more particularly, literature’s subject matter is that of the world 
where human nature is shown in all its glory and ignominy, caught as it 
were in a web of circumstances that reveal the mutability of life and 
man’s ability, or inability, to cope with its uncertainties, these being 
the ultimate test ’’that illuminates character.” And characteristic of 
the undemocratic age in which Dryden lived, only that segment of human 
nature which could possibly qualify for imitation is the ’’’great*” natures, 
for only these represent an ’’external impressiveness,” and only these— a 
Hamlet, an Alexander the Great, a Cleopatra— ’’whose fate involves more 
than their own domestic f o r t u n e s , a r e  caught in situations acceptable 
for the literary imagination. This, then, making up the doctrinal con­
tent, is the concrete world, the subject matter of ’’things as they were 
or are,” that part of Aristotle’s theory generally accepted at the': timie.
But later Dryden is to extend his ideas to include the rest of 
Aristotle’s theory, namely that the poet might also imitate ’’things as 
they are said or thought to be” and ’’things as they ought to be.” En­
larging the scope of imitation, therefore, would free the writer to imi­
tate native tales and legends.
’’Poets [he states] may be allowed the liberty for describing 
things which exist not, if they are founded on popular beliefs.
^^Daiches, pp. 74, 76-77.
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Of this nature are fairies, pigmies and the extraordinary ef­
fects of magic; for ’tis still an imitation, though of other 
men^s fancies; and thus are Shakespeare’s Tempest and his Mid­
summer Night’s Dream,. • . to be defended."
With the inclusion in his criticism of this clause of Aristotle’s
theory, Dryden did two things for literature: he indicted; those of
Hobbesian persuasion who would confine the writer to the stricture of
versimilitude and he "commended supra-natural themes, including ’the
fairy ways of writing’, to which coherent and convincing form had been
given." More than this, he became specific in his defense by speaking
out for the practices of Skaespeare.
Also, the writer, by imitating ’'things as they ought to be," the 
remaining clause in Aristotle’s theory, can portray an ideal imitation.
In this view, however, Dryden, contrary to Sidney and his ideal represen­
tation, conceives of Nature as being "subject to change and decay," a 
process that she tries to correct and a process that the poet in turn 
imitates. In explanation, Atkins says:
Yet Nature.ever strives to correct these defects by aiming at 
perfection in all her creations; and art in like manner imitates 
the creative processes.of Nature in also striving to represent 
things in that ideal form. Hence in poetry . . an idealized 
form of life and humanity is depicted; we see therein ’ the scat­
tered beauties of Nature united by a happy chemistry, without 
its deformities or faults’.
Thus, the universe that Dryden offers for imitation allows the poet a wide
range of subject matter.
There is, however, also the matter of form. And the definition- 
including as it does a two—part aim— implies that human nature must be 
presented in a pleasing manner and the style must be "lively": it will
O Û   ; '
J. W. H. Atkins, English Literary Criticism; 17th and 18th 
Centuries (New York: Bames and Noble, 1950), p. . 111. (Hereinafter referred
to as Criticism: 17th and 18th Centuries),
3°Ibid., p. 112.
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delight and in so doing will instruct. This directive, therefore, leads 
to certain inferences about form and style: Namely, it must be of such
a nature that the content, or the psychological knowledge inherent in • 
the content, is palatable— in other words, Dryden endorsed Sidney’s doc­
trine of "food for the tenderest s t o m a c h s . e f f e c t  the trans­
mission of this psychological realism, the poet who creates is one who 
"works under the control of a higher r e a s o n , w h i l e  at the same time he 
is conscious of technique and methods. This view then brings up the ques­
tion of Dryden’s stand on the controversial issue of the times— that of
models and their imitation. Briefly, he believed— and this is in accord—
33ance with Longinian doctrine to which he was exposed through Boileau—  
that imitation, whether based on classical, French, or native models, is 
a "process of the spirit," both inspiring and illuminating. In his pre­
face to Troilus and Cressida. he explains:
"Those great men whom we propose to ourselves as patterns of our 
imitation, serve us as a torch . . .  to enlighten our passage, 
and often elevate our thoughts as high as the conception we have 
of our author’s g e n i u s . "^4
31Sidney, p. 90.
^^Atkins, Criticism: 17th and 18th Centuries, p. 15.
33This doctrine is expressed in a treatise entitled On the Sublime. 
According to Bate in Criticism: The Major Texts, pp. 59—62, it is believed
to have been written by a certain Greek rhetorician Longinus sometime in the 
first century, A. D., "[stressing] the extent to which emotional intensity 
and imaginative power are innate and ’beyond the reach of art’ and of rules."
This is not to say, however, that "genius is degraded by rules" and art is 
a "mere self-expression, uninhibited and ’unballasted’ with knowledge." This 
work was "virtually unknown until it was published during the Renaissance (1554)," 
after which it was translated into Latin and other languages. It was the 
translation of Boileau (1674), the famous French Neoclassicist, however, that 
influenced the thinking of Dryden.
^^Atkins, Criticism: 17th and 18th Centuries. pp. 15, 113.
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To explain his theory of form, Dryden sets up three general head­
ings to direct the discussion: "inventlo [invention], dispositio [ar­
rangement], and elocutio [expression].'* The invention of subject matter, 
he says, is a matter of genius; no rules are possible in this respect.
As for arrangement, however, rules are not wanting. A poem or play should 
be a unit, "free from irrelevancies or trifling ornaments.” And, in re­
gard to a play, the protagonist, or main character, should be made promi­
nent, that is, he should be "placed in the foreground with minor charac­
ters (or episodes) in support; the passion besides should be discreetly 
handled; while the use of contrast [is] also said to be effective • . .” 
Moreover, expression, or style, "an element in poetry which he frequently 
[compares ] to the colouring in a picture . . . should be skillfully 
varied”: in some passages of a work, it should be made colorful by meta­
phorical and musical language "and neat turns of thought"; whereas in
other passages, the language should be free of ornaments and "couched in 
35a;quieter vein."
But so much for rules. Dryden closes this discussion of poetic
form by pointing out that these aspects should not be belabored, for too
studied an application of technique in style will produce a form both un­
inspired and mechanical.
"A work [writes Dryden] may be over-wrought as well as underwrought;
too much labour often takes away the spirit by adding to the polish­
ing, so that there remains nothing but a dull correctness, a piece 
without any considerable faults but with few beauties; for when the 
spirits are drawn off there is nothing left but a caput mortuum." ^
Thus,
". . . since moral teaching, it is said, is the chief business of the 
poet, his first task [is] to decide on the moral to be conveyed. This
p. 114. ®̂Ibid.
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[will] direct the whole action to one centre; after which a 
suitable theme [will ] suggest itself , together with charac­
ters, thoughts and style in keeping with the t h e m e . "37
Here it is worth noting that contained in these words is an obtrusive ex­
ample of Dryden's conception of content and form as separate elements, a 
primitive and mechanical view in terms of modem critical theory. For him, 
apparently, with his eye on instruction, the tune to be played is inventio, 
dispositio... and elocutio.
Such then are Dryden's theories concerning the nature and art of 
peotry in general; and just as his definition explained the essential 
nature of drama and implied the separation of content andform, so too did 
it indicate literature's function. The story must at the same time please 
and instruct. Literature thus is not a pleasure all its own. It must be 
justified as to function, that function being the transmission of infor­
mation— the delineation for the audience of the depths of human nature, 
its virtues and vices, in a style both interesting and lively. According 
to Daiches,
literature[then] would be a form of knowledge, and it would bear 
the same relation to psychology as it does in Sidney to ethics.
That is, while for Sidney the poet makes vivid and impressive, by 
his imaginary examples, the ideas of the moral philosopher, so for 
Dryden the poet makes vivid and impressive, by imaginary examples, 
the knowledge of the psychologist.
Still, in his definition Dryden put "delight" before "instruction'v" and
from his time on "through the eighteenth century" most critics viewed
pleasure as "the ultimate end, although poetry without profit was often
thought to be trivial, . . ."39
But apart from his definition, Dryden also refers to poetry as
pleasure in his essay "Parallel of Poetry and Painting" (1695). Abrams
quotes him as saying:
^^Ibid., p. 118 ^^Daiches, p. 75. Abrams, p. 16.
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"Having thus shewn that imitation pleases, and why it pleases 
in both these arts, it follows, that some rules of imitation 
are necessary to obtain the end; for without rules there can 
be no art, any more than there can be a house without a door 
to conduct you into it."
The word end here is equal to the pleasure that imitation affords.
Hence, Dryden is saying that pleasure is the terminal aim. Apparently, 
with Daiches and Abrams there is a variance of opinion as to the func­
tion of poetry as revealed by Dryden*s thought. And earlier Atkins 
quoted Dryden as stating that "the chief business of the poet" is that 
of "moral teaching." Here then are three theories concerning Dryden's 
view of the chief aim of literature: to instruct morally, to Instruct
psychologically, to give pleasure. Perhaps Dryden himself had no clear- 
cut opinion on the matter, a second-guessing matter which might be 
settled by compromise— namely, what the "optamist moralist" of neoclassic 
tradition believed: "that if poetry instructs, it only pleases the more
effectually."^*^
But however it may be— delight or instruction— the function and 
value of literature are interrelated aspects. And for Dryden, literature’s 
worth is tied up with the infinite scope of its subject matter; for as an 
imitation it ranges from human nature ("things as they were or are") to 
legends ("things as they are, said to be") to ideal nature ("things as they 
ought to be"). Thus, it offers man many worlds in which to explore, to 
leam, and to take delight. The epic, the form for which Dryden had a pre­
dilection, offers the value to be derived from "perfect" heroes as models 
for one’s actions; and, as opposed to tragedy, it is a form that lends it­




. . .it insinuates itself in insensible degrees into the 
liking of the reader; the more he studies it the more it grows 
upon him; every time he takes it up he discovers some new graces 
in it . . , works such as this are like the diamond, the more 
they are polished'the more lustre they receive.
However, the value Dryden accorded literature is shown more by 
his actions than his words. He spent a lifetime at writing and his out­
put was volumnious. He "wrote in so many different literary genres*— di­
dactic poetry, satire, the lyric, poetic drama, and critical prose—  
eighteenth-century England looked back on him as the first great model 
of English classicism." But he has another "first" to his credit. Be­
cause "he wrote so much more critical prose . . .  than any other English
man—of-letters before him, the eighteenth century looked back upon him as
42the virtual founder of serious English criticism." In fact, Samuel 
Johnson, the eighteenth—century critic whose views will immediately fol­
low, spoke out in this regard: "’Dryden . . .  may be properly considered
as the father of English criticism, as the writer who first taught us to 
determine upon principles the merit of composition.’"^^
But if Dryden was considered the "father of English criticism" 
by the eighteenth century. Dr. Samuel Johnson (1709—1784), who paid him 
this tribute, was to enjoy an equally venerable position in the realm of 
criticism. In his work The Literary Criticism; A Study of English Descrip­
tive Criticism (1962), George Watson speaks of him as " . . . our first 
great scholar-critic."^^ Johnson's approach to literature "is based on 
Nature, the watchword and controlling idea of eighteenth—century thought
The conception of Nature had coloured contemporary speculation 
in the fields of religion, philosophy, politics and to some extent
^^Atkins, Criticism: 17th and 18th Centuries, p. 131*
^^Bate, p. 123. ^^Abrams, pp. 16—17. ^^Watson, p. 93.
^^Atkins, Criticism: 17th and 18th Centuries, p. 279.
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literature; since its laws, those of reason, were regarded as 
fixed and stable, the one sure foundation in an age of conflict­
ing ■ thought.
Therefore, on this foundation, the foundation of the ancients, Johnson 
rests the framework of his literary doctrine, so that its main structure 
is determined by the principles of "order, proportion, fitness, per­
spicuity, and the like," principles inherent in Nature as well as in 
human nature and "embodying qualities satisfying to the mind of rational 
man." And it is this strong belief in Nature and reason that led Johnson 
to reject the strict creed of the neoclassical school, which "required an 
imitation of the ancients, the recognition of certain fixed 'kinds’ origi­
nated in antiquity, as well as an observance of rules ostensibly derived 
from the ancients." Nowhere, however, did he "[expound] his theory in 
complete or systematic form . . ."^6 fact, "the general cast of his
mind is vigorously anti-theoretical"; this is not to say, though, that he 
had no critical theories. He was, as Watson abserves, simply "averse to 
arguing them at length." Rather his speculations, when he formalized 
them, gave him freedom to range— "to praise what he [liked] and condemn 
what he [ did] not like," and they "[led] him directly into descriptive 
criticism." The Preface to his edition of Shakespeare (1765) serves as 
a good example of his method of indirection, whereby one type of criti­
cism sheltered another type. "The Preface is in essence a brilliant ex­
ercise in descriptive criticism [embodying] . . .  a major essay in theo­
retical criticism . . And it is this work and scattered comments
and remarks from other works that reveal the significance of his judgments.
In like manner, Daiches refers to the inclusive quality of the
Preface:
^®Ibid., pp. 275, 279. '^^Watson, pp. 87, 99, 90.
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Though this is a discussion of Shakespeare and not a theoretical 
treatise on poetics, it is by implication also a statement of , 
the nature and value of drama and of literary fiction generally.
This statement anticipates an exploration of Johnson’s views.while at.
the same time it offers a place to start. The Preface, then, as the
starting point, is fertile ground— one quotation in particular— from
which certain inferences can be drawn concerning Johnson's thought on
the nature of literature— its definition, its content and form, and its
function and value. In praising Shakespeare's art, Johnson says':
Nothing can please many and please long but just representation 
of general nature. .
Appearing early in the Preface, this pronouncement is heavy with impli­
cation. For one thing, it defines a play as an imitation of "general" 
nature and one that must be "just." Reminiscent of Dryden's requirement 
that a play give "a just and lively image of human nature," it prescribes 
rather that the nature to be imitated be that of a general quality. 
Daiches explains this "general quality" by saying that
general nature is for Johnson what is found in most people in most 
ages— it is, one might almost say, a statistical rather than a 
philosophic concept. Its opposite is the idiosyncratic, the be­
havior of only a few people in a few times or places. Yet it 
would be unfair to say that this statistical concept is not at the 
same time philosophical, for. Dr. Johnson would maintain, what is 
most common is most typical and most revealing of human nature as 
it really is. Reality and generality are in a sense identified: 
what is most general is what is most r e a l . 50
From this view must follow the belief in the immutability of human nature,
the implication being that literature is concerned with traits that are .
Daiches, p. 81
49Samuel Johnson, "Preface to Shakespeare," in Criticism; The 




common to all men of all times and excluding particularities, presents
reality- Shakespeare, Johnson says, holds up a "faithful mirrour of 
51manners and life." For Johnson, it would seem, poetic truth and "general" 
truth are synonymous.
But more can be gleaned from Johnson’s statement than the view 
that literature is an imitation of general nature, and as such, is what 
literature tends "naturally" to be. It also, by implying literature’s 
two-part aim of instruction and delight, reveals Johnson’s awareness of 
content and form, and like Sidney and Dryden, he sees them as separate ele­
ments. To be sure, literature that teaches must have something to teach, 
a meaning to convey. Thus Johnson is concerned with what is taught, and 
the subject matter the writer selects must be of a general nature in order 
to effect the aim. In Rasselas he has Imlac point out what the writer 
must do. He must, Imlac asserts:
" . . .  examine not the individual, but the species; to remark 
general properties and large appearances; he does not number the 
streaks of the tulip, or describe the different shades in the ver­
dure of the forest. He is to exhibit in his portraits of nature 
such prominent and striking features as recall the original to 
every mind, and must neglect the minuter discriminations, which 
one may have remarked and another have neglected, for those charac­
teristics .which are alike obvious to vigilance and carelessness."^^
In other words, the heroes that are presented in a play should "act accord­
ing to the general laws of human nature. They are not demigods or super­
men, but men, whom we recognize as fellow human beings," The poet de­
cides what aspect of general nature he will imitate and then devises a 
technique; hence, matter and manner are conceived of separately.
51Johnson, "Preface," p. 208.
52Samuel Johnson, "Rasselas," in Criticism: The Major Texts, ed.
by Walter Jackson Bate (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952), p. 206.
53Daiches, p. 84.
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However, a preoccupation with the general at the expense of the 
particular, and choosing the content first, does not mean that in paint­
ing with such a wide brush the method is a secondary concern, Johnson's . 
statement— "Nothing can please many and please long,but just representa­
tion of general nature"— makes this clear. For literature that gives 
pleasure implies concern for form and technique. And no one knew better 
than Johnson that realism cannot be achieved in literature by portraying 
card—board, characters generalized by abstraction. "Johnson's praise of 
Shakespeare’s psychological realism is by implication a recognition of 
the importance of the particular, through which the general must be pre­
sented."^^ In other words, Shakespeare through his art— his ability to 
create the psychological plausibility of characters as they speak and act 
— illuminates general human nature. His protagonists are men acting like 
men, with whom the audience can identify; men speaking like men: "men
[in fact] who act and speak as the reader thinks that he should himself 
have spoken or acted on the same occasion.
So it is that
style and plot contribute to the effect of reality, to the illu­
sion that here are real people acting as they do in real life, 
while at the same time their behavior illuminates those general 
aspects of human nature which, Johnson insists, are the true con­
cern of the poet.56'
And it is the pleasing style that delivers the effects.
Thus fax, Johnson's statement reveals his views on the essential 
nature of literature and his aesthetic awareness of content and form. Im­
plicit in the statement also is his feeling about literature’s aim. Like 
Sidney and Dryden, he too adopts the edict of dulce et utile and ascribes 
to literature and the writer a dual function: instruction and pleasure.
^^Daiches, p. 84. ^^Johnson, "Preface," p. 209 ^^Daiches, p. 83.
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Literature, therefore, is a form of instruction on the grounds that the 
dramatist presents a "just and lively” imitation of human nature. But for 
Johnson it is a general human nature that is to be presented, so that 
"from this wide extension of design . . . much instruction[ may be] de­
rived.”
It is this [ Johnson states ] which fills the plays of Shakespeare 
with practical axioms and domestic wisdom. It was said of Eurip­
ides, that every verse was a precept; and it may be said of Shakes­
peare, that from his works may be collected a system of civil oeco— 
nomical [ sic ] prudence. Yet his real power is not shô -m in the 
splendour of particular passages, but by the progress of his fable, 
and the tenour of his dialogue; and he that tries to recommend him 
by select quotations, will succeed like the pedant in Hierocles, 
who, when he offered his house to sale, carried a brick in his poc­
ket as a specimen.
But to further extend his function as a teacher, the writer must
know more than the nature of man. He must know the conditions, the manners,
the customs of Everyman. In Rasselas, Imlac, in speaking of the poet, says:
"He must divest himself of the prejudices of his age or country; 
he must consider right and wrong in their abstracted and invari­
able state; he must disregard present laws and opinions, and rise 
to general and transcendental truths which will always be the same 
. . .  He must write as the Interpreter of nature and legislator 
of mankind and consider himself as presiding over the thoughts 
and manners of future generations, as a being superior to time
and place."58
To his audience, then, the poet does offer instruction; he is the one who 
shows his reader "a faithful mirrour of manners and life,”^^ whereby he 
can profit by the deeds of good and virtuous men and avoid the heartbreak 
and disgrace of those who pursue evil ways. And to do all this, the poet 
must be a gifted "superior" creature, one who can transcend "time and 
place."
^^Johnson, "Preface," p. 209 ^^Johnson, "Rasselas,” p. 207,
^^Johnson, "Preface," p. 208,
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But literature via the writer also has the aim of transmitting 
pleasure. It is a form of pleasure because it "can please many and please 
long." This part of Johnson's statement, then, attributes a delight in 
connection with literature's function. In other words, not only must the 
audience be shown the truth, it also must experience pleasure in this show­
ing forth. It is incumbent on the poet-, therefore, if he is to present a 
"lively image,” to cultivate an effective style. His expression must be 
clear and simple, free from the ornaments of epithets, "needless inver­
sions, and harsh and daring f igures, all of which [militate ] against 
natural u t t e r a n c e . H e  must use nothing but general terms— only these 
can reveal truths general and transcendental.
And to test literature's function as pleasure, Johnson submits it 
to the laws of '"reason"' or "'nature'" or "'experience '"— all applied in 
such a way that the pleasure of the audience is sure to be evoked. And 
his predilection for reason leads him to decry a number of neoclassical 
rules, pointing to their futility, and to deplore dependence upon the 
"overrated classic models and the general failure of writers to distin­
guish between laws of nature and mere conventions."^^ Hence, the writer 
who can call forth pleasure in his readers will want, as Johnson writes 
in Rambler No. 156: ". . . to distinguish nature from custom; or that
which is right only because it is established."^^
As for the function of literature, Johnson does not leave his posi­
tion about its aim undeclared. He specifically states in the Preface that
60Atkins, Criticism: 17th and 18th Centuries, p. 280.
William K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Cleanth Brooks,'Literary Criticism: 
A Short History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), p. 326.
^^Bate, p. 202.
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"the end of writing is to instruct; the end of poetry is to instruct by 
pleasing." At a later point he adds, "the greatest graces of a play are 
to copy nature and instruct life." And worth noting is the fact that his 
definition of instruction is moral instruction, an attitude that becomes 
quite clear when he discusses Shakespeare's faults;
His first defect is that to which may be imputed most of the 
evil in books or in men. He sacrifices virtue to convenience, and 
is so much more careful to please than instruct, that he seems to 
write without moral purpose.63
Needless to say, this aberration— Shakespeare or no— would go against all 
of Johnson's principles as a literary critic. For, if any one thing, his 
criticism "rests on the classical conviction that the aim of art . . .  is 
the mental and moral enlargement of manj and that art attains this end 
through a moving and imaginative presentation of t r u t h . H e n c e ,  John­
son's views about the nature of literature, that is what it imitates, are 
indeed bound up with what the abilities and duties of the poet should be 
and the function and value literature has as a conveyor of truth.
A final consideration in connection with Johnson's views on the 
nature of literature is the value he assigns literature. Like Dryden, he 
saw literature as a knowledge form, deriving its value from its ability 
to illustrate and illuminate human nature and deriving its pleasure from 
"seeing human nature thus illustrated and Illuminated;.« . and from the 
incidental beauties of expression which the poet e m p l o y s . A l l  accord­
ing to the laws of Nature and reason of course.
With Johnson the Neoclassical period came to rest. It was a long 
period, representing approximately two centuries of concentrated specu­
lation that demonstrated a growing sophistication on the part of critical
^^Johnson, "Preface,"p. 212.. ^^Bate, p. 199. ®^Daiches, p. 84.
48
endeavors. Bate points out the direction that neoclassic criticism had 
taken:
By the close of the seventeenth century neoclassic theory [had] 
attained its most complete form, with its trust in system and 
method, its emphasis on "correctness" in structure and style, 
its feeling of superiority to the ancients, and its belief that 
its rules are grounded on the "law of nature."
But, "almost in direct reaction to this extreme neoclassic rationalism" 
there was a growing "tendency toward an emotional conception of taste—  
a tendency to rest it upon feeling," so that it might be said that 
" . . .  the eighteenth century began with the belief that man's distinc­
tive nature is his reason, [but ] it ended with a common belief that what 
is 'natural' in man is his feelings. T h u s  the period which saw litera­
ture as an imitation of the universe, saw content and form as separate en­
tities and function and value as instruction and pleasure, the period 
which oriented all critical tenets to a theory that held the poet account­
able to the audience— this period anticipated before its close an affec­
tive theory in which the poet and his feelings occupied the center from 
which nineteenth-century thought would proceed.
The Expressive Approach— Romantic Period 
With the advent of the Romantic Period (1798-1860), the second 
period in this evolution, there was in literature, philosophy, art, re­
ligion, and politics a marked reaction to and departure from the formal, 
orthodox rational spirit of Neoclassicism to one characterized by liberal­
ism, freedom of expression, and emotion.
In English literature, the period of Romanticism begins with 
William Wordsworth's Lyrical Ballads (1798) and is the time that the
66Bate, pp. 10, 270.
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expressive theory in criticism predominated. This theory puts the poet
at the "center of all life and all experience," hence
. . . the center of art, making literature most valuable as an 
expression of his [the poet's] unique feelings and particular 
attitudes and valuing its accuracy in portraying his experiences, 
however fragmentary and incomplete, more than it values its ad­
herence to completeness, unity, or the demands of genres. It 
places a high premium upon the creative function of the imagina­
tion, seeing art as a formulation of intuitive imaginative per­
ceptions that tend to speak a nobler truth than that of fact, 
logic, or the here and now.“^
The expressive theory finds its spirit most clearly defined with 
such nineteenth-century poet-critics as William Wordsworth and Samuel Tay­
lor Coleridge. And just as with the Weoclasslcists who were guided by 
Horace, the system of thought for the Romantics found its roots in that 
of the ancient Longinus, who believed that "the purpose of literature is 
to be moving, exciting, elevating, transporting and that the "author must 
possess certain qualities as a man as well as certain skills as a writer."®® 
Wordsworth and Coleridge, too, attempted to define literature and to dis­
cover its nature by considering its content and form as well as its func­
tion and value.
William Wordsworth (1770-1850), the first great English Romantic, 
looked to the poet's feelings as the "center of critical reference and by 
so doing marked a turning point in English literary history,"®^ a time 
when the preponderance of critical activities shifted its focus from the 
audience as the central concern to the poet and his mental faculties. And 
Wordsworth, according to Daiches, was the first English poet of note "to
®^William Flint Thrall and Addison Hibbard, A Handbook to Litera­
ture, rev. ed., rev. and enl. by C. Hugh Holman (New York: Odyssey Press,
1960), pp. 431-32.
68 69Daiches, p. 48. Abrams, p. 103.
50
explain, defend, and define poetry by asking how it is p r o d u c e d . I n  
attempting to come to terms with this question, he set forth in the Pre­
face to the second edition of the Lyrical Ballads (1800) his principal 
theories.
Unlike critics before him, he dismissed the idea of mimesis as the 
essence of poetry. For him, poetry through the imagination was both a 
product and a process of the poet's mind. Rather than its being an imi­
tation or representation of the concrete world, it was a "concrete and 
sensuous illustration of both a fact and a relationship which provides 
pleasure and at the same time shows the universal Importance of pleasure. 
Moreover, he saw it as "[having] its inception in passionate utterance—  
rather than, as Aristotle had assumed [ as had Sidney, Dryden, and Johnson;], 
in an instinct for imitation.
In exploring his beliefs, Wordsworth's method is defensive, but 
it is not a defense of poetry, not a concern for the dilemma posed by 
Plato. Rather the formulations of his theoretical assumptions are a self- 
defense, an attempt to explain his deep-felt insights. The one thing, • 
however, on which he stands firm and to which he remains true is his con­
cept of the word nature, and on this concept his critical principles rest. 
But his concept of nature is a more inclusive term than it was for Johnson* 
For Wordsworth,
nature . . .  means all those aspects of the physical world— the 
elements, the seasons, rural life— through which the truth of 
universal harmony and order is given beautiful and permanent form.
Human nature instinctively responds to those forms; therefore, the 
best human condition is one in which man is most directly exposed 
to the bénéficient powers of nature and freed of artificial, in­
tellectual, and social barriers to natural feelings.
^^Daiches, p. 90. ^^Daiches, p. 96 ^^Abrams, p. 101
^^Daniel G. Hoffman and Samuel Hynes, eds., English Literary Criti­
cism: Romantic and Victorian (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), p. 11.
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As would be expected, therefore, most of the remarks Wordsworth 
makes about the poetic process are bound up in the view he takes of man 
and nature together. Various definitions run throughout the Preface,
One defines poetry as "the image of man and nature"; another, as "the 
breath and finest spirit of all knowledge; . . .  the impassioned ex­
pression which is in the countenance of all Science"; and still another 
defines poetry as "the first and last of all knowledge—  . . .  as im­
mortal as the heart of man."^^ Thus from these definitions which ex­
press the harmony of this relationship between man and nature evolve his 
theories of the nature of poetry.
Poetry, then, a process and product of the poet’s mind (rather
than an imitation) has as its fit subject the
"humble and rustic life"; . . .  for there "the essential passions 
of the heart" are less restrained, simpler, and more "durable"; 
they may therefore be "more accurately contemplated"; and also 
in this state "the passions of men are incorporated with the 
beautiful and permanent forms of Nature."
This tendency toward "romantic naturalism" which Wordsworth shows in his
preference for rural characters ’is closely related to his theory of poetry’s
proper language. The language of "urban life, the fashions of society,
the technical character of specific occupations, all foster associations
in us that are accidental and temporary rather than basic and permanent
and these associations color our language." Whereas, the "lasting idiom”
is that of the rustic whose "associations and emotions have been molded
by ’the permanent forms of Nature,’ who ’hourly communicates with the best
objects, from which the best part of language is originally derived.
William-Wordsworth, "Preface to the Second Edition of the Lyrical 
Ballads," in Criticism: The Major Texts, ed. by Walter Jackson Bate (New
York; Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952), pp. 340, 341.
p. 332.
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Another attribute of poetry, although it cannot be separated from
its content, is its manner. Wordsworth felt that it must be geared to
truth, the truth that only the humble life can validly illustrate. Like
the true Romantic, Wordsworth did not believe that
. . . genuine poetry or art will depict Nature in a false, idyllic, 
Arcadian manner, shedding upon it "the light that never was, on 
sea or land," but will paint it with fidelity and face with forti­
tude "the sea in anger, and the dismal shore . . . "  It is not 
in fanciful Utopia that we are to live, "But in the very world, 
which is the world / Of all of us, — the place where, in the end, /
We find our happiness, or not at all!"77
And as for the manner in which emotion is achieved in poetry, Wordsworth 
denies its accomplishment by means of stylistic devices. On the contrary, 
its form "arises from the nature of the poet’s perception of his subject.—  
the ’spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings'— and of the subject itself." 
From this view, perhaps, "one might imagine that for the true poet express­
ion takes care of itself. If only the poet has the right kind of perception, 
what he has to say will be p o e t r y , a n d  will render man's feelings more 
consonant with nature. Broadly speaking, this is Wordsworth's belief. But 
more specifically, he believes that to order and control man's feelings 
in this way is the gift the poet has of imagination, an educated sensi­
bility that "draws upon a principle of the doctrine called the 'associa­
tion of ideas' ... . developed by David Hartley and other eighteenth—cen—
79tury English writers,** Accordingly, Wordsworth posits that first the 
object in the physical world must be accurately perceived; upon which per­
ception, feelings of a profound nature are aroused. Then this emotion—
Content and form were not considered separate entities by those 
critics who espoused the expressive approach to literature, since the es­
sence of literature for them was expression, an organic process.
77Ernest Bembaum^ A Guide Through the Romantic Movement, 2nd ed* 
(New York: Ronald Press Co,,1949), p. 89,
^^Daiches, p. 96. ^^Bate, p. 334.
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laden object-— "recollected in tranquillity"— comes under the spell of 
the imagination which "broods over it, and discerns its essential nature 
and deepest significance,"®*^ its true beauty— its kinship, in other words, to 
the infinite and eternal. For the poet, therefore, the problem becomes one 
of tuning in to nature, so to speak, in order to make best use of the "visi­
ble, audible, tangible, and temporal actualities of the outer world . - , 
to express his inner life.
But Wordsworth does not leave the subject here. He gives over a
good part of his discussion in the Preface to the pros and Cons of prose
and verse, concluding that "the essential quality of the poet's utterance
does not depend on its being in verse rather than prose . . . that meter
"is merely a 'superadded' and 'adventitious* attraction,Still, on the
side of verse (since— and he admits this— "professing these opinions" he
had written in verse), he has this to say:
. . .  a very small part of the pleasure given by Poetry depends 
upon the metre . . .
. . .  hence, though the opinion will at first appear paradoxical, 
from the tendency of metre to divest language, in a certain degree, 
erf its reality, and thus to throw a sort of half—consciousness of 
unsubstantial existence over the whole composition, there can be 
little doubt but that more pathetic situations and sentiments, that 
is, those which have a greater proportion of pain connected with 
them, may be endured in metrical composition, especially in rhyme, 
than in prose.
Earlier Wordsworth explained that all synqoathy is "propagated by plea­
sure" and when we "sympathize with pain," such sympathy is produced and 
carried on by subtle combinations with pleasure."®^
^^Wordsworth, p. 344- ^^Bembaum, p. 98.
^^Daiches, p. 96- ®®Watson, p. 116.
®^Wordsworth, pp- 343, 341.
It is worth noting that at the same time Wordsworth is extricat­
ing himself from an earlier position in which he pronounced meter as merely 
a stylistic device to a later position in which he deems it as an affec­
tive agent, he is making a case for poetry— the lyric in particular, since 
it was considered by him and most Romantics as the poetic genre* In the 
Preface, he states: "the end of Poetry is to produce excitement," but this
excitement must be "in co-existence with an overbalance of pleasure,
Thus poetry's value and function are correlative. Indeed, his "view of 
the relation of man to the natural world . , . and the significance of the 
pleasure with which its recognition [ is ] accompanied" is his fundamental 
concept. Moreover, "he removes the instruction from the 'instruction and 
delight' formula of many seventeenth- and eighteenth-century critics but 
saves himself from falling into a simple hedonistic theory by insisting 
on the moral dignity of pleasure and its universal significance in man and 
nature." In addition, he declares that the true poet is a teacher and "re­
veals the relationship of men both to each other and to the external world."
Hence, he resolves the Platonic dilemma, Daiches believes, "in a quite new 
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way" (even though this would have been a far-removed concern for Words­
worth). In short, the true aim of poetry, in Wordsworth's view, is the 
communication of pleasure, pleasure that derives its value from uniting 
man and nature in such a way that man's feelings are morally dignified.
This concludes the theoretical assumptions behind Wordsworth's 
own poetic artistry. Undoubtedly, he did to some extent subscribe to the 
theory of imitation. But imitation for him was illustration and reflec­
tion of the poet's mind and soul: "the mirror held up to nature becomes
^^Ibid., p. 343. ®Saiches, pp. 95, 96.
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transparent and yields the reader insights into the mind and heart of the 
87poet himself." The differences lies however in the fact that the poet 
oriented his views, whereas, the audience had oriented neoclassic thought. 
His firm belief that the poet is the wellspring from which all poetry 
flows does of necessity define it as an utterance proceeding from the re­
lationship of harmony between man and nature-—"a spontaneous overflow of 
powerful feelings . . . [ taking ] its origin from emotion recollected in 
tranquillity"^^ — not as an imitation of an imitation; nor of an action; 
nor that of a "golden" world, nor of human or general nature, "for [ him] 
as for most Romantic theorists, the creative process is Immediate and 
emotional . . .; [ he ] is typically Romantic in concentrating his critical 
attention on the artist, not on the reader."
But Wordsworth is not a pure "self-expressionist"; he recognizes 
that the initial poetic emotion may be "recollected in tranquil­
lity," thus allowing for the operation.'of judgment and meditation 
as well as spontaneity; and he maintains a strong moral bias.
"Every poet," he wrote in a letter, "is a teacher"; he teaches by 
enlightening the understanding and purifying the affections of his 
readers. This is accomplished by bringing the reader as directly 
as possible into contact with the beautiful and permanent forms of 
nature.
In truth, Wordsworth’s theory has its roots in primitivistic doc­
trine, and it was he "by doctrine and example, [ who] brought into the
literary province the store of materials which has since been richly ex-
90ploited by writers from Thomas Hardy to William Faulkner," writers 
whose works not only gain their emotional density and mystic illumination 
from the elemental sources of nature, but from it take their direction. 
Nature, for Wordsworth, is the "cardinal standard of poetic value . .
Q*7 88Abrams, p. 23- Wordsworth, p. 344.
^^Hoffman and Hynes, p. 12-. ^^Abrams, p. 113.
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and . . in his usage, is given a triple and primitivistic connota­
tion" :
Nature is the common denominator of human nature; it is most 
reliably exhibited among men living ’according to nature’ ( . . . 
in a culturally simple and especially a rural environment); and 
it consists primarily in an elemental simplicity of thought and 
feeling and a spontaneous and ’unartificial’ mode of expressing 
feeling in words.
And, as to feelings, Wordsworth was the first great Romantic poet-critic 
to make the poet the subject of reference.
For Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834), another Romantic poet 
who "roots his theory in the constitution and activity of the creative 
mind"^^ and thus embraces the expressive theory, "right critical theory 
is a cause— the cause." In the one work published in his lifetime, the 
Biographie Literaria (1817), his critical principles come to light as he 
examines Wordsworth's theory of poetry and poetic diction; and not only 
does the Biographia "marshal objections against the Preface [to the sec­
ond edition of Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads] that had been growing up in 
his mind over the past fifteen years," but it also "[provides] criticism 
with a systematic basis of its own." In fact, Coleridge was the one 
considerable English spokesman to convert the eighteenth-century notion 
of the poet-nature dualism into a "puzzlingly circular process of end­
less counteraction," so that the
. . .  product of such a process, the poem itself, is of a bafflingly 
difficult logical status . . . being neither subject nor object 
but 'an interpenetration of the counteracting powers, partaking 
of both* ; it is neither a thought nor a thing, but what Cole­
ridge later called 'a middle quality’ between the two.
At the same time, paradoxically, "he retained a large part of the 
neoclassic critical tenets and terms which Wordsworth minimized or
Q-i op 93Ibid., p. 105. Ibid., p. 115. Watson, p. 119.
rejected." This "double view" enabled him to produce a "more flexible and 
practicable" criticism: to " [dwell] on a poem as a poem, and on a poem as
a process of mind"; to affirm the "concept of a poem as a quasi-natural 
organism without sacrificing the indispensable distinctions and analytic 
powers of the concept that writing a poem is basically a rational and ac­
quired art of adapting parts to parts and of bending means to foreseen 
ends.” It also allowed him to " [remain] free to maintain that the judg­
ing of poems . . .  must proceed on the assumption that poetry has a "logic 
of its own, as severe as that of science; . . .
Coleridge’s method of proceeding in this venture is dialectic; but,
according to Abrams, "he repeatedly attacked as false the absolute opposi—
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tion of deduction to induction." For him any literary fact must pro­
ceed from first principles, and just as the relationship between nature and 
man had directed Wordsworth, first principles for Coleridge begin 
with the productive faculties of the human mind— the source and test of 
art. His critical principles flow naturally from his "dynamic philosophy" 
which views life as "an organic process of development toward higher levels 
of existence." True, life has its mysteries,, its enigmas, but nature is 
to a great degree "knowable," beginning first through sense perception and 
understanding, and next moving from that to a higher level through the rea­
son and imagination, then, finally through faith to the highest level.
These different steps are patterns of development that support one another, 
each necessary to the attainment of the other, since the human mind " [can] 
not attain complete truth suddenly but [can] rise toward it only by con­
stant effort and gradual s t a g e s . S i n c e  literature should give a vision
^^Abrams, p. 124. ^^Ibid., p. 115- ^^Bembaum, p. 64.
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of life, and Coleridge felt that it should and that the view should be 
not as it appears to the understanding, but as it is revealed to the 
reason; arid since the system of his literary thought can be understood 
only in terms of his postulations on imagination (which he considered a 
form of reason, or judgment) and the distinctions he drew between imagi­
nation and fancy (which he correlated with understanding), it would be 
profitable at this point to present his ideas on these two faculties of 
the mind.
Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century critics treated the terms
imagination and fancy synonymously; and what Coleridge terms "fancy" up
97until his time had been "the total account of poetic invention." But 
Coleridge considered them as distinct terms, signifying different facul­
ties of the human mind, and he was determined "to cut off the term 'imagi­
nation' from its older meaning of an 'image-making' faculty that simply
98reproduces and combines images derived from sense impressions." The
imagination, he believed, is found in two degrees: the primary and the
secondary. In the thirteenth chapter of the Biographia, he states:
The primary Imagination X hold to be the living Power and prime 
Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite 
mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I Am, The 
secondary Imagination, I consider as an echo of the former, co­
existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with 
the primary in the kind of its agency and differing only in de­
gree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, 
dissipates, in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered 
Impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and 
to unify. It is essentially vit^, even as all objects (as objects) 
are essentially fixed and d e a d . ^
^^Abrams, p. 168- ^^Bate, pp, 362-63.
99samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, in Criticism: The
Major Texts, ed. by Walter Jackson Bate (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
1952), p. 387.
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Imagination, then, in its primary degree is an agent of the human mind 
which enables us to perceive order in chaos as the outer world enters 
our consciousness because we are unconsciously attuned— a basic faculty—  
to the infinite creator. The secondary imagination uses this power to 
recreate. It is a vital force which "projects and creates new harmonies 
of meaning." It "struggles" to discern the underlying idea and to unify. 
It is "more conscious and less elemental, but it does not differ in kind 
from the primary-
Fancy, however, which corresponds to the human faculty under­
standing, is a quite mechanical act.
Fancy . • . has no other counters to play with, but fixities and 
definites. The Fancy is indeed no other than a mode of Memory 
emancipated from the order of time and space; while it is blended 
with, and modified by that empirical phenomenon of the will, which 
we express by the word Choice. But equally with the ordinary memory 
the Fancy must receive all its materials ready made from the law of
a s s o c i a t i o n . 1 0 1
The mere fancy, therefore, is "skillful only in collecting and combining 
particulars"; thus it is "inferior to the genuine imagination, which [is] 
an ally, or even a form, of the reason and [discerns] the general and per­
manent. True art and literature [partake] rather of the supernatural than 
of the natural.
Genuine poetry, then, is a child of the imagination. And as art 
it is an imitation of the reality we call nature. But "the reality of na­
ture is to be found in a process or activity in which the concrete and 
universal fulfill each other."
The universal gives to the particular its form, thus permitting 
it to flower into existence and become what it is. In a similar 
way, the universal must have the particular in order to fulfill 
• -itself.......
lOODaiches, p . 107. _ ^Q^Coleridge, Biographia, p. 387-
^^^Bernbaum, p. 67,
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More specifically poetry imitates this process in nature, acting "as the
'mediator' between nature and m a n , e x p l a i n i n g  and transmitting reality
into terms of human feelings and reactions. In short, it
imitates the essential process of nature, the reconciliation of the 
universal and the particular . . .  by translating its insight into 
a given medium: . . .in a drama, into words, metaphors, verse-rhythms, 
arid the interplay of characters and incidents, rounded and harmon­
ized to an ordered end.
But as an "abridgement of n a t u r e , b y  which truth is imitated 
and translated into terms that can be humanly apprehended, poetry is not 
imitation as Aristotle and the pragmatic critics saw it; rather it is an 
instinctual expression which imitates truth. Beginning as a seed in the 
mind of the poet, "a poem is not created," it evolves; "it grows like a 
tree as if with an inner life of its own." Thus imitation, for Coleridge, 
is a dynamic, living representation, which begins with diversity and ends 
with unity— not a passive copy that having begun with similitude, ends 
with diversity. Similarly, in all his definitions of art and literature, 
he speaks of them in terms of organic activity: All true art and litera­
ture are a fusion by the imagination of the knower with the knowable ob­
ject, a fusion which is the highest psychological experience of man be­
cause through this experience he : has his deepest insights into reality; 
by it he sees moral and spiritual principles in the universe and in nature 
its symbolisms. Again, the poem is neither a "thought nor a thing; it is 
'a middle quality' between the two."^^^
Ostensibly, then, if Coleridge believes that art imitates the reality 
of nature, which is in essence the process of nature reconciling the
^°^Bate, pp. 359, 351.. ^°Sate, pp. 360-61.
^^^Samuel Taylor Coleridge, "On Poesy or Art," in Criticism: The
Major Texts . ed. by Walter Jackson Bate (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.,
1952), p. 398.
^°®Watson, pp. 124, 119.
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universal and the particular, and thereby counterbalancing diversity with 
unity, in no way could he agree with Wordsworth's poetic principles that, 
the humble life is the best subject for poetry because the feelings of 
plain, simple people are sincere and natural or that the everyday language 
of humble people best conveys these feelings and is therefore best suited 
to poetry. To him this would be too simplistic and certainly not consis­
tent with what Wordsworth practiced in his better p o e t r y . N o r  did he 
agree with the sentimental writers of his day, whose work introduced super­
natural beings or agencies which in no way suggested the real forces of the 
universe, and thus rendered itself "'incapable of exemplifying a moral 
t r u t h - I n  the Biographia he states:
I adopt with full faith the principle of Aristotle, that poetry 
as poetry is essentially ideal, that it avoids and excludes all 
accident; that its apparent individualities of rank, character, 
or occupation must be representative of a class; and that the 
persons of poetry must be clothed with generic attributes, with 
the common attributes of the class; not with such as one gifted 
individual might possibly possess, but such as from his situa­
tion it is most probably beforehand that he would possess.
But.Coleridge's argument for the ideal does not mean that the
poet is to discard the "actual" and pursue the "idyllic."
If he was a poet of genuine imagination, he would keep in con­
tact with the actual, but would dissever from its representa­
tion any features which were accidental, temporary, contingent, 
and irregular, retaining only what disclosed its permanent 
nature and its essential relations to the u n i v e r s e .
107Bernbaum in A Guide Through the Romantic Movement, p. 67, ex­
plains Wordsworth's practice: "In Michael Wordsworth chose characters, that
had in a considerable degree a sound and religious education, and the diction 
he then employed was far above what might be called . . .  'low or rustic.' 
Those poems which actually kept to the primitive or vulgar were of little 
value." Coleridge points this out in the Biographia because for him "the 
best part of language, the most expressive of human nature, originated with­
in the mind and was not natural to the uneducated."
108-ggrhbaum, p. 62. ^^^Coleridge, Biographia, pp. 381—82.
^^^Bembatim, p. 67.
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In his own poems— particularly the two considered his best. The 
Ancient Mariner and Christabel, and which are explicit examples of the 
"golden mean" that he endeavored to establish "between the kind of ro­
mance which is invented to point a moral, and the kind which is invented 
merely to entertain and which sheds no illumination upon life"— the con­
tent focuses on the primordial theme of Good and Evil; but Good through­
out the actions holds steadfast, even though it gets pushed to one side 
in the wake of Evil’s "veiled yet dreadful power, half-repellant, half- 
fascinating, seizing upon us when least expected, and visiting conse­
quences upon us that are unforeseen." And, Bernbaum comments, "It is a 
vision of Evil perfectly true to life . . .  a vision not an analysis of 
it, nor a sermon upon it." To achieve his objective in these poems, 
to find a middle ground between composition to instruct morally and that 
simply to entertain, Coleridge
. . .  [removes] the incidents, variations of the perpetual conflicts 
between good and evil, out of the commonplace conditions of 
ordinary life the trademark of the sentimental writer [into realms] 
where the forces of good and evil seem invested with supernatural 
qualities,
harmonizing the supernatural with universal laws to authenticate them
and to "[suggest] the eternal mystery of the interpenetration throughout
life of spirit and matter, of good and evil."^^^ Thus he achieves "for
these shadows of the imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for
the moment which constitutes poetic f a i t h . A n d  "what the Ancient
Mariner feels in his circumstances, what Christabel [feels] in hers is
113unerringly in accord with our common human nature."
n i l  112 ...............Bernbaum, p. 62. Coleridge, Biographia. p. 376.
113Bernbaum, p. 62.
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And just as the supernatural and unusual constitute the content 
of Coleridge’s work, so too does the unusual dictate his form and style.
He employs the unusual in diction and meter and makes it work toward a 
purpose— namely, to evoke an air of mystery, wonder, and pathos and to 
divorce his themes from hackneyed associations. In Christabel. rather 
than the usual practice of employing an equal number of syllables to a 
line, he makes use of an equal number of accents, thus gaining greater 
freedom to adapt the rhythm to any change in content or emotion. Similar­
ly, "in The Ancient Mariner, he [uses ] the ballad stanza, *' but with a 
difference. "He [avoids] those crudities and ineffective simplicities 
which [ are] apt to appear in even the most beautiful ancient ballads and 
[introduces ] new features into it." The diction gives him trouble, however, 
in the first version of the latter poem because "he introduced too many
archaisms" in his determination to rise above realism; but "later he skill-
114fully removed those that were unnecessary or disturbing."
But where he is particularly brilliant in this latter poem is in 
his handling of structure, where form (the conduct of the action) and con­
tent (the supernatural) fuse into an aesthetic whole of supreme artistry.
"In the plot there is nothing ’romantic’ in the bad sense of the term, 
nothing meandering, digressive, episodic; all is balance and order . •
And just as he achieves this symmetry of form, so too does he establish 
credibility for the supernatural; that is,.
. . .  [he] makes the suspension of disbelief as easy as possible 
by introducing only such supernatural beings and incidents as had 
long been believed in by former generations and appealed for 
faith to a kind of hereditary memory.
These observations, of course, have mainly to do with Coleridge’s 
practices as a poet, but they do support his theory that "true" poetry is
llAsembaum, p. 63. ^^^Xbid., pp. 63—64.
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ideal and Imitates the reality of nature. In more general terms, however,
his views on form and content, subsumed as they are under his concepts of
imagination and organicism, come to light most explicitly in a passage
from his Shakespearean criticism when he writes:
The form is mechanic, when on any given material we impress a 
pre-determined form, not necessarily arising out of the proper­
ties of the material; as when to a mass of wet clay we give what­
ever shape we wish it to retain when hardened. The organic form,
on the other hand, is innate; it shapes, as it develops, itself 
from within, and the fulness of its development is one and the
same with the perfection of its outward form. Such as the life
is, such is the form. ̂ ^6
From this statement, then, form in genuine poetry is determined by the 
content and is not falsely superimposed upon it in a calculated manner.
It cannot be separated from the content because it cannot fulfill its 
function as a shaping and guiding agent unless there is something to be 
formed. It cannot have an existence of its own; it depends upon content 
as content depends upon it for its individuality, for its moment of self­
exposition whereby it achieves its individuality. And both elements, in 
turn, depend upon the poet whose imagination— having first discerned the 
"Natur—geist, or spirit of nature." in that which is to be formed—  
in the process of fulfilling the form brings the universal to focus in 
the individual.
Again, as with content and form, imagination and organicism dic­
tate Coleridge’s views concerning the function and value of poetry. In 
this way he is a Platonist (Bate says that he is "always maintaining
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, "Shakespeare’s Judgment Equal to His 
Genuis," in Criticism; The Major Texts, éd. by Walter Jackson Bate (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace &"Co., 1952), p. 392.
^^^Coleridge, "On Poesy or Art," p. 397.
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that he is a Platonist, not an Aristotelian"^^®). But, in a sense, he is
also an Aristotelian. The care Coleridge takes with distinctions in the
Biographia is reminiscent of the method of Aristotle. And when in his
"disquisition" here, he defines a poem as a means to an "object," "Pur- 
119
pose," or "end," he is quite in the tradition of neoclassic criticism, 
whether he intends to be or not. Thus, in his winding argument that leads 
from the distinction between prose and a poem, to the definition of a 
poem and poetry, respectively, he makes clear the purpose of each form.
For prose its ultimate aim is the communication of truth; for the poem, 
"immediate pleausre," a pleasure engendered by its special kind of form 
that provides a double pleasure in that the delight that comes from the 
whole work is consonant with and even led up to by the pleasure taken in 
each part. This distinction, then, not only satisfies the poem's function, 
it justifies its being. But a poem's value "[derives] partly from its 
qualities as poetry (so that its value would be that it achieves and com­
municates that great imaginative synthesis which is both valuable in it—
120self and is a special kind of awareness or insight)." Indeed, Cole­
ridge's constant and most emphatic iteration is that poetry brings "the 
whole soul of man activity." And on the basis of this accomplish­
ment, perhaps, the case for its value and justification should rest.
Daiches remarks that "it is in the last analysis through [ his ] new defi­
nition of the imagination that Coleridge is able to escape completely from 
122Plato's dilemma." Nonetheless, Watson argues that "the question of
118Bate, p. 360. ^^®Coleridge, Biographia. pp. 377-78.
^^%aiches, p. 109. ^Coleridge, Biographia, p. 379.
122Daiches, p. 110.
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values is scarcely an aspect of his criticism at all • , . that Cole­
ridge hardly ever tells you whether he thinks a poem is good or bad.”
There were, he felt, too many "dabblers" around, "eager to know which 
were good books and which bad." Coleridge was more abstract than this.
He was captivated by "all of man’s creation" and "had a passionate curio­
sity to explore it."^^^
"So literary criticism is for Coleridge intimately bound up with, 
and finally perhaps subordinated to a quest for metaphysical knowledge."
His questions are not those of Johnson, his great Neoclassicist predecessor, 
who asks’"Does this poem satisfy our commonsense for emotional and 
moral truth and validity?*"; nor those of his contemporary and friend 
Wordsworth, who "in his insistence on judging poetry directly by the stan­
dard of the emotional and moral integrity of its language" is closer to 
Johnson than to Coleridge. But of course neither Johnson nor Wordsworth 
is the theorist that Coleridge is— their concerns are addressed more to 
poetry’s function and value and its effect on the reader than to meta­
physics. "But Coleridge, initially certain only of the mysterious exist­
ence, in a continuum, of nature and the mind, asks the question, ’What is 
the structure of reality?’" He sees
. . works of art [ therefore ] as data of the mind’s structure 
and organic operation, which reflect, in turn, nature’s structure 
and operation.
Thus, although he is an exponent of the expressive theory, which holds the 
poet central to all other elements, it is the action of the poet’s mind 
that matters, the theory that explains the counteractive forces between 
the human mind and nature, between art and nature. Hence for Coleridge,
123Watson, pp. 113, 114.
124Walter Sutton and Richard Foster, eds.^Modern Criticism; Theory 
and Practice (New York: Odyssey Press, 1963), p. 28.
the ideal poet is defined by his qualities of genius,
"To have genius [ he writes ] is to live in the universal, to 
know no self but that which is reflected not only from the 
faces of all around us, our fellow-creatures, but reflected 
from the flowers, the trees, the beasts, yea from the very 
surface of the waters and the sands of the desert. A man 
of genius finds a reflex of himself were it only in the mys­
tery of being.
Indeed, through the imagination, "he brings" his "whole soul
into a c t i v i t y . "126 por him "only a theory of poetic creation matters;
he analyzes, not so much poems as they exist, but the creative act that
makes them what they are." This central concern appears to Watson as "an
interest of revolutionary significance." A first in English criticism.
He expresses it thusly:
No English critic since Dryden had much concerned himself with 
the question of poetic process, and Dryden’s Interest had been 
no better than a passing one, based on his acquaintance with 
Hobbesian psychology. For eighteenth-century critics, a poem 
is simply there, and it is the variety of uniformity of human 
reactions to it that is worth discussing. With Coleridge, creation
is centeral,127
And for Coleridge the creative act is an act of growing, of evolving, of 
becoming. There is no studied concern for the value principle of poetry 
or for the ideal reader. There is just the Imagination. His elaborate 
dialectic is designed in large measure to show just this.
Literary consensus places Coleridge above all other English 
critics ; today, partly because his criticism has a philosophical founda­
tion. His theory of the imagination "was the first important channel for 
the flow of organicism into the hitherto, if perhaps not very deep, stream 
of English aesthetics . . ."12S fact, "his ideas, unfinished and even
contradictory as they sometimes are, remain remarkably current and make
?*^^Wimsatt and Brooks, p. 394. ^Coleridge, Biographia. p. 379. 
^^^Watson, p. 112, l^^Abrams, p. 168.
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him the patriarch of modem criticism.*' One has only to consider his
theories of organic form and the imagination to recognize the "kinship"
between the views of Coleridge and twentieth-century thought.
The theory for form is based on the principle that the essence of 
existence is not matter, but process; the work of art is a record 
of such process and therefore has the same oganic relationships 
among its parts as has any other vital thing. Thus the work must 
be judged as a whole, and the parts cannot be arbitrarily sepa­
rated for criticism. The vital force in the mind which creates a 
work of art Coleridge called Imagination; it corresponds in his 
theory to the creative process in nature ("the eternal act of cre­
ation") by which matter and form are fused and given life. In at­
tributing power to the imagination, Coleridge rejected eighteenth- 
century mechanistic theories of the creative process, and laid the 
groundwork for modern "ontological" theories of poetry, and for 
the common view of the poem as an autonomous e x i s t e n c e . 1^9
Poetry, Coleridge defines "as the general activity of the imagi­
nation"; a poem, a "particular structure of w o r d s . A n d  it is this 
"particular structure" that gives it the autonomy that twentieth-century 
critics accord it.
The Objective Approach— Period of the New Criticism 
Between the mid-nineteenth century and the twentieth, between 
Wordsworth and Coleridge, the two Romantics most central to the expressive 
theory, and the New Critics, who view poetry as a serious body of know­
ledge, as an autonomous source of revelation, and expound the objective 
approach to literature, there resides "a multiplicity of viewpoints and 
traditions of greater or lesser continuity," so great, in fact, that "in 
the present century literary criticism has become a major intellectual 
discipline." And going back to the first World War "with the growing 
interaction between American and English critics . . .  modem criticism 
became internationalized,"^^^ a fact aptly illustrated by the immigration
Hoffman and Hynes, p. 41. ^^Daiches, p. 110. 
^^^Sutton and Foster, pp. 3, 5,
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.to London of such American poet-critics as Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot 
and by the establishment in the United States at a later date of the 
British critic I. A. Richards. Perhaps Ezra Pound did more than any 
twentieth-century critic in the years before World War I to foster an 
international Xmagist movement, a force which "inaugurated a poetic re­
naissance, but also developed a theory to support it." Indeed, Pound 
"[broke] the mold of old forms, [pioneered] new ones, and [advocated] a 
rigorous discipline for both the critic and the poet . . . ." About this 
same time T. S. Eliot came under the influence of Pound, and he and 
"other 'classicists* focused upon problems of technique and structure," 
concentrating their efforts formalistically and aesthetically on the na­
ture of the work itself, rather than on the work in relation to its au­
thor, its audience, or the circumstances of its composition— that is, 
with the tradition of historicism or positivism, a tradition which had 
dominated criticism in the last years of the nineteenth century and which 
these twentieth-century critics were finding intolerable. Still, even 
though the aesthetic was emphasized, Eliot, and those of like persuasion, 
did demonstrate in their methods the influence science was having on criti­
cism in their "preoccupation with impersonality, 'objectivity,* and pre­
cision of method." And it was Eliot, with his 'impersonal theory' of poe­
try and his definition of the 'objective correlative* and 'disassociation of 
sensibility' ", who was to significantly influence the New Criti­
cism. Eliot is also to be credited with "the postwar vogue of seventeenth- 




Simultaneously, developments in history and the social sciences—  
anthropology, psychology, and sociology— were having their effect on 
criticism. In 1920 Sigmund Freud advanced his theory of psychoanalysis, 
which let loose a flurry of concerns with such nonliterary concepts as 
dream symbolism, the stream of consciousness, and psychobiography, all of 
which could be applied to literary theory and criticism.
However, these new developments in theory and practical criticism 
were to turn the critical scene in another direction, "inspiring a counter­
revolution against the forces of science and modernism." This movement 
led by Irving Babbit and Paul Elmer More under the banner of the New Hu­
manism rejected romanticism and naturalism and "stressed the dualism of 
man and nature." Opposing determinism, "they asserted man's moral re­
sponsibility and his need of discipline by the 'inner check.*" They, like 
Matthew Arnold, the late nineteenth-century moralist critic, considered 
themselves an elite group "entrusted with the traditional moral and cul­
tural values in an age of confusion." Their moralistic views, "their dis­
trust of democracy, and their hostility to the literature of their time" 
engaged them as anti—modernists in "an extended controversy" with the 
modernists and "culminated in the publication, in 1930, of rival symposia 
defending and attacking the New Humanist position.” But they always "tend­
ed to be more interested in moral and cultural questions than in critical 
theory . . .
Following the New Humanists, "in the midst of the general depri­
vation of the 1930*s, . • . "a growing concern for the social, economic, 
and political inçlications of literature," in both England and America, 
gave rise to Marxist criticism, a criticism which saw literature as "an
, 71 .
134instrument of propaganda iri the cause of revolution.*' But by the mid-
thirties Marxist critics and writers had become suspect; even though, they 
themselves, by this time had become opposed to the "rigidity and oversim-̂  
plifications of proletarian theory" and were (although "in sympathy with 
the general objectives of the revolutionary movement,") looking for a 
way to "integrate Marxist theory" within a larger framework which would 
include a **larger progressive view" along "with psychology and other sy­
stems of t h o u g h t . C h i e f  adherents to this group are such critics as 
Edmund Wilson and Kenneth Burke.
But by the second World War a general disillusionment among 
liberal critics had set in and was reflected in a **groi7ing emphasis upon 
complexity in literature and upon the irresolvable ironies of the  ̂tragic 
vision.*" In reaction to this stress, "new (or renewed) theories of poe­
tic language" emerged along with a growing interest in *'the relation be­
tween literature and myth." I. A, Richards was an early exponent of these 
theories,*’[ helping] to give irony and complexity a new importance as cri­
teria of literary value and[ encouraging ] further studies assuming the
136identify of poetry and myth.** And it was he as well as T. S. Eliot 
who gave impetus to the New Criticism, **which arose in England in the 
late twenties, spread to the United States in the years before the Second 
World War, and showed signs of dominating academic criticism, especially 
in America, after 1945." Two events led up to the establishment of this 
system as so characteristically American (so much so that Watson observes 
that "it is easy to forget its largely British origins"): first, the
advent of Richards to the United States in 1939 and his [ fixing] upon
p. 7. ^^®Ibid,
anti-historical criticism the . . .epithet of 'new'”^^^; and,'second, 
the appearance of John Crowe Ransom's The New Criticism a year later.
Thus the New Criticism followed hard on the heels of a myriad of critical 
views, views that spanned almost a century of controversial speculation 
between romantic expressionism and neocritical objectivism.
In the United States, the "nucleus of this movement, which was
already well established when . . .  Ransom's The Rew Criticism appeared
in 1941," was a group of teacher—critics— "Cleanth Brooks, Allen Tate,
R. P. Warren, and others associated with Ransom at Vanderbilt University
in the 1920's and early Thirties."
[ This group ], . . attracted many followers and achieved a position of 
strength^ particularly in the universities, where a curricular revo­
lution was replacing the older historical scholarship. Unlike the 
socially oriented criticism of the Thirties, the more formalistic New 
Criticism was devoted to problems of language and structure. The 
eu^hasis on wit and paradox and irony, already introduced by Eliot 
and Richards became programmatic in works like Cleanth Brooks' Modem 
Poetry and the Tradition (1939) and The Well Wrought U m  . . .  (1947). 
Taking their cue from I. A. Richards* distinction between the language 
of poetry and the language of science, most of the New Critics accept­
ed and promoted Ransom's idea of an "ontological" critical theory that 
would give poetry status as a. unique source of iknowledge. They 
also attempted to maintain a distinction between formal or aesthetic 
criticism and criticism which is in some sense social or historical. 
This distinction was reinforced by Rene Wellek and Austin Warren's 
Theory of Literature (1949), which assumed a dichotomy between "in­
trinsic" and "extrinsic" modes of literary study.138
And although there was a growing interest in the relation of literature 
and myth, and the theories of Coleridge and Richards implied this re­
lationship, the study of myth had little interest for most of the leading 
New Critics; rather, the emphasis with them was on rhetorical and lin­
guistic analysis.
^^^Watson, p. 202. ^^^Sutton and Foster, pp. 7-8.
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Thus, "it is the New Critics who are usually meant when modem 
criticism is a t t a c h e d , w i t h  the point of attack aimed at their tendency 
to stress words at the expense of ideas. To them, the paraphrase of a 
poem is of little concern. Rather the real meaning of a poem inheres in 
the interaction of the words. "They point to the kind of poem that takes 
two opposite stands at the same time, thus negating the possibility of 
meaning in a prose sense in order that it may mean in a poetic sense."
In short, "what the New Critics are saying is that poetry is about a com­
plex state of consciousness of which ideas are only one, very inadequate 
expression." That which a word states in the poem and which reduces to 
a paraphrasable prose meaning is far from the complete substance of 
a poem because "words have in their contexts— their contexts in individual 
and collective experience— an organic life like that of consciousness."
Of this organic life, any specific meaning of the word is, like 
meaning in poetry, only one inadequate expression. Poetic dis­
course uses more of the organic life of the word than prose dis­
course d o e s . 140
Generally speaking, the New Critics take off from Coleridge and 
affirm that there is "a special 'logic' of the imagination." And again, 
like Coleridge, they show that there is a difference between the language 
of poetry and that of prose and that this special language of poetry— for 
its purposes— is "just, as exact as the language of discursive prose.”
And when they speak of the "special language of poetry," the term poetry 
here is used in the larger sense, for these critics have done work also 
in fiction and drama ("less well, however, because fiction and drama do
139Robert Langbaum, The Modem Spirit (New York: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1970), p. 10.
^“̂“ibid., pp. 10-11.
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not so easily lend themselves to microscopic analysis"). But their best 
work has been done with the lyric, and Langbaum believes that the New 
Critics
. . .  have done more than any critics since Coleridge to re-estab­
lish, after the challenge of science, the intellectual validity of 
poetry, to rescue poetry from the general modern sense of it as
a kind of inexact prose decorated with metaphors and 'souped up'
with emotion.
Although the New Critics emphasize their method as an intrinsic 
approach, with all work completely within the poem, it is by going out­
side the poem, by making use of what Langbaum refers to as "nonliterary
concepts " that they are able to build their case for the "exactness" of
poetic language. The concepts they call upon are, in the main, those of 
psychology "and especially— as the movement developed from Richards to 
Empson to such American New Critics as Ransom, Tate, Brooks, Warren—  
Freudian concepts." Thus "the idea of subconscious processes leads to 
the idea of other dimensions of reality."
Images or symbols are pre—conscious and pre-analytic modes of 
thinking, % e n  used consciously in poetry, they are, far from 
being mere decoration, the most exact modes for thinking with 
both the conscious and unconscious mind about the whole of 
reality.
The terms and ideas used most consistently by; the New Critics stem from 
the commerce they see between poetry and the subconscious. Since in poe­
try connotations of a word take precedence over denotations, they allow 
for "ambiguities of meaning and ambivalences of judgment," whereby "all 
possible meanings of a word operate at the same time. . . . "  It is the 
same in dream or free association. As for ambivalence, an object in a 
dream can symbolize opposite things; and "subconsciously, we can love and
141ibid., pp. 11, 12, 14. ^^^Ibid., p. 12.
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hate the same person." Based on Freud, "such anomalies" are a part of 
reality and work by a "psychological 'logic'" which "is analogous to the 
'logic' of art, to the orchestration of meanings by which certain art 
c o m m u n i c a t e s . O r ,  indeed, to the "logic" of the imagination.
The New Critics have worked best (and this work "is indeed neces­
sary," Langbaum asserts) "with the literature that deals with the subcon­
scious and with a multidimensional reality, but deals with them as psycho­
logical experience and not— like Dante or Spenser— as allegory.” The poe­
try they have concentrated on and which has yielded most effective results 
is the witty, metaphysical poetry of the seventeenth century, particularly 
that of John Donne, whose telescoped images are seen not simply as rhe­
torical devices but are a means of producing emotion, the kind of emotion, 
in other words, "which is, as Freud showed in his study of wit, rooted in 
subconscious p r o c e s s e s . A n d ,  in spite of their anti—romantic disposi­
tion, they have also analyzed romantic poems to good advantage, finding 
them excellent examples to illustrate their methods. (Cleanth Brooks in 
his book The Well Wrought Urn (1947) has analyzed the poetry of Wordsworth, 
Tennyson, and Keats, three leading Romantics).
Langbaum offers an economic and humorous summation of the New
Critics situation. In Speaking of their contribution, he says:
If we start with the idea that there is a special 'logic' of the 
imagination and that poetry is a serious body of knowledge, even 
of revelation, then it behooves us to find out and to be able to 
talk about what the poem itself is saying. For what it is saying 
will be more complex than anything you could learn about it through 
a study of its sources, or of the period in which it was written, or 
of the author's life and ideas. The sort of procedures from which it 
has delivered us is that of the old-time English professor who, in 
teaching Marvell's "Coy Mistress," would talk about the English 
Civil War and about Marvell's life, his Puritanism, his reading, his 
friendship with Milton, and finally, just as the bell rang, would
l^^Ibid. . p-̂ Îbid., pp. 13, 14.
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say, "And as for the poem, gentlemen, beautiful, beautiful." The 
story explains why the New Critics had to adopt that particular 
strategy of combat.
Thus far, the concern has been to bridge the critical scene in 
literature, with its complex of critical views, from English nineteenth- 
century Romanticism and the expressive theory to the twentieth-century 
objective theory as represented by the New Critics, beginning as it were 
with Richards in England in the 1920s and moving from there to America 
in the late 1930s with such teacher-critics as John Crowe Ransom, Allen 
Tate, and Cleanth Brooks. It has also been thought profitable to offer at 
the same time an overview of the system of thought central to the New 
Critics before examining in profile certain New Critics important to the 
movement. Be that as it may, the New Critics which will direct this section 
of the chapter have been selected according to theextent that each has dom­
inated the critical scene and to the degree the thinking of each has offer­
ed divergent views and terminology in regard to the nature of literature—  
its defining qualities and its content and form and function and value.
Whether or not I. A. Richards would be considered a New Critic is 
a moot question*. But the fact that he was a pioneer of the movement is 
not. Watson states that his "claims to have pioneered Anglo-American New 
Criticism of the thirties and forties is unassailable," unassailable in 
that he furnished the theoretical groundwork "on which the technique of 
verbal analysis was b u i l t . A n d  even though his "analytical work . . .  
is overlaid by a theory of the psychic effect of poetry" so that the "only 
value of art is in the psychic organization it imposes on us. . . .," 
Richards, undoubtedly, was the one who " . . .  [turned] attention to the
^^^Ibid., p. 13. ^^^Watson, p. 196.
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language of poetry," And even though this desired balanced pose, which 
Richards calls the theory of "synaesthesis" and which he later applied to 
his poetry of "inclusion" and "synthesis,demands that we order our 
impulses and "leads to a complete divorce between the poem as an objec­
tive structure and the reader's mind so that poetry is deliberately cut
,,149
in the meaning of meaning, in semantics," has offered a terminology to 
some of the New Critics, who, although they "[do] not share his philo- . 
sophical assumptions," are indebted to him for such "key terms" as "attitudes, 
tensions. ambiguities, and irony. ( I t a l i c s  mine.) In respect, then, 
to the theories fathered by him, theories which gave impetus to the New 
Criticism, Richards will be discussed.
Richards' theories reveal themselves, of course, in his writings 
and may be divided into his early writings and his later writings, as they 
respectively illuminate his views on the nature of literature. The early 
writings— Meaning of Meaning (1923), The Principles of Literary Criticism 
(1924), and Practical Criticism (1929)— indicate Richards' espousal of the 
organic theory of literature— hence, the integration of content and form; 
although, as 'Wellek puts it, he "hardly bothers about form"; rather "form 
is totally dispensed with, dissolved into attitudes and i m p u l s e s . A s  
to function and value, these two, are relegated to the psychological realm, 
wherein literature becomes the mere agent for arousing impulses in the poet 
and reader alike.
^^^Rene Wellek, Concepts of Criticism, with an Introduction and ed. 
by Stephen G. Nichols, Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 352.
^^^Wimsatt and Brooks, p. 615. ^^^Wellek, p. 352.
150ibid., p. 324. ^^^Ibid., p. 59.
78
The later writings— Coleridge on Imagination (1934) and Philosophy 
of Rhetoric (1936)— emphasize even more the organic nature of literature 
and the inseparable relationship of content and form. However, in these 
works literature becomes an object with autonomy, functioning as a struc­
ture of intuition and truth, and acquiring value in terms of its revelatory 
power. These publications, therefore, proved fruitful to the New Critics
with their interest in the complexity of literature and in an instrument
152"that would give literature status as a unique source of knowledge."
The Principles of Literary Criticism, Richards’ first book of 
strictly literary aesthetics, identifies poetry as "the supreme form of 
emotive language^" 1^3 whose value lies in its use of language for the 
sake of its effects in emotion and attitude. Here Richards defines litera­
ture, specifying its character as an agent for arousing impulses in both 
poet and reader. He then introduces his principle of poetic tension along 
with the terms "inclusion" and "synthesis," which he applies to poetry 
and by them judges "bad poems" and "defective poems." And in his thinking, 
.the great and valuable poetry calls forth impulses organized by "synthesis" 
and "inclusion," whereas a less valuable type of poetry, one deficient in 
a rich-organization of impulses, operates by "exclusion" and "elimination." 
Based on impulses, therefore, Richards views the content and form of poetry 
as organically related and is concerned with " [distinguishing] a richer, 
deeper, and more tough-minded poetry from a more ’limited and exclusive’ kind 
of p o e t r y . H e  maintains that
152Sutton and Foster, p. 8.
153I. A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, 5th ed. (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1934), p. 267.
^^^imsatt and Brooks, p. 619.
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a very great deal of poetry and art is content with the full, 
ordered development of comparatively special and limited ex­
periences, with a definite emotion, for example. Sorrow, Joy,
Pride, or a definite attitude. Love, Indignation, Admiration,
Hope, or with a specific mood. Melancholy, Optimism, or Longr- 
ing. And such art has its own value and its place in human _ _c 
affairs. . . .But it is not the greatest kind of art; . . _
In fact, this limited kind of poetry is "unstable" compared to the pecu­
liar stability of the poetry of synthesis which gains its effects through 
irony.
The difference comes out clearly if we consider how comparatively 
unstable poems of the first kindE poetry of exclusion] are. They 
will not bear an ironical contemplation. • . .Irony in this sense 
consists in the bringing in of the opposite, the complementary im­
pulses; that is why poetry which is exposed to it is not of the 
highest order, and why irony itself is so constantly a characteristic 
of poetry which is.^^®
Thus, the poetry of exclusion limits itself to one experience, 
say. Love; the poem "excludes" any conflicting element that will diminish 
this particular emotion, such as an element suggestive of the ephemeral 
quality of erotic love or love’s vulnerability to human caprice; there­
fore, it cannot sustain "ironical contemplation." In other words, by 
this exclusion, which has omitted antithetical elements within the context, 
irony is thereby eliminated. The poem, consequently, fosters a sentimen­
tal attitude,.precluding any realistic connection with life. It cannot 
then be classified as "tough-minded" poetry, a poetry of intellectuality.
And just as poetic tension is a principal concern for Richards, 
so too is the meaning of words and the way they operate in poetry. His 
book the Meaning of Meaning (1923) had appeared a year before the Princi­
ples, and here "he created a new jargon in semantics and its 'emotive*
157use in poetry. . . . "  After this treatise came Practical Criticism
^^^R±chards, p. 267. ^^^Watson, p. 197.
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(1929), which is a practical application of the method he propounded in
the Principles. During this period of publications, Richards is
. . .  primarily a psychologist and semanticist who is interested 
in the therapeutic effects of poetry, in the reader's response and 
the patterning of his impulses. 158
Also with this period of publications— the earlier work, the Principles 
in particular— the New Critics’ interest in the complexity of literature 
is revealed; but it is not until in his later writings that Richards 
seemingly turns his back on the psychic effect of poetry and centers 
his interest on literature as a source of knowledge, the other prime con­
cern of the New Criticism.
Coleridge on Imagination (1934) and the Philosophy of Rhetoric 
(1936) are the two later works which show Richards’ change-over in philo­
sophy. Richard Foster speaks of this change-over as a "conversion." In 
his book The New Romantics (1962), he states:
. . . most of the critics viewed the appearance of Coleridge 
on Imagination in 1935 as the document of a virtual conversion 
experience— an experience not unlike Coleridge’s own "conver­
sion" as Richards himself has spoken of it, from Hartley to 
Kant. • . .Ransom, however, had tentative reservations about 
the "conversion" being one to "idealist philosophy," but with 
the publication of The Philosophy of Rhetoric a year later he 
cheered the new Richards unreservedly for abandoning the "af­
fective" approach and returning to "objective literature itself" 
complete with the "cognitions.
With these works, then, Richards relinquishes his psychological view
which put the poet and reader at the forefront, making the arousal of
their impulses literature’s chief function and value and joins forces
with the objective approach wherein the work, itself, takes on autonomy
ISSwellek, p. 255.
^^^Richard Foster, _ 
varsity Press, 1962), p. 53.
The New Romantics (Bloomington: Indiana Uni—
31 .
and literature’s worth is measured by the service it renders as a know­
ledge form.
Foster includes a "sample text" "on the nature of language" from
the Philosophy of Rhetoric to demonstrate Richards’ "conversion" from
positivism to idealism:
"Words [ Richard states ] are the meeting points at which regions 
of experience which can never combine in sensation or intuition, 
come together. They are the occasion and means of that growth 
which is the mind’s endless endeavor to order itself. That is 
why we have language. It is no mere signalling system- It is 
the instrument of all our distinctively human development, of 
everything in which we go beyond the other animals."
This sample, Foster believes, indicates "how far Richards has gone in 
the direction of abandoning his early reductionist motives and assump­
tions (man is not like the animals; language is more than a signalling
system) and his "willingness now to regard intuition, or the nonrational, 
,160as an avenue of knowing."
Although Foster (perhaps because of his purpose, a purpose which 
the title of his book suggests) speaks of Richards’ conversion as an 
awakening and subsequent rejection of positivistic tendencies, and even 
parallels his movement toward idealism with that of Coleridge— Romanti­
cism’s foremost theorist— Wimsatt comments on Richards’ change in a more 
restrained manner. He states:
In his Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936), Richards seems to have 
quietly laid aside the distinction between the referential and 
the emotive aspects of language and to have devoted himself to 
an account of a new rhetoric founded upon semantic analysis.
But these views notwithstanding, it is the Philosophy of Rhetoric
which contains Richards’ context theory, so that "words are now seen to
160Foster, pp. 53, 55-56- ^^^Wimsatt and Brooks, p. 641,
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be endowed with a kind of life of their own,"^^^ And it is with this theory 
that he most concisely explains his views on the nature of literature and 
the criteria that serve to describe it. It would seem that . . what 
Richards calls broadly a 'context* theory of meaning** allows certain "con­
sequences**: *'First, words interanimate one a n o t h e r . T h e y  are modified
by the whole context in which they find themselves, just as they act as 
modifiers on this same context, each works bringing the power it has derived 
from "contexts in the past** to this new matrix; second, the theme or thesis 
of a poem or drama or piece of fiction is not the complete meaning of the 
work with everything else relegated "to the role of ornament or detailed 
illustration.** True, it may summarize the meaning, but this is not enough.
As the theme, it is "subject to all the pulls and attractions of the other 
elements of the work**; third, **the poet necessarily tailormakes his language 
as he explores his meaning- He does not and cannot build up the meaning of 
his sentences as a mosaic is put together ofdiscrete independent tesserae"; 
his words take on meaning "only through the interplay of the interpretive 
possibilities of the whole utterance"; fourth, *'the reader, like the writer 
finds the meaning through a process of exploration** (this consequence sug­
gests a cognitive value for literature and a reversal in Richards’ former 
postulations when he had assigned this value to science alone); and fifth, 
"metaphor becomes the linchpin joining two contexts . . .  quite far 
apart and, in conventional discourse at least, utterly unrelated." And 
images that exist merely for their vividness are not the concrete particulars 
in which Richards is interested. Concrete particulars, for him, gain their 
importance because they are heterogeneous, and heterogeneity means difference
^^^Foster, p. 56. ^^^fimsatt and Brooks, p. 643.
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which "insures the sort of confrontation of unlike elements that is neces­
sary to prevent discourse from collapsing into literal statement," But 
metaphor "fundamentally . . .  is a borrowing between . . .  a transaction 
between contexts." It is not "'a grace or ornament or added power of 
la nguageit is 'its constitutive form.
Moreover, this contextual theory of meaning that Richards posits 
in his Philosophy of Rhetoric distinguishes more efficiently between the 
poetry of "exclusion** and the poetry of "inclusion," The former fails be­
cause it does not take into account the larger relevant context of the 
poem; it excludes from its context contradictory elements of experience 
which would, through ambiguity, supply a necessary tension and thereby sus­
tain the "ironical squint." The poetry of "inclusion," on the other hand, 
anticipates a wider range of context. "It has already made its peace with 
the recalcitrant and the contradictory.** Thus, as Richards says, it is 
"'invulnerable*** to "’ironic contemplation-*"^^^
Be that as it may, the form of all poetry for Richards and the 
criteria that separates good poetry from defective is conceived of as op­
posing impulses in a state of synaesthesis, or balanced tension, where con­
templation becomes the touchstone. And if our impulses are ordered by 
synaesthesis, the poetry of "inclusion** can transmit experience therapeu­
tically stable; and experience acquired emotionally as well as intellectu- 
. ally is knowledge both infinite and transcendant.
In Richards * own time his approach seemed **wholly novel" and came 
as a clean, fresh wind to the literary front— particularly did the thought 
presented in the Principles have its impact. Walter Jackson Bate sees 
Richards* impact on criticism as having had two major effects: one, it
^®^Ibxd., pp. 643-45. ^^^Ibid., pp. 621, 646.
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" [popularized] among critics a renewed interest in psychology**; and, two, 
it ** [redirected] the interest of the critic to the text of the particular 
poem and to the problem of analyzing it in terms of language, imagery, and 
m e t a p h o r . T h e  second effect, however, is the one^ according to Wellek, 
that not only succeeded but also dominated critical fashion in the forties 
and fifties. Rewrites:
Richards* dissolution of poetry into an occasion for the 
ordering of our impulses, as a means toward mental hygiene seems 
to me a blind alley of literary theory. But Richards had the real 
merit of turning attention to the language of poetry. When his 
central psychological teaching was ignored, his method of ana­
lysis could be made to yield concrete results.167
In the United States, the New Criticism that takes its direction 
from Richards originates, as might be expected, at the college level = with 
such teacher-critics as John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate, and Cleanth Brooks. 
As men-of-letters their preoccupation with criticism leads them to speak 
in different voices. The voice of Ransom and Tate is '*'personal, ’** "'im­
pressionistic,'" "'speculative,'** that of the critic who may "begin with 
a text" but will "move away toward general considerations of the imagina­
tion, the modem world, the nature of poetry, even the nature of reality." 
He will disdain the habits of the "academician" and will militate "against 
'scientism* and the anti-humane workshop of method," engaging his activi­
ties rather in general critical problems that are sometimes something 
other than criticism. By way of illustration, Foster observes:
With the exception of a few brief analytical **note‘s'* from Tate,
. . . of an occasional illustrative passage from Richards and 
a few special items like Ransom's study of Shakespeare's lang­
uage and Tate's detailed discussion of his own "Ode," we have 
mostly general or "speculative" essays from the critics . . .
p. 573. p. 352.
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In fact, among the major New Critics, only the voice of Brooks, the New 
Critics with which this section will close, is “impersonal," "textual,** 
and "technically analytical," that of the critic who ’*[engages] mainly 
in the detailed and selfless analysis of particular works of literature.
. . "(John Edward HardyE in The Hopkins Review, VI (1953), 160-61)
praises E his ] ’plain, steady, utilitarian manner . • . as an antidote to 
.the dangers of 'inspired* criticism.) Consequently, Brooks is long 
on analysis and short on theory; still his analyses serve as brilliant 
examples in support of theory.
In their "gestures toward theory," the work of Tate, Ransom, and 
Brooks has been more "casual and essayistic." But when they have theo­
rized, it has been to examine and define the nature of poetry—-good poe­
try, that is, and to defend its importance; and their work has produced 
"what Richards likes to call 'speculative instruments*— that is, metaphors 
or catchwords by which to conceive or * see* or to inquire further into, 
the nature of p o e t r y . T h e i r  "speculative instruments,” moreover, have 
concentrated on the poem as an object in which form and content are in­
separable, "the materials . . .  completely assimilated into the form" and 
the form "aesthetically organizing its ’matter’”; "what was ’world’ has 
become l a n g u a g e . A n d  collectively they have seen poetry’s function 
and value as a special kind of knowledge.
pp. 195, 198, 196. p. 195.
^’°Ibid., p. 199.
^^^Eene Wellek and Austin Warren, The Theory of Literature (london: 
Jonathan Cape, 1949), p. 252.
, 86
In his book The New Romantics, Foster has this to say about
the New Criticism and about John Crowe Ransom in Particular:
Of all the New and related critics who have gone in pursuit
of theory, it seems to me that John Crowe Ransom [b. 1888]
has had the largest and best success. In his whole critical 
life work he has devoted himself to only two or three major 
ideas, running them through and through his essays, refining 
them into, as I believe, the truest speculative instruments 
of this kind that we have had from any of the critics, in­
cluding Richards or Coleridge via Richards.
Ransom's speculative instrument is most explicitly set out in the last
chapter ("Wanted: An Ontological Critic") of his book The New Criticism.
Here he defines a poem as a "loose logical structure with an irrelevant
local t e x t u r e , a n d  on the basis of this definition he speculates as
to what poetry intends and builds the chief concepts of his views on
the nature of poetry. In fact, this special view of poetry and the
poetic process is Ransom’s contribution to criticism. For him a poem
is by nature an integrated structure with form and content, becoming,
after considerable compromise, one in the Concrete Universal.
Murray Krieger describes Ransom’s special view as a "struggle between
172Foster, p. 199.
173John Crowe Ransom, The New Criticism (Norfolk, Conn.: New
Directions, (1941), p. 280.
^^^"The criteria," according to Alex Preminger, Frank J. Hamke, 
and 0. B. Hardison, Jr., in Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 149—50, "for determining whether 
or not an object is a [concrete universal] are diversity of parts, inter­
relatedness of parts, completeness, unity, independence, and self-main­
tenance. In terms of these criteria, the only true [concrete universal] 
is the ’Absolute’ or ’(-Thole World’; but the phrase is also used in a 
secondary sense to denote microcosms within this macrocosm. A human 
being, a work of art, or an integrated society would be examples of such 
’finite’ concrete universals.
W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., in his article ’The Structure of the "Concrete
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173the poet and the linguistic medium,” "in which the argument [mean-
176
ing, or "structure,” as Ransom terms it] fights to displace the meter.”
The poet [Krieger says] . . . begins with a "determinate meaning," 
the prose statement he wishes to make. He chooses to present 
this meaning in one of the possible formal patterns which have 
been impressed on the medium of his tradition. Thus, along with 
his "determinate meaning" he begins with a "determinate sound."
Universal" in Literature* (1947) formally proposed [concrete universal] 
as a key term for a holistic poetics which would be 'objective and 
absolute* . . .He classifies as a [concrete universal] any natural 
or artificial object which exhibits 'organized heterogeneity' of a 
complexity sufficiently great to make it seem 'in the highest degree 
individual* . . .  In poetics he recommends that the term be used to 
denote not only the poem as a whole but also any of its distinguish­
able parts, such as characters or metaphors, which may be considered 
as small wholes within the larger whole. Perhaps the chief reason 
for Wimsatt*s preference for "[concrete universal]" is that it pro­
vides him with a pair of polar terras which suggest the structure of 
the organic unity of the poem. He regards a work of literature as 
discourse which expresses a *meaning,' 'value,' 'idea,' 'concept,* 
or 'abstraction* (the universal) by means of the specific details 
(the concrete) which constitute the matter of the poem. Thus the 
meaning is the form or unifying principle; and the poem is an or­
ganic unity if the characters, actions, metrical devices, words, and 
metaphors combine to body forth this universal. Furthermore, the 
concrete is the only possible means for expressing the universal, 
which (in a good poem) is so subtle and individual that ordinary 
language cannot provide a substantive class name for it.
^Murray Krieger, The New Apologists for Poetry (Minneapolis: 
The University of Minnesota Press, 1956), p. 82L
^^^Ransom, The New Criticism, p. 295.
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Ransom’s use of the term determinate means, then, that the poet begins 
with two factors which he believes to be "fixed and unyielding," His pro­
blem henceforth is to unite these two independent components into a poem.
Obviously, when he attempts to reconcile these opposites, "one or the
other or both of them will have to give."
These compromises emerge in the form of either "indeterminate 
meaning" (when the thought is somehow altered so that the formal
pattern may be maintained) or "indeterminate sound" (when the
sense of the prose paraphrase is maintained at the expense of 
the strict formal pattern). Thus, so far as meaning is concerned. 
Ransom is led to his distinction between "structure" and "tex­
ture." For him structure is what he calls the strict "logical" 
paraphrase, the determinate meaning with which the poet began.
The indeterminancies of meaning, into which the poet is forced 
by his devotion to the determinate sound constitute the poem’s 
texture- Texture, then, consists of "logical irrelevancies."
This explication of texture— as a body of "logical irrelevancies 
" . . .  although Ransom hardly means it disparagingly"— has earned for Ran-r 
som the criticism that he "is operating in terms of a form-content or 
message—embellishment dichotomy not unlike the 'decoration theories' of 
the eighteenth century"; therefore, as the criticism goes, "he blocks him­
self from his objective of achieving an ontological criticism of the poem 
as an organic entity," a criticism that he asks for in the final chapter 
of his book The New Criticism. Indeed, it would seem that Ransom's texture 
in a poem serves only the purpose of decoration and has "no inevitable func­
tion with the poem’s integrity,"^78 but in view of his distinctions be­
tween "'positive' indeterminancy," and that which is "'negative'" and 
"'corrupt,'" his theory essentially asks that in good poetry the "irrele­
vancies [ be ] made relevant." And if this happens poetry is "[transformed] 
. . .  into a new kind of discourse which has dimensions far beyond those
17?Krieger, pp. 82-83. p. 83.
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of mare logic." Moreover, "would-be compromises" become "triumphs," 
"mechanical form" becomes "organic form." "It is this positive inde­
terminancy [ irrelevance or texture 1 which, for Ransom, gives poetry its 
unique ontological status, which 'induces the provision of icons among 
the symbols,'" which in short, "'launches poetry upon its career.
And what more heroic career can there be for literature than a poe­
try "that stands up against the eviscerated world of ruthless efficiency 
which is the domain of nonpoetic discourse." For "poetry asserts its love 
for the individual object" (and in this sense Ransom claims "that the bio­
logical sanction for poetry is found in man’s need for love . . .") "even 
at the cost of introducing matter that is irrelevant to logic, the unyield­
ing overlord of other forms of d i s c o u r s e . Poetry, then, is the "demo­
cratic state" that Ransom speaks of in his essay "Criticism as Pure Specu­
lation,"^®^ the "relaxed atmosphere," in which "there is time for play, 
time to pause musingly over the autonomous units which the democratic state 
of poetry a l l o w s . I t  is the "pleasurable activity of mind excited by 
the attractions of the journey itself"^®® that Coleridge referred to in 
distinguishing poetry from prose.
Ransom later refines his structure-texture instrument into the 
idea of the Concrete Universal "by identifying the special nature of poetry
pp. 86, 87. pp. 85, 84, 85.
^^^John Crowe Ransom, "Criticism as Pure Speculation" in The Intent 
of the Critic, with an Introduction and ed. by Donald A. Stauffer (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 108.
^®^Krieger, p. 85 ^®®Coleridge, Biographie. p. 378.
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with the experienced concretions relation of abundant excess to the 
rational meaning. . . ." In other words, "the poem has more detail than 
the meaning requires. And because of this we care for the poem beyond 
its use as ’m e a n i n g . O r  in the words of perhaps Ransom's most useful 
trope:
The walls of my room are obviously structural; the beams and board 
have a function; so does the plaster, which is the visible aspect 
of the final wall. The plaster might have remained naked, aspir­
ing to no character, and purely functional. But actually it has 
been painted, receiving color; or it has been papered, receiving 
color and design, though these have no structural value; and per­
haps it has been hung with tapestry, or with paintings, for "decor­
ation." The paint, the paper, the tapestry are texture. It is 
logically unrelated to structure. But I indicate only a few of 
the textural possibilities in architecture. There are not fewer 
of them in poetry.
The intent of the good critic becomes therefore to examine 
and define the poem with respect to its structure and its texture.
If he has nothing to say about its texture he has nothing to say 
about it specifically as a poem, but is treating it only insofar
as it is p r o s e . 185
Thus, just as all the New Critics, Ransom looks at the poem as 
an entity, complete within itself. It has a "logical substance" that "[re­
mains ] there all the time and [is ] in no way specially remarkable, while 
the particularity [comes] in by accretion, so that the poem:[turns] out 
partly universal and partly particular, but with respect to different parts. 
(Even though Ransom accepts the theory of the concrete universal, he ac­
cepts it only as a term designating the components in poetry and only in 
a nonholistic s e n s e . A n d  despite the struggle that goes on in the
184 ig5Foster, p. 199. Ransom, "Criticism as Pure Speculation," p. 111.
p. 110.
187preininger, Warnke, and Hardison in Encyclopedia of Poetry and 
Poetics, p. 150, point out that the "holistic connotation of ’concrete uni­
versal,* which made Ransom view the term with suspicion, has made it an 
attractive term for other modem critics who argue that a work of literature 
should be regarded as an organic unity from which nothing can be subtracted 
and to which nothing can be added without detriment to the whole."
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composition of a poem between the "argument” and the "meter," between the 
meaning and the sound, all elements of the poem— meter, diction, metaphor, 
and methods of organizing the poem, such as thejuxtaposition of unlike 
elements, the bringing together of homogeneous elements, the use of alliter­
ation, of rhyme, the use of assonance to echo and stress a word rather than 
repeat it explicitly— contribute to its meaning and constitute its form. 
Essentially, then, for Ransom, there is no form-content dichotomy in his 
structure-texture instrument. He testifies to this when he says, "I sug­
gest that the meter—meaning process is the organic act of poetry, and in­
volves all of its important characters.
As to the function and value that Ransom assigns poetry, he is ex­
plicit here also. He sees it as knowledge. For even though his critical 
career has largely been directed toward a "’speculative’ inquiry into the 
nature of poetry" through his structure-texture instrument that was later 
to be "[restated] in the idea of the Concrete tlniversal,"^®^ he has 
steadily moved toward the abstractionism that he earlier detested in those—  
"Plato, Aristotle, the Hegelians, and many others related and unrelated"^^^ 
— who were unable to appreciate the particulars of the world, "of nature as 
an object to be beloved for itself, of poetry or art as the flesh of experi­
ence filling out to completion the otherwise merely skeletal knowledges 
of science and conceptualization." "He has," as Foster phrases it, "himself 
taken, in fact, a small pilgrimage toward Truth along with some of his
1938), p. 200.
^®®Ransom, The New Criticism, p. 195 ^^^Foster, pp. 137-38,
^^®John Crowe Ransom, The World’s Body (New York: Charles Scribner’s,
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fellow critics." Indeed, Ransom defends poetry's right to call itself 
"knowledge," and he witnesses to this belief when in his later criticism 
he merges his texture-structure trope with the idea of.the Concrete Univ­
ersal by a shift of grammar: the "noun-noun duality" of texture-struc­
ture becomes the "adjective-noun unity" of the Concrete Universal.
Specifically, Ransom explains his doctrine of poetry as knowledge 
in terms of scientific and poetic discourse, discourses distinguished by 
the fact that each has its own referential world. "[The] world or worlds, 
for there are many of them which we treat in our scientific discourses . . .  
are its reduced, emasculated, and docile versions." Poetic discourse, on 
the other hand, " [recovers ] the denser and more refractory original world 
which we know loosely through our perceptions and memories." In this sense, 
then, "it is a kind of knowledge which is radically or ontologically dis­
tinct" from scientific knowledge because content of the "original" world 
usually defies logical contemplation. But the crucial feature of poetry 
as discourse that distinguishes it from scientific discourse is the fact 
that poetic discourse has "an order of content, : rather than a kind of con­
tent, and this in turn, distinguishes texture from structure . . .  poe­
try from prose," Therefore, for Ransom, "the differentia of poetry as dis­
course is an ontological one," because poetry "treats an order of existence, 
a grade of objectivity," an original or primordial world, "which cannot be 
treated in scientific d i s c o u r s e .
Hence, if Ransom's view of poetry's special function should become 
the consensus, the ancient unresolved question of whether literature, com­
pared to science, is knowledge would cease to be pertinent. For just as 
science is knowledge of a world that poetry has no answers for, so too is
191 192Foster, pp. 138, 144. Ransom, The New Criticism, p. 281.
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poetry knowledge of a world that science cannot explain. Each, in fact,
is knowledge. One, cognitive; one, affective.
Ransom seemed to be trying to straddle this archetyptal split be­
tween feeling and intellect when he claimed in The New Criticism 
that for Coleridge images and feelings "are synonymous . . .  in 
so far as they are one-to-one correspondents, one representing 
the cognitive side and the other the affective side of the same 
experience." This means that though an image may be said to be 
a cognition in that it "corresponds" to something in the real 
world and is in that sense "true," as Ransom put it elsewhere, 
it also engages our affections for itself on its own terms as a 
valuable object of sense experience over and above its service 
as a cognition. Most simply, then, an image or a poem may be 
both an object understood and an object loved.
But "the real act of knowledge," Ransom believes, would come 
about when scientists "commit themselves to aesthetic as well as scienti­
fic discourse." And when (if ever) this should occur, the "scientific 
and aesthetic ways of knowledge," which are perhaps "alterantive know­
ledges," would "illuminate each other . . . Here Ransom reiterates 
what Wordsworth affirmed more than a century earlier in his Preface to 
the Lyrical Ballads: "If the time should ever come when what is now
called science . . .  shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of 
flesh and blood, the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the trans­
figuration . . . Thus the notion that a "poem is a self—inclosed 
world, which 'recovers for us the world of solid substance,'" that "poetry 
is one way of knowing the w o r l d , i s  Ransom's doctrine of poetry as 
knowledge. And since "the body supplied by poetry" came to be called 
"'texture,' and the conceptual skeleton which it clothed and animated" 
came to be designated "'structure,'" with structure meaning
193 194Foster, pp. 139—40. Ransom, The New Criticism, p. 294.
l^^Wordsworth, p. 342.
^^^Robert Wooster Stal ________
(New York: Ronald Press Co., 1949), p. 499.
lman, Critiques and Essays in Criticism
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its plot, its theme, its 'paraphrasable content'— along with its 
machineries of continuity and organization— and texture meaning 
all the engaging inclusions of the poem's art— its sound, its 
rhythm, its images— that interest us aesthetically after they ,gy 
have made whatever structural contribution they are capable of.
the nature of poetry, its form and content, its function and value would 
all seem to ray out from Ransom's special instrument of speculation. More­
over, the key terms of his instrument epitomize his views on the nature of 
poetry and mark him as the one New Critic (along with Allen Tate) only in­
cidentally concerned with the technical criticism of poetry, yet vitally 
committed to the philosophical principle "that the differentium of poetry 
is a metaphyiscal or ontological one" and that "poetry [in short] is onto­
logy . . . 'for poetry strives . . . towards the roots of the knowledge of
B e i n g . ' " 1 9 8
The next New Critic, Allen Tate (b. 1899), who saw John Crowe Ran- 
some as "'skepitcal and searching,'” is also seen as "'skepitcal and search­
ing-'" According to Foster, "he is less a technical literary critic than 
an essayist using literature as a frame of the reference within which he 
criticizes the mind and life of his time in the light of his convictions 
about the proper ends of m a n . N o n e t h e l e s s ,  Tate subscribes to special 
tenets concerning the nature of poetry and its process of creation and ex­
amines the "patterns of coherent relationships between denotative and con— 
notative meanings in poetry"^^^ by making use of his analytic Instrument 
which he calls "tension." Like Ransom, he opposes the view of Art for
19?Foster, p. 139 ^^^Stallraan, p. 499.
l^^Foster, p. 108.
^9^Wllliam Van. O'Connor, An Age of Criticism: 1900—1950 (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1952), p. 170.
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Art's S a k e . R a t h e r  his view speaks of "art for life's sake,"^^^
Thus, poetry is experience in itself, experience which Tate sees as an
inherent part of life; it is absolute and is not as the Hegelians saw it
203"the concrete experience . . . dissolved into the absolute Absolute."
More specifically, as a quality of the imagination, it seizes "the inward 
meaning of experience" and creates the "vision of the whole of life . . ."204 
With this view, Foster says, "Tate does for the imagination what Coleridge 
was unable to do. He performs an act of recognition of the imagination as 
the unifying power not only of artistic creation, but also of man's total 
life as a spiritual and social b e i n g . ( O f  course, Foster's statement 
is in variance with Ernest Bernbaum's comment concerning Coleridge's phi­
losophy of life, which, according to Bernbaum, served as the wellspring of 
his critical principles I see supra p. 55, par. 1, II. 7-16].)
Theoretically, Tate's basis of the formal structure of a poem, as 
organic with form and content inseparable, is bound up with his concept 
of "tension," which Wellek says "punningly combines 'extension' and 'in­
tension,' with 'intension' meaning something very close to Ransom's 'tex­
t u r e . W i t h  "tension," then, as a criterion, Tate— using "extension"
Preminger, Warnke, and Hardison, in Enclvclooedia of Poetry and 
Poetics, pp. 645-47, explain that "the common ground of the various doctrines 
and there are many of them, beginning with the writers and philosophers 
of the German Romantic movement— Kant, Schelling, Goethe, and Schiller 
classified as 'Art for Art's Sake' is the concept that its claim to truth, 
its principles of order, and its values are bounded by the confines of the 
work of art itself; and that the end of a poem is not to teach, nor even to 
please, but simply to exist and be beautiful."
202Allen Tate, The Man of Letters in the Modern World (London: 
Meridian Books, 1957), pp. 119-20.
203poster, p. 120.
^^^Allen Tate, On the Limits of Poetry (New York: William Morrow.
& Co., 1948), p. 92
ZO^Foster, p. 121. p_ 62.
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or denotation, as a base "on which 'intension,* or connotation, can build 
207poetically" — fuses the intensive and extensive elements into a new and
integral mode of discourse. From his essay "Tension in Poetry" (1938) 
Tate, writes:
Ifhat I am saying, of coursé, is that the meaning of poetry is its 
"tension," the full organized body of all the extension [ denota­
tion] and intension [ connotation] that we can find in it. The 
remotest figurative significance that we can derive does not in­
validate the extensions of the literal statement. Or we may be­
gin with the literal statement and by stages develop the compli­
cations of metaphor: at every stage we may pause to state the
meaning so far apprehended, and at every stage the meaning will 
be coherent.
To further explain, he continues:
The meanings that we select at different points along the infinite 
line between extreme intension and extreme extension will vary with 
our personal "drives" or "interest" or "approach" : the Platonist 
will tend to stay pretty close to the end of the line where exten­
sion, and simple abstraction of the object into a universal, is 
easiest, for he will be a fanatic in morals or some kind of works, 
and will insist upon the shortest way with what will ever appear to 
him the dissenting ambiguities at the intensive end of the scale.
The Platonist [ for example ] might decide that Marvel's "To His Coy 
Mistress" recommends immoral behavior to the young men, in whose be­
half he would try to suppress the poem. That,of course, would be 
one "true" meaning of "To His Coy Mistress," but it is a meaning 
that the full tension of the poem will not allow us to entertain ex­
clusively. For we are compelled, since it is there, to give equal' 
weight to an intensive meaning so rich that, without contradicting 
the literal statement of the lover-mistress convention, it lifts 
that convention into an insightjinto one phase ofthe human predica­
ment— the conflict of sensuality and a s c e t i c i s m . ^ 0 8
Inferior poetry, however, does not have tension; that is, it suf­
fers from what Tate refers to as a lack of "logical determinism" or co­
herence. For example, some poems are a "failure in denotation." The 
language they use "appeals to an existing affective state; [ they have] no 
coherent meaning either literally or in terms of ambiguity or implication.
^^^Krieger, p. 143. ^^^Tate, Limits of Poetry, p. 83.
pp. 79, 81, 78.
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In short, the words in the context of the lines refer to no literal object; 
they are, in fact, denotatively fallible. Tate illustrates this "failure" 
by James Thomson's poem "The Vine," an eighteenth-century lyric "selected 
at random." The lines read:
The wine of love is music
And the feast of love is song:
When love sits down to banquet.
Love sits long:
Sits long and rises drunken.
But not with the feast and the wine;
He reeleth with his own heart.
That great rich Vine.
He points out that the words "’music” ' and "'song’" in the first two lines
cannot, in the context, be rendered in extension (denotation), for "there
is no reference to objects that we may distinguish as ’music’ and ’song’;
the wine of love could have as well been song, its feast music." The reader
brings to the reading of this poem an "existing affective state" and the
language is "replaced by any of its several paraphrases already latent in
[his mind] Moreover, "the imagery adds nothing to the general idea it
tries to sustain.
To illustrate a poem that fails connotatively, Tate submits lines
from Abraham Cowley’s poem "Hymn" to light," another example of what Tate
designates as "bad lyric verse no better than ’The Vine,’ written in an age
[the seventeenth century ] that produced some of the greatest English poetry."
"Here," he says, "is one of the interesting duties of light:"
Nor arftidst all these Triumphs does thou scorn 
The humble glow-worm to adorn.
And with those Living spangles gild,
(0 Greatness without Pride]) the Bushes of the Field.
21°Ibid., pp. 81, 78. Zlllbid., p. 79.
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The Violet, springs little infant, stands 
Girt in thy purple Swadling-bands:
On the fair Tulip thou dost dote;
Thou cloath'st it in a gay and party-colour*d Coat.
"This," he tells us, "doubtless is metaphysical poetry," and metaphysical 
poetry, according to John Crowe Ransom— and Tate quotes him— has the"impulse" 
of
committing the feelings in the case . . .  to their determination, 
within the elected figure. That is to say, in metaphysical poetry 
the logical order is explicit; it must be coherent; the imagery by 
which it is sensuously embodied must have at least the appearance 
of logical determinism: perhaps the appearance only, because the
varieties of ambiguity and contradiction possible beneath the lo­
gical surface are endless . . .  Here it is enough to say that the 
development of imagery by extension, its logical determinants being 
an Ariadne's thread that the poet will not permit us to lose, is the 
leading feature of the poetry called metaphysical.212
Now "Hymn: to light" is "a simple analysis of the term God and 
gave Cowley . . . the propositions: God is light." To write his poem 
he developed the symbol of listing "some of the offices" that light "per­
forms" in the universe. And he does this by "synthetic accretion," Tate 
explains, "by adding to light properties not inherent in its simple ana­
lysis. The lines he takes exception to and deals with explicitly are 
the first lines in the second stanza:
The Violet, springs little Infant, stands.
Girt in thy purple Swadling bands:
The image, here, "is an addition to the central figure of light, an as­
sertion of a hitherto undetected relation among the objects, light, dia­
pers, and violets - . .*̂ 213 short, it is a tacked on image, one that is
not embodied in light as one of its properties. As a "failure in connota­
tion," Tate says:
. . .  a reduction to their connotations of the terras violet, swad— 
ling bands, and light (the last being represented by the pronoun
pp. 79-80. pp. 80-81.
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thou) yields a clutter of images that may be unified only if 
we forget the firm denotations of the terms. If we are going 
to receive as valid the infancy of the violet, we must ignore 
the metaphor that conveys it, for the metaphor renders the 
violet absurd; by ignoring the diaper, andthe two terms as­
sociated with it, we cease to read the passage, and begin for
ourselves the building up of acceptable denotations for the 
terms of the metaphor.
Thus, according to Tate, Cowley's poem denies the feelings '"to their de­
termination in the elected figure'"; whereas "good poetry" is coherent 
at every step along the way and "is a unity of all the meanings from the 
furthest extremes of intension and e x t e n s i o n . A n d ,  as earlier noted, 
in his view there is no matter of form and content as separate entities.
He sees this unity as a "fusion of art and nature, of technique and sub­
ject," with "nature intractable to art, art unequal to nature,
But even though art is unequal to nature, its product-process—  
poetry— gives complete knowledge, and this is its function and true value. 
Tate, like Ransom, opposes "the positivists' claim that valid knowledge 
is the sole preserve of science" and insists "that poetry is 'cognitive' 
and yields us a 'special, unique, and complete k n o w l e d g e . S c i e n c e ,  
on the other hand, gives "partial knowledge," gives us abstraction and 
"abstraction violates art." Still he feels that poetry to be good must 
"^proceed] from a union of intellect and feeling, or rather [and here he
gets back to his special trope] from a 'tension' between abstraction and 
217sensation." In comparing the scientific spirit and the creative spirit,
however, he sees the former as the "cheerful confidence in the limitless 
power of man to impose practical abstractions upon his experience." He 
calls this a "positive P l a t o n i s m , A t  the opposite end of the scale is
214ibid., pp. 81, 79, 82. ^^^O'Connor, p. 168, n. 8.
^^®Preminger, Warnke, and Hardison, p. 647. ^Wellek, p. 359. 
^^^Tate, Limits of Poetry, p. 95.
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"negative Platonism" or "romantic irony," whereby "the romantic tries to 
build up a set of fictitious 'explanations' by means of rhetoric for ex­
perience." But the creative spirit denies both forms of Platonism, being 
rather a middle ground between the two positions. And "its function is 
the quality of experience, the total revelation— not explanation for the 
purpose of external control by the will." It is, in fact, and this is 
its "true usefulness . . .  a focus of repose for the will-driven intellect 
that constantly shakes the equilibrium of persons and societies with its 
unremitting imposition of partial formulas." More important,
when the will and its formulas are put back into an implicit re­
lation with the whole of our experience, we get the true knowledge 
which is poetry. It is the "kind of knowledge which is really es­
sential to the world, the true content of its phenomena, that which 
is subject to no change, and therefore is known with equal truth for 
all time.219
For Tate, then, literature "is a •*criticism of life,' which is 
more than a matter of the 'aesthetics of l i t e r a t u r e . Indeed, "works 
of literature . . .  are the recurrent discovery of the human communion as 
experience, in a definite place and at a definite time."^^l These obser­
vations, of course, return the focus to the function and value of litera­
ture, the concern with which Tate was preoccupied. Also they speak out 
on literature's nature and the oneness, the union of intellect and feeling, 
the "tension" between abstraction and sensation that, in Tate's view, serves 
as the touchstone of all good poetry.
Cleanth Brooks (b- 1906), perhaps (the last critic with which this 
history is concerned), subscribes to the organic theory of literature more 
than any one of the New Critics- Although his forte is technical criticism.
219lbld., pp. 95, 113-14. ^^°Foster, p. 123.
Tate, Man of Letters, p. 18.
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in which he has examined "a number of celebrated English poems . . .  from 
the Elizabethan period to the present," he necessarily theorizes as to the 
nature of literature and its process as a structural matrix in which form 
and content are inextricably bound. But concerning the function and value 
of literature he has been less vocal than some of the other New Critics, 
preoccupying himself rather with what constitutes "good" poetry and sepa­
rates it from poems that have less merit. Like Ransom and Tate, then, he 
too has been in search of a speculative Instrument, one that can be applied 
to any and all kinds of poetry. In his book The Well Wrought Ilm (1947), 
he states:
. . . what must be sought is an instrument which will allow for 
some critical precision, and yet one which may be used in service, 
not of Romantic poetry, or of metaphysical poetry, but of p o e t r y . 222
Brooks's method of procedure would be to establish common structural prin­
ciples that should inhere in "good" poems and use these as the criteria 
by which to judge any poem.
He views the poem as a symbolic structure and defines it as a 
"simulacrum of r e a l i t y . "223 More specifically, it is a structure of oppo­
sites, tensions, paradoxes, ambiguities, and ironies. And for him, para­
dox and irony are the broad terms for certain elements that get structured
into the poem and which serve as its hallmark. But "irony is not the op-
,224 ,posite of an overt statement" (the conventional meaning of irony), but
"a general term . . .  for the kind of qualification which the various ele—
225ments in a context receive from the context." Irony "indicates the re-
222Cleanth Brooks, The Nell Wrought Urn (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock,
1947), pp. 9, 200.
^^^Ibid., p. 194. 224̂ ĝ]̂ ]̂ ĝ  ̂ p. 329. 225Bj-ooks, p. 191.
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cognition of incongruities, the union of opposites which Brooks finds in
all good, that is, complex 'inclusive* poetry. [ For] poetry must be ironic
in the sense of being able to withstand ironic c o n t e m p l a t i o n . O r ,  as
many of the New Critics insist **a poem can make itself invulnerable to
the reader's irony only by being itself i r o n i c . B r o o k s  offers the
poetry of Dante and Milton as examples of irony being built into the poem
so that the attitude informs the poem. In reference to Dante, he states:
• • . Dante was not content merely to set forth Catholic dogma • • • 
he wishes to dramatize it . . . [ and] . . .  to me it is significant 
that Dante, in dramatizing his faith, was willing to portray more 
than one pope in hell. Surely there is more than mere propagand­
izing for a dogma and an institution in a view which can envisage 
Christ's vicar among the damned. Indeed, I should say that Dante 
was quite willing to expose his preachment to something very like 
an "ironical contemplation."
Similarly, he cites Milton's presentation of Lucifer "with full dramatic
sympathy . . ."as ironic in that "inadvertantly" he made "out a case
for Lucifer rather than for God."
A weaker poet [ Brooks continues] — and a more forthright propa­
gandist— would have risked no such ambiguity. He would have set 
up Lucifer as a straw man to be overthrown rather than as a power­
ful being who challenges the place of hero.228
But "the same principle that insures the presence of irony in so 
many of our great poems [such as the Divine Comedy and Paradise Lost], 
Brooks believes, also accounts for the fact that so many of them seem to 
be built around paradoxes." Therefore, "it is not enough for the poet 
to analyze his experience as the scientist does, breaking it up into parts, 
distinguishing part from part, classifying the various parts."
226wellek, p. 329. ^^^Krieger, p. 121.
228Brooks, pp. 204-5.
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His task is finally to unify experience. He must return to us the 
unity of the, experience itself as man knows it in his ox-m experi­
ence. The poem, if it be a true poem is a simulacrum of reality—  
in this sense, at least, it is an "imitation"— by being an experi­
ence rather than any mere statement about experience or any mere 
abstraction from experience.
It is alive and vital, then, and complex— much more complex than what it
has to say on a surface level. For example, in Keats's poem "Ode
on a Grecian Urn" "the u m  must express a life which is above life and its
vicissitudes, but it must also bear witness to the fact that its life is
not life at all but is a kind of death." Similarly, in John Donne’s poem
"Canonization," where he "treats divine love as profane love,” " his lovers
must reject the world in order to possess the world."
If the poet, then, must perforce dramatize the oneness of the ex­
perience, even though paying tribute to its diversity, then his 
use of paradox and ambiguity is seen as necessary. He is not 
simply trying to spice up, with a superficially exciting or mysti­
fying rhetoric, the old stale stockpot . . .  He is rather giving 
us an insight which preserves the unity of experience and which, 
at its higher and more serious levels, triumphs over the apparently 
contradictory and conflicting elements of experience by unifying 
them into a new pattern.
Thus, the "language of poetry is the language of paradox," and the poem gets
its power "from the paradoxical situation out of which the poem arises.
In "good" poetry then, as distinguished from "bad," the "words 
struggle" to import meaning, struggling to negate "their natural (that is.
229lbid., p. 194. 23°Ibld., pp. 194-95, 10, 195, 3, 5.
231Brooks qualifies his use of these terms by acknowledging that 
good and bad "are meaningless terms when used absolutely . . .  We have 
come to believe less and less [ he says] in any absolute criteria . . .
But giving up our criteria of good and bad, we have, as a consequence, I 
believe, begun to give up our concept of poetry itself. Obviously, if 
we can make no judgments about a poem as ^  poem, the concept of poetry as 
distinct from other kinds of discourse which employ words becomes mean­
ingless." (The Well Wrought Uim, p. 198.)
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their [ referential ] nonpoetic) function" and "to block their direct point-
ing"232 to a propositional statement. To be sure, a poem
may contain statements among its elements; but they are not in 
its essence, have no primacy over other elements, but are or­
ganically related to them. Though they can be paraphrased, the 
paraphrase is not the real core of meaning which constitutes the 
essence of the poem; . . .
And it is worth noting at this point that **[ a poem] has a dramatic, not 
a logical structure; , . . it is a structure of attitudes. . . It is 
not à statement, but . . .  a symbolic action; and . . . its form is in­
separable from its content.Nevertheless, and Brooks emphasizes this 
point, this does not mean that "there is not the closest relationship be­
tween the intellectual materials which { the poem absorbs ] into [its ] struc­
ture and other elements in the structure . . . the relationship is not 
that of an idea *wrapped in emotion’ or a ’prose sense decorated by sen­
suous imagery.’" Or to put it another way:
The dimension in which the poem moves is not one which excludes 
ideas, but one which includes attitudes. The dimension includes 
ideas,, to be sure; we can always abstract an "idea" from a poem-
even from the simplest poem • . • But the idea which we abstract
. . .  will always be abstracted.
And this will not do. "In terms of a principle analogous to that of dra­
matic propriety," an abstraction cannot remain in limbo, nor can it be
justified "by virtue of its scientific or historical or philosophical 
t r u t h . I t s  only justification can be effected in terms of the poem.
Thus, the proposition that "Beauty is truth, truth beauty" is 
given its precise meaning and significance by its relation to 
the total context of the poem . . .  We as readers can attempt
^^^Krieger, p. 131.
^^^Preminger, Warnke, and Hardison, pp. 344-45. 
^^^Brooks, pp. 187-88.
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to frame such a proposition in our effort to understand the 
poem; it may well help toward an understanding. Certainly the 
efforts to arrive at such propositions can-do not harm if we do 
not mistake them for the inner core of the poem— if we do not 
mistake, them for "what the poem really says." For, if we take 
one of them to represent the essential poem, we have to disre­
gard the qualifications exerted by the total context as of.no 
account, or else we have assumed that we can reproduce the ef­
fect of the total context in a condensed prose statement. But 
to deny that the coherence of a poem is reflected in a logical 
paraphrase of its "real meaning" is not, of course, to deny 
coherence.to poetry; it is^rather to assert that its coherence 
is to be sought elsewhere.
And, finally, (Here, in a final summation on poetic unity. Brooks
demonstrates his proposition that "the parts of a poem are related as are the
parts of a  growing p l a n t .
the characteristic unity of a poem . • . lies in the unification 
of attitudes into a hierarchy subordinated to a total and govern­
ing attitude. In the unified poem, the poet has "come to terms" 
with his experience. The poem does not merely eventuate in a 
logical conclusion . The conclusion of the poem is the working 
out of the various tensions— set up by whatever means— by proposi­
tions, metaphors, symbols. The unity is achieved by a dramatic 
process, not a logical; it represents an equilibrium of forces, 
not a formula. It is "proved" as a dramatic conclusion is proved: 
by its ability to resolve the conflicts which have been accpeted 
as the données of the drama.
Thus, it is easy to see why the relation of each item to the 
whole context is crucial, and why the effective and essential 
structure of the poem has to do with the complex of attitudes 
achieved. A scientific proposition can stand alone. If it is 
true, it is true. But the expression of an attitude, apart from 
the occasion which generates it and the situation which it encom­
passes, is meaningless. For example, the last two lines of . . . 
[Wordsworth's] "Intimations" ode.
To me the meanest flower that blows can give 
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears,
when taken into isolation— 1 do not mean quoted in isolation by one 
who Is even vaguely acquainted with thecontext— makes a state­
ment which is sentimental if taken in reference to the speaker, 
and one which is patent nonsense if taken with a general refer­
ence. The man in the street (of whom the average college fresh­
man is a good enough replica) knows that the meanest flower that 
grows does not give him thoughts that lie too deep for tears; and.
235ibid., pp. 188-89, 236Abrams, p. 222.
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if he thinks about the matter at all, he is inclined to feel that 
the person who can make such an assertion is a very fuzzy senti­mentalist, 237
It would seem, then, that any statement detached from its context is in 
grave danger of becoming misconstrued.
Moreover, such a formula that implies "that the poem constitutes 
a 'statement* of some sort, the statement being true or false, and ex­
pressed more or less clearly or eloquently or beautifully" is what Brooks 
calls the "heresy of paraphrase," his trope and concept discussed in his 
book The Well Wrought U m » Here, he points out that the heresy of para­
phrase can lead to "most of [ the ] difficulties in criticism": It results
in the distortion between the poem and its "'truth,*" in the dichotomy of 
its "'form*" and its "'content,'" bringing "the statement to be conveyed 
into an unreal competition with science or philosophy or theology,
Thus, as Brooks would say, "the discussion of the poem is not to 
be substituted for the poem; it should return us to the poem." And since 
a poem "does not state ideas but rather tests ideas" and since the ideas 
being tested are those concerned with man ,"a poem . . . is to be judged, 
not by the truth or falsity as such, of the idea which it incorporates, 
but rather by its character as drama— by its coherence, sensitivity, depth, 
richness, and tough-mindedness." Based on this premise, then. Brooks sug­
gests that on the basis of Richards* distinction between "a poetry of ex­
clusion" and one of "inclusion" (see•supra, pp. 78-79, 82) a scale might 
be developed for "determining the value of poetry."
^^^Brooks, pp. 189-90. pp. 179, 184.
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Low in the cale he explains one would find a rather simple poe­
try in which the associations of the various elements that go to 
make up the poem are similar in tone and therefore can be unified 
under one rather simple attitude— poems of simple affection, posi­
tive, "external" satires, etc. Higher in the scale, one would find 
poems, in which the variety and clash among the elements to be com­
prehended under a total attitude are sharper- In tragedy, where 
the clash is at its sharpest— where the tension between attraction 
and repulsion is most powerful— one would probably find the highest 
point in the scale. So much for the positive side; but there is a 
negative side too, where one would place those poems which failed 
to secure unity at all— or achieved only, a specious reconciliation 
of attitudes— the sentimental poem.
Such a test. Brooks feels, although it does not "[eliminate] the subjec­
tive element in judgment," would provide a two-fold advantage: (1) "a
hierarchy" could be established "in terms of the organization of the 
poems themselves— not by having to appeal to some outside scale of values"; 
and (2) "the recently accepted hierarchy of poems" could be corrected and 
improved "if this mode of evaluation rests upon what is really a more ac­
curate account of the structure of poetry."^40
Technical critic that he is, striving for a means by which to 
evaluate literature in terms of the selection itself. Brooks seldom com­
mits himself in regard to the function and value literature may possess, 
as do his contemporaries Ransom and Tate, But he does speak of poetic 
truth and scientific truth in relation to the language of paradox, so that, 
obliquely, it would seem that he assigns a knowledge-value to poetry. 
Otherwise, however, he skirts the issue, preferring rather to report what 
others have to say in this regard and then taking issue. In the last chap­
ter of The Well Wrought Urn— "The Problem of Belief and the Problem of Cog­
nition" (pp. 226-38)— he discusses Wilbur Marshall Urban and his views on 
poetry's function as set out in his text Language and Reality. "Poetry 
[Urban says] is not merely emotive , . . but cognitive. It gives us truth.
239ibid., pp. 233, 229-30. , p. 239
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241and characteristically gives us truth through its metaphors . . -**
Such statement Brooks could hardly counter. But any commitment he might 
have to it is qualified by skepticism, in that he questions Urban’s position 
as that perhaps of those theorists who "claim cognition for poetry only 
at the price of considering it ultimately as distorted and imperfect philo­
s o p h y . I n  this same chapter, he also makes reference to I. A. Richards, 
Allen Tate,, and Suzanne Langer, discussing their views on poetry's use but 
always marshalling objections. However, in the chapter "The Heresy of 
Paraphrase" (The Well Wrought U m , pp. 176-96), he openly disclaims any 
desire to assign a function to poetry- For example, after having dis­
cussed the positive function that such "irrelevancies" as "metrical pat- »
tern" and "metaphor" have in the poem, he makes the statement:
If the last sentence seems to take a dangerous turn toward 
some special "use of poetry"— some therapeutic value for the 
sake of which poetry is to be cultivated— I can only say that I 
have in mind no special ills which poetry is to cure. Uses for 
poetry are always to be found, and doubtless will continue to be 
found. But my discussion of the structure of poetry is not being
conditioned at this point by some new and special role which I ex­
pect poetry to assume in the future or some new function to which
I would assign it.243
Nevertheless, since Brooks is an exponent of the objective theory of the
New Criticism, he, along with the other New Critics, separates himself
from impressionistic criticism and the theory of Art for Art's Sake by
his instrument of irony and paradox, upon which he has built his aesthetic.
Thus, he has, as Preminger and his associate editors put it, "rescued the
poem as poem from the claim that its sole function is a beautiful inutility,
by engaging it with our ordinary moral consciousness and experiences of life."^^^
241ibid., p. 232. p. 233.
^^^Ibid., p. 191. ^^^Preminger, Wamke, and Hardison, p. 647.
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Cleanth Brooks, more than any of the New Critics, has worked close 
to specific texts in order to show a poem as an organic unit of sensibi­
lity, one in which form and content are inseparable. He feels that such 
an attempt must be made
. . .  if poetry exists as poetry in any meaningful sense . . .
Otherwise he maintains the poetry of the past becomes signifi­
cant merely as cultural anthropology, and the poetry of the pres­
ent, merely as a political, or religious, or moral Instrument.2^5
Thus, with Cleanth Brooks and the New Criticism, a history of criti­
cism that began in England almost four centuries ago comes to an end. 
Historically, the conception of literature has progressed from the prag­
matic theory in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the expres­
sive theory in the nineteenth century to the objective theory in the 
twentieth century. Each theory has had a different approach with a dif­
ferent element as the point of focus so that the movement in this respect 
has been from audience to poet to the work itself. Moreover, each theory 
has been dealt with as to the conceptions that the representative critics 
of each approach have taken toward literature’s nature— its essence, wheth­
er imitation, expression, or structure, and the characteristics— content 
and form and function and value— that describe it. Perhaps the objective 
approach under the aegis of the New Critics created more of a "stir" than
either the pragmatic or expressive approaches. But opinions vary as to the
impact the New Criticism, with its emphasis on the work itself, has had 
on literary theory, since its inception in the early thirties. Robert W. 
Stallman in his text Critique and Essays in Criticism (1949) writes:
Our age is indeed an age of criticism. The structure of
critical ideas and the practical criticism that British critics—
^^^Brooks, pp. 10-11.
110
Leavis, Turnell, Empson, Read— and American critics— Ransom,
Tate, Brooks, Warren, Blackmur, Winters— have contrived upon 
the foundations of Eliot and Richards constitute an achievement 
in literary criticism which has not been equaled in any previous 
period of our literary h i s t o r y . ^46
Some twelve years later, Richard Foster in his book The New Romantics
(1962) gives the Neïf Critics credit for having *'[ hounded ] the age back
to the text and the conscious analytical reading of it . . .** And in
other passages, he adds his praise to Stallman’s He writes:
There certainly seem to be more than sufficient grounds on which 
to assert the importance for our age of the New Criticism.
A viableness of sensibility, a readiness for "speculative fury," 
a susceptibility at bottom, even to moments of romantic frenzy, 
these are qualities that gave the New Critics their original im­
petus to move against the sterility of literary study in their 
time and to challenge the dehumanizing conditions of the world 
that bred it . , . The New Critics have created, willy-nilly, 
by the hard personal labor of their extemporizing a structure 
of value in the midst of chaos, a major testament of that modem 
necessity.
On a less positive note a decade later, Robert Langbaum, The 
Modern Spirit (1970), speaks of the New Criticism as an incomplete criti­
cism and the New Critics as technicians, who "must always in the end put 
[their ] tools at the service of the man who knows what he wants to use 
them for. And understanding the text, if we may judge by the best criti­
cism of the past, is where criticism begins, not where it ends." He 
maintains moreover that as a movement it is "dead— dead of its very suc­
cess." Still, as he repudiates them, he manages to praise them:
We are all New Critics nowadays, whether we like it or not, in 
that we cannot avoid discerning and appreciating wit in poetry 
. . . images, ironies and so on-^^^
René Wellek also sees the New Criticism as limited. In his text Concepts
of Criticism (1963), he speaks of its having "reached a point of exhaustion,"
^^®Stallman, p. 506. ^^^Foster, pp. 205, 209-10.




|| not being "able to go beyond its initial restricted sphere," of its having
in fact a number of specific weaknesses; these he proceeds to list:
Its selection of European writers is oddly narrow . . . Literary 
history is neglected. The relations to modern linguistics are left 
unexplored with the result that the study of style, diction, and 
meter remains often dilettantish. The basic aesthetics seems often 
without a sure philosophical f o u n d a t i o n . ^49
But his remarks are not all negative. Even though he feels that their ap­
proach to literature has lost its appeal, he points out many contributions 
that their work has made to criticism:
It has immeasurably raised the level of awareness and sophisti­
cation in American criticism. It has developed ingenious methods 
for the analysis of imagery and symbol. It has defined a new 
taste averse to the romantic tradition. It has supplied an im­
portant apology for poetry in a world dominated by s c i e n c e . 250
And with Wellek’s mention of an "apology for poetry," it would 
seem that the evolution has come full cycle: The Neoclassicists— Sir
Philip Sidney with his An Apology for Poetry (1595) specifically— de­
fended poetry against the judge of their day— Religion. The Romantics 
and the New Critics, against Science, a judge less dour, less forbidding, 
less declamatory, but nonetheless hostile. Be that as it may, it was 
the New Critics who brought criticism back— from the audience and the 
poet— to the work itself, a point from which it digressed after Aristotle.
249 o cmWellek, p. 359. pp. 359-60.
CHAPTER III
A REVIEIJ OF JEAN PIAGET'S THEORIES 
ON COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT
Jean Piaget (b. 1896) is best known as a developmental psycho­
logist. But "it is probably fair to say that Piaget views himself as a 
biologically oriented genetic epistemologist first, a psychologist sec­
ond, and an educator not at all."^ Nonetheless, his theories are perti­
nent to education in that at a time when traditional education is floun — 
dering, the ideas of Jean Piaget show ways in which it has failed and 
give direction not only for improvement in teacher practice but also for 
curriculum revision. Be that as it may,.it is in the capacity of genetic 
epistemologist that Piaget carries on his present work as "director of 
his own research institute, the International Center of Genetic Episte— 
mology, as well as co-director of the Institute of Educational Science,” 
And it is here, to Geneva, "that students from all over the world come to 
study with him,"^ to learn first-hand about his theories of intelligence.
^David Elkind and John H. Flavell, Studies in Cognitive Develop­
ment; Essays in Honor of Jean Piaget (New York: Oxford University Press,
1969), p. 18.
2Mary Ann Spencer Pulaski, Understanding Piaget; An Introduction 
to Children's Cognitive Development (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 4-5.
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Piaget’s general theory of Intellectual development, "born in bio­
logy and . . . nurtured by logic,evolves from two theories central to 
his thinking: the "stage-independent theory" and the "stage-dependent
t h e o r y . T h e  stage-independent theory "utilizes the scientific frame­
work of biology," wherein the individual is constantly tending toward equi­
librium, a state of balance derived from those things given to him through 
heredity: (1) "physical structures,f which] set broad limits on his intel­
lectual functioning"; (2) "automatic behavioral reaction[s]" or "reflexes»" 
which have their greatest influence on functioning in the first few days 
and which are rapidly transformed into primitive intellectual structures 
that Incorporate the results of experience, structures that Piaget calls 
"scheme [s I": and (3) the general principles of functioning— "organization 
and adaptation."^
"In essence, Piaget looks at intelligence in terms of content,
' structure, and function." Content is what the environment furnishes the 
individual; it is "what [he] is thinking about, what interests him at the 
moment, or [is] the terms in which he contemplates a given problem." But 
content is only a minor goal for Piaget and for the psychology of intelli­
gence. "The primary goal . . .  is an understanding of the basic processes 
underlying and determining the content."^ So for him it is the structures 
and functions of intelligence that count. Biologically, heredity passes
qElkind and Flavell, p. 10.
4John H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, with 
a Foreword by Jean Piaget (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1963), pp.
262, 264.
Herbert Glnsburg and Sylvia Opper, Piaget’s Theory of Intellectual 
Development: An Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, N- J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969)
pp. 2, 17, 20.
®Ibld., p. 16.
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on -physical structures which govern intelligence (e.g. , the difference be­
tween the structures of a worm and those of a horse) and automatic behav­
ioral reactions or reflexes, such as sucking or crying, which in inter­
acting with the environment lay the foundation for the primitive intellect­
ual structures— the schemes of the infant. Gradually, these evolve into 
mature structures, that is, into the operations of the child and the more 
formal ones that emerge with adulthood. Heredity also passes on two basic 
tendencies or invariant functions: organization and adaptation, which are
interrelated in the process of development. Organization "refers to the 
tendency for all species to organize their processes into coherent systems, 
whether physical or psychological." An example of the first is the struc­
tures "a fish possesses . . . for functioning in the water"— namely,
"gills, a particular circulatory system, and temperature mechanisms," which 
are integrated "into a composite system (or higher-order s t r u c t u r e ) A n  
infant also has the psychological tendency to organize his structures into 
a higher-order system. Initially, he looks (one scheme, or structure) and 
grasps (another scheme) separately. These are structures that he has avail­
able but has not as yet coordinated. Eventually, he will combine the struc­
tures into a higher-order structure of looking and grasping at the same time.
As mentioned earlier, the invariant function of organization is
bound up with that of adaptation, which in turn is made up of the "comple—
8mentary processes" of assimilation and accommodation, and is a term that 
refers to the tendency for all species to cope with the environment, phy­
sically and psychologically. Accommodation corresponds to the notion of 
outer adaptation to the environment (i.e., modifying the internal structure
^Ibid., pp. 17-18. p. 18
115
so that it can adapt to outer reality), and assimilation corresponds to
inner organization (i.e., using the structures available to incorporate
elements of the external world). Herbert Ginsburg and Sylvia Opper offer
an illuminating example of this concept in-their book Piaget's Theory of
Intellectual Development (1969). They write:
Suppose an infant of 4 months is presented with a rattle. He has 
never before had the opportunity to play with rattles or similar 
toys. The rattle, then, is a feature of the environment to which 
he needs to adapt. His subsequent behavior reveals the tendencies 
of assimilation and accommodation. The infant tries to grasp the 
rattle. In order to do this successfully he must accommodate in 
more ways than are immediately apparent. First, he must accommodate 
his visual activities to perceive the rattle correctly; then he must 
reach out and accommodate his movements to the distance between him­
self and the rattle; in grasping the rattle he must adjust his fin­
gers to its shape; in lifting the rattle he must accommodate his 
muscular exertion to its weight. In sum, the grasping of the rat­
tle involves a series of acts of accommodation, or modifications of 
the infant's behavioral structures to suit the demands of the en­
vironment .
Grasping the rattle also involves assimilation. In the past the 
infant has already grasped things; for him, grasping is a well—formed 
structure of behavior. When he sees the rattle for the first time 
he tries to deal with the novel object by incorporating it into a 
habitual pattern of behavior. In a sense he tries to transform the 
novel object into something that he is familiar with; namely, a 
thing to be grasped. We can say, therefore, that he assimilates the 
object into his framework.°
Thus, Piaget postulates that there are two general principles of 
function which affect intelligence— organization and adaptation (assimila­
tion and accommodation). They are inherited, but they are tendencies, not 
structures. The different ways "an organism adapts and organizes its pro­
cesses depend also on its environment and its learning history." But "the 
human being does not inherit particular intellectual reactions; rather, he 
does inherit a tendency to organize his intellectual processes, and to 
adapt to his environment in some w a y A n d  it is "these tendencies" (to 
organize his behavior and thought to adapt to reality) which "result in
9lbid., p. 19 pp. 17-19, 20.
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. . . psychological structures which take different forms at different 
ages.” This idea of structure formation gets to another Piagetian con­
cept— namely, that "the child progresses through a series of stages, each 
characterized by different psychological structures before he attains 
adult intelligence."^^
These stages and the characteristics that delineate them come 
under Piaget's stage-dependent theory and "show the actual succession of 
genetic steps."^^ Described below are the stages that Piaget defines.
Sensori-Motor Stage 
This stage occupies a period from birth to approximately eighteen 
months to two or two and one-half years. "During this . . .  period the
first signs that intellect is developed, and does not just occur, begin
13to emerge.” By performing overt actions on his environment, the child 
develops a practical knowledge in the sense that this knowledge is simple 
perceptual and motor adjustment to objects and events and constitutes sub­
structures of later representational knowledge— that is, the permanent 
object and sensory-motor systems of space, time, and causality.
According to Hans Furth,
One can distinguish six substages in the course of this first major 
stage of development; their continuity is assured by ’schemes' of 
action. The schemes are transposable or generalizable actions. The 
child establishes relations between similar objects or between ob­
jects which are increasingly dissimilar, including relations between 
those objects and his own body (for instance, the extension of the 
scheme of graspable objects to that of invisible objects). Thus a 
scheme can be defined as the structure common to all those acts which—  
from the subject’s point of view— are equivalent.^
lllbid. ^Slavell, p. 264
John W. Renner, Robert F. Bibens, and Gene D. Shepherd, Guiding 
Learning in the Secondary Schools (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 87.
^^Hans G. Furth, Piaget and Knowledge: Theoretical Foundations
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 29.
Pre—Operational Stage 
This stage lasts for approximately five years, from the age of 
two to that of seven, and is marked by the beginning of language, of sym­
bolic function, and therefore of thought or representation. The child’s 
imitative processes become interiorized, allowing him to imitate absent 
models and through symbolic play to project imitative schemes onto new 
objects (e.g., the use of a stick to represent a sword when he plays 
"war"). At this second stage of development, the child is characterized 
•by phenomenism— that is, he can understand only what is immediate and ap­
parent; "like the sensory-motor infant in the field of direct action, the 
pre-operational child is confined to the surface features of the phenomena 
he tries to think about, assimilating only those superficial features which 
clamor loudest for his attention"; by egocentrism, which prevents him from 
taking any viewpoint other than his own or from thinking about his own 
thought, what Piaget refers to as his "prise de conscience"; and by "states 
and transformations,"^^ or "stability,whereby "the child is much more 
inclined to focus attention upon successive states of configurations of a 
display than upon the transformations by which one state is changed into 
another • • Similarly, the child at this level has difficulty in main­
taining a stable equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation: "suc­
cessive changes" in the "configuration" of a display tend to "pull him in 
different directions, this way and that" so that "any momentary assimila­
tion-accommodation equilibrium he may have attained just previously" is 
destroyed by the new change. But for Piaget, perhaps the most predominant 
characteristc of pre—operational thought is "irreversibility."^^ To ex­
plain— thought "is reversible, as opposed to irreversible . . .  if it can
^^Flavell, pp. 157, 256. ^^Ginsburg and Opper, p. 173, 
17Flavell, pp. 157-59.
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compose into a single organized system the various compensating changes 
which result from a transformation and, by seeing how each change is an­
nulled by its inverse (the one which compensates for it), insure an under­
lying constancy or invariance for the whole system." But the pre-opera— 
tional child's thought is irreversible. Bound by perception, it is not 
until in the latter phase of this period, at approximately the age of four 
or five, that his static, rigid structures "begin, in Piaget's phrasing to 
'thaw out' and become more flexible, mobile, and above all decentered- .
Concrete-Operational Stage 
When the child reaches this stage— temporal duration of four years 
more or less, between the ages of seven to eleven— he has achieved a new 
level of thought. At this stage the first operations appear (operational 
thought "refers to the mental capacity to order and relate experience to 
an organized whole")— concrete operations, which "presuppose that mental 
experimentation still depends upon perception. The individual, in the 7- 
to 11-year age range, cannot perform mental operations unless he can con­
cretely perceive their inner logicality. These first operations, in 
other words, are limited to operating on concrete objects. These opera­
tions include classification, ordering, construction of idea of number 
and construction of spatial and temporal operations. The child at this 
level can internalize overt actions, but they always involve motor activ­
ity. Since his thought is reversible, he can conserve quantity, volume, 
and weight. Moreover, he has de—centered and can adopt points of view 
other than his own
IGibid., pp. 159, 163.
19Henry W. Maier, Three Theories of Child Development (New York; 
Harper & Row, 1965), p. 136.
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Formal-Operational Stage 
At this stage— "eleven or twelve years,childhood is left be­
hind and the adolescent emerges. And, according to Piaget, "formal 
thought reaches its fruition during adolescence and the adolescent, un­
like the child, is an individual who thinks beyond the present and forms 
theories about everything . . This period is characterized by hypo-
thetico-deductive operations. The youth can now reason on hypotheses; no 
longer does he need concrete objects to manipulate. He constructs opera­
tions of prepositional logic and not simply operations of classes, rela­
tions, and numbers. Piaget explains:
Now, reasoning formally and with mere propositions involves 
different operations from reasoning about action or reality.
Reasoning that concerns reality consists of a first-degree 
grouping of operations, so to speak, i.e., internalized actions 
that have become capable of combination and reversal. Formal 
thought, on the other hand, consists in reflecting (in the true 
sense of the word) on these operations and therefore operating 
on operations or on their results and consequently effecting a 
second degree grouping of operations. No doubt the same oper­
ational content is involved; the problem is still a matter of
20It is worth noting that 11 to 12 years as the entering age for 
formal operational thought has come under question and the lower limit 
on the thought of this period may come several years later for some people.
Recent studies carried out at the University of Oklahoma illuminate the
matter. Renner, Bibens, and Shepherd take important notice of this in 
their text Guiding Learning in the Secondary Schools, pp. 106-07, where 
they cite research to support the statement. One study done by Friot and
Renner (1970) showed that "of 258 eighth and ninth graders studied, 253
exhibited concrete-operational thinking. The average of the students in 
this sample was approximately 14 years 6 months." Another study carried 
out on "entering freshmen" (Renner and McKinnon, 1970), found 72 in a 
sample of 143 Freshmen to be at the concrete operational level. "Based 
on these studies[ they write] it seems safe to say most junior high school 
students think on a concrete-operational level." In speaking of the for­
mal operational period they put it this way; ". . . [it] can begin at 
about 11 or 12 years of age." (Italics mine.) But, they add, "Piaget 
himself has pointed out that there is little consistency in the entering 
age level. 'Although the order of succession is constant, the chrono­
logical aages of children entering these stages varies a great deal.’"
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classing, serializing, enumerating,, measuring, placing or dis­
placing in space or in time, etc. But these classes, series 
and spatio-temporal relations themselves, as structurings of 
action and reality, are not what is grouped by formal oper­
ations, but the propositions that express or "reflect" these 
operations. Formal operations, therefore, consist essentially 
of "implications" (in the narrow sense of the word) and "contra­
dictions" established between propositions which themselves ex­
press classifications, sériations, etc.
At this level, therefore, the adolescent is filled with his ability to
structure any number of possible combinations of events as they might
occur. He can now deal with the possible as well as the actual; no longer
is he content to reckon with empirical events alone; As Piaget puts it,
he "[delights] especially in considerations of that which is not."^l
Before leaving the operational stages of thought, it would be 
well at this point to call attention to two terms that Piaget uses in 
dealing with intellectual structures at the operational levels. In des­
cribing concrete—operational thought, he speaks of groupings or logic of 
classes and relations; in describing formal-operational thought, of groups 
and lattices. Mary Ann Spencer Pulaski in her work Understanding Piaget 
(1971), gives a lucid account of Piaget’s strategy. Beginning with the 
concrete—operational stage first and the grouping, she explains;
In order to describe the intellectual structures which develop 
in the school-age child, Piaget turned to the language of logic and 
mathematics. In mathematics, a group is a set of elements whose re­
lations with each other have the properties of combinativity, asso­
ciativity, identity, and reversibility.
But "at the stage of concrete operations, Piaget observed, most 
structures of thought do not satisfy these requirements for a mathematical
21Jean Piaget, Psychology of Intelligence,•trans. Malcolm Piercy 
and D- E. Berlyne (Totowa, N- J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1966; ILP
Series, 1966), pp. 148-49.
^^Pulaski, p. 54.
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group,** except those found in arithmetic— namely, addition and multi­
plication.
However, he did note a number of organized structures of thought 
which, though they do not possess mathematical properties, are 
reversible and logically organized in the sense that every element 
is related to every other one. Piaget called these structures 
logical groupings. They include the logic of classes [classes may 
be added or multiplied to form a larger class ] and the logic of 
relations [ serial ordering operations by which things are arranged 
in increasing or decreasing o r d e r ]."23
Thus by experimenting with the concept of the grouping, Piaget 
found that **from about seven years on, a child is capable of many kinds 
of classification and sériation. He has the ability to understand the 
relationships that he sees around him in actuality.*'^^ That is, by first- 
degree operations on the raw extemae, he can ** [speed] up his thinking 
process immeasureably and give it much greater mobility and freedom,**
*'What he still does not have [however ] is the ability to think of all 
possibile kinds of relationships, whether actual or hypothetical.** It 
is these relationships rather that Piaget finds in the adolescent, in 
**the development of adult inferential thinking.*'^^
*'To describe the integrated structures of formal operations [the 
"structure d*ensemble”^^3, Piaget turned to the logic of groups and lat­
tices.** From the Bourbaki school of mathematicians, he **borrowed*' a 
group called the *'*four-group* . . .  to express the flexibility of adoles­
cent thought. This was a group of four transformations, known as the INRC 
group,** the letters of which *'stand for Identity, Negation (or inverse), 
Reciprocal, and Correlative transformations.*'^^ But the structure d*en­
semble of formal thought also includes the lattice structure, which enables
^^Ibid., p. 65- ^^Ibid., pp. 54, 65.
^^Flavell, p. 212. ^^Pulaski, p. 67.
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adolescent thought to deal with all possible combinations in a proposition; 
this concept Piaget describes under the system of the 16 binary operations.
In connection with Piaget*s concepts of intellecutal structures 
and the models he uses to describe them, it is worth turning to Herbert 
Ginsburg, and Sylvia Opper to note some of the observations they offer re­
garding the interpretation of the models:
First, [they caution ] like the Groupings . . . discussed in 
connection with concrete operational thought, the 16 binary oper­
ations and the INRC group are not intended to imply that the ado­
lescent understands logic in any explicit way . . . Piaget does not 
use logic to describe the adolescent’s explicit knowledge, but to 
depict the structure of his thought.
Second, the logical models are qualitative, not.quantitative.
The adolescent comes to conclusions like . . . "thinness causes 
bending in rods."' His conclusions are statements which do not 
involve numbers; therefore, the model of the statements must also 
be non-muerical. Neither the binary operations nor the INRC group 
involve numbers . . .
Third, the logical models are intended to describe the struc­
ture of adolescent activities. It is not the case that the models 
exactly duplicate the adolescent’s performance in full detail. The 
models are not simply protocols which list everything that the ado­
lescent does; instead, they are abstractions which are intended to 
capture the essence of his thought . . .
Fourth, like the Groupings, both the system of binary operations 
and the INRC group are integrated systems. According to Piaget, 
none of the 16 binary operations nor the INRC group exists in isola­
tion from the others. An operation like implication, for example, 
does not stand alone; it is part of a larger system which makes im­
plication and other operations possible.
Fifth, like the Groupings, the formal operations describe the 
adolescent’s competence. Both the 16 binary operations and the 
INRC group describe the capacities of the adolescent and not neces­
sarily what he does on any one occasion at any one time , • .
Sixth, the models may be said to explain and predict behavior.
There is an explanation in the sense that the models describe basic 
processes underlying the adolescent’s approach to problems. We can 
say that the adolescent solved a particular problem because his 
thought can utilize the logical operations of implications or nega­
tion, and so forth. Such a structural description is one kind of 
explanation; another kind is prediction in the sense that the models 
are general. That is, having knowledge of the basic structure of 
his intellectual activity, we can predict what his performance will 
be like in general terms in other, similar tasks . ,
^^Ginsburg and Opper, pp. 200-1.
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And these operational structures that Piaget describes by the 
terms grouping for concrete operations and group and lattice for formal 
operations presuppose, of course, the substructures built at the earlier 
pre-operational and sensory-motor stages. Thus, central to the fact that 
these stages— sensory-motor through formal operations— follow in a se­
quence is Piaget’s conviction that one stage lays the groundwork of sub­
structures upon which the next stage will build. He asks the reader "to 
picture the mechanism of this process of construction and not merely its 
progressive extension . . . [noting] that each level is characterized 
by a new co-ordination of the elements provided— already existing in the 
form of wholes, though of a lower order— by the processes of the previous 
l e v e l . S t r u c t u r e s  are built, therefore, in each stage as the individ­
ual matures; as he encounters experience, both physical experience, wherein 
knowledge is abstracted from the object, and logico-mathematical experience, 
wherein knowledge derives from actions the cognizer performs upon the ob­
ject; as he receives knowledge linguistically as well as socially; and, fin­
ally, as he tends toward equilibrium, a self—regulatory process of organi­
zation and adaptation that implies a system in active balance with its en­
vironment. "Out of this interaction [then] develop the structures of 
thought, each one richer, more complex, more inclusive than the one before.
The three major characteristics of this equilibrium are field of 
application, mobility, and stability. The first term refers to "objects 
or properties of objects" which the individual meets in his environment 
and acts upon in the knower—known relationship. Ginsburg describes this 
characteristic, as he does mobility and stability, in terms of the distinction
Piaget, Psychology of Intelligence, p. 151. ^^Pulaski, p. 13.
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between perception and classification, perception having application 
for the pre-operational child and classification for the operational cog-
. . . in visual perception [he explains] the field of application 
is the visual field, that is, the objects which a person can appre­
hend visually at a glance* In the case of classification, the field 
of equilibrium is considerably wider. It involves the extension (the 
list of members) of the particular class under consideration. This 
list may, of course, contain a variety of objects- The greater the 
field of application, the more powerful is the equilibrium.^^
The next characteristic of equilibrium is mobility, which has ref­
erence to the distances both spatially and temporally that "separate the 
person and the elements of the above mentioned field." The child of pre­
operations, a slave to his perceptions, lacks the mental operations to 
apprehend objects beyond his visual field. Classification, however, "in­
volves representation of objects which are not present. The spatial and 
temporal distances between the elements are unlimited." For example, the 
operational thinker can classify; therefore, he can think "of the class of 
elephants.” Thus, "the equilibrium involved in the operation of the classi­
fication structure is . . , more mobile than that of the perceptual system.
Stability, the third characteristic, allows the individual to 
maintain equilibrium of thought processes in spite of changes in the 
elements. Again Ginsburg illuminates this characteristic in terms of per­
ception and classification:
Once again in perception equilibrium is partial and limited.
If new elements are introduced into the visual field, percep­
tion is changed. This can be seen most clearly in the case of 
visual illusions. Parallel lines are not seen as parallel if
^^Ginsburg and Opper, p. 173-
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they are placed close to curved lines. In classification, how­
ever, the introduction of new elements does not destroy the sys­
tem. The structure easily incorporates the new elements and 
does not change. For example, if we classify animals into ele­
phants and non-elephants, and if we discover that zebras exist, 
they can easily be classified under non-elephants. Thus the 
classification system can take into account additional elements 
without distortion, whereas the perceptual system is affected, 
even distorted, by the addition of new elements. The former, 
therefore, presents a greater degree of equilibrium than the 
latter.
In coming to terms with equilibrium, Piaget thinks two questions 
should be asked: (1) the synchronic question, which inquires into the
general and basic nature of the human cognizer, and (2) the diachronic 
question, which challenges the principles by which the cognizer alters 
his nature in the course of its development. To answer these questions 
is to reiterate concepts that have been previously discussed under the 
stage-independent theory. But, briefly— to consider the synchronic 
question first— the **human cognizer*' is a "device" that is given by na­
ture the equipment he needs— the functional invariants of organization 
and adaptation— to maintain his balance in a constantly changing environ­
ment. Presumably, he is an "ever organized entity which accommodates its 
schemas . . .  to external reality as it assimilates the reality to the 
schemas." From infancy to adulthood as he follows these "basic tendencies.
he moves sequentially from one stage to the next, "each structure [inte­
grating ] its predecessor to form a new and higher form of equilibrium," 
so that within this continuous operation "a succession of discontinuous 
cognitive structures" emerge, discontinuous in that the cognizer "typically 
equilibrates his actions on one plane before another, and, on the same plane, 
for one content before another . . . "  And to these concepts Piaget ascribes 
the terms "vertical and horizontal decalage, respectively."^^
35Flavell, pp. 262-64.
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Piaget’s theories of cognitive development have brought him to the 
problem of knowledge and the respective roles of the subject and the ob­
ject in the act of knowing. He neither, discounts the rationalist who "ac­
centuates the role of the knower at the expense of the object knotm." in the 
knower-known relationship^ nor that of the empiricist who "stresses the 
role of experience"^^ in the same relationship. He attempts rather
. ; . to provide a synthesis of the two opposing points of view by- 
proposing what he calls an interaction theory. This theory stresses 
the interrelationship between the knower and the known in the act of 
discovering reality with each element making a more or less equal con­
tribution. Piaget consequently acknowledges the importance of the en­
vironment which undoubtedly determines the development of thought to 
a certain extent. Obviously, the type of experience he acquires and 
the situation to which he is exposed will channel the child’s mental 
performance. But they will not determine development entirely be­
cause the child in no instance comes to a situation a tabula rasa.
He comes with a mental structure, or accumulation of past experience 
in the form of schemes, and these v̂ill influence his apprehension of 
reality. This means that for the child reality is not an ob­
jective phenomenon which has its own independent existence. Reality 
is determined by the type of structure with which it is apprehended.
The reality of a 4—year—old child is not the same as that of a 7-year- 
old, nor the same as that of a 14-year-old. Yet the different "real­
ities" are equally legitimate, since the things that a 4-year-old sees 
and believes are as real to him as the things a l4-year-old sees and 
believes . . . So Piaget feels that Che role of the knower and the 
development of his mental or cognitive structures is very Important 
in the dual relationship between knower and known. As the one changes, 
so does the other. With development the child acquires a less super­
ficial view of reality. Knowledge proceeds from the preiphery to the 
center of reality, but at each level there is a constant interaction 
between the knower and the external world.
Armed, then, with the gifts of heredity— physical structures, 
reflexes, and the general principles of functioning (organization and 
adaptation)— ”1’homme piagetian," as Flavell would say, plays a significant 
role "in the formation of his own cognitive world.
^^Ginsburg and Opper, p. 216. ^^Ibid., p. 217.
^^Flavell, p. 263-
CHAPTER IV
A COMPARISON BETÎfEEN THE COGNITIVE THOUGHT 
OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND ENGLISH AND 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LITERARY THOUGHT 
As a genetic epistemologist, Piaget's method is to use informa­
tion concerning the cognitive development of the child and the historical 
development of a culture as a foundation for theories that will offer an 
understanding of "the nature of both individual and social knowledge.
He has examined a number of knowledge forms in this way in order to show, 
first, that parallels exist between the development of thought in the in-r 
dividual and the development of thought in the collective mind as it con­
cerns itself through the ages with a particular knowledge form; and, sec­
ond, that these parallels indicate that just as the child's cognitive 
structures change and show a movement from egocentric thought to opera­
tional thought, so too does social knowledge change in the way it is con­
ceived from one age to the next so that egocentric conceptions concerning 
that knowledge form in one age are restructured in the next to a more 
sophisticated, higher-order conception. In view of this study's first 
hypothesis— that literature from the English Neoclassic period to the 
period of New Criticism when put in a historical perspective will show ad­
vances in the ways it has been conceived by literary critics of this par­
ticular time span that parallel advances in the cognitive development of
1Herbert Ginsburg and Sylvia Opper, Piaget's Theory of Intellectual 




the individual— a comparison will be made between the two and will pro- 
2ceed from two theories central to Piaget's general theory of intellectual 
development— namely, the "stage-independent theory" and the "stage-depen­
dent theory."^
Stage-Independent Theory 
This theory concerns the nature of the human subject and the nature 
of his development and asks two basic questions: the "synchronic" and the
"diachronic." The synchronic question is "'What sort of device’ is the 
human cognizer, not at any particular stage, but basically and generally?" 
And the diachronic question asks "What are the general principles by which
the subject— granted a conception of the sort of device.he is— changes his
4state in the course of development?"
To the first-question, the synchronic, Piaget's answer is bound up
essentially with his ideas of function; that is,
the basic equipment of any knower at any stage consists of the bio­
logically given functional invariants of organization and adaptation 
(assimilation and accommodation). The subject is construed to be an 
ever-organized entity which accommodates its schemas (the basic units 
of this organization) to external reality as it assimilates the reality 
to the schemas. This basic state (the fact of organization) and this 
basic process (the fact of assimilation and accommodation) are really 
the only apriorities which Piaget feels it necessary to assume. All 
other cognitive possessions, including knowledge forms which many 
might regard as the very axioms of cognition, are the products of the 
operation of these invariants over time. Thus, the organization of 
space objects,- and other fundaments of human experience are not given
These theories and the concepts that characterize them— touched 
upon briefly in Chapter 3— will receive here, in some instances, a more 
complete treatment in order to illuminate certain aspects of the comparison.
^John H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, with 




at the outset but are constructed in the course of complex and 
interesting evolutions. . .
In answer to the diachronic question, Piaget posits that
across a childhood of continuous operation of the functional in­
variants, arises a succession of discontinuous cognitive struc­
tures. This is the heart and essence of cognitive development.
The question then is, what are the principal attributes of this 
development ?
In summary, they are,
first, cognitive behavior is at all levels a matter of subject 
actions performed on reality; and one characteristic of the de­
velopmental process is that these actions become progressively 
internalized and covert. Second, assimilation and accommodation, 
while remaining invariant as existants, show an increasing dif­
ferentiation and complementation as development proceeds. And 
both of these attributes are part of a more general one, i.e., 
the progressive equilibration of cognitive actions.
"In this interpretation," therefore, "the sequence of cognitive structures
becomes . . .  a sequence of equilibrium state ’moments’ with an ongoing
continuous process of equilibration;"
Each structure integrates its predecessor to form a new and 
higher form of equilibrium, "higher” in terms of the equilibrial 
properties of field extension [field of application], mobility, 
permanence, and stability. . . .
"And, finally, the fact that"
the subject typically equilibrates his actions on one plane before 
another and, on the same plane, for one content before another, 
gets expressed in the concepts of vertical and horizontal decalage, 
respectively.®
Such then are Piaget’s postulations on the nature of the hu­
man cognizer and the nature of his development— the synchronic and dia­
chronic aspects of his stage-dependent theory. But can his postulations 
as they concern the individual be theoretically applied to literature as 
a form of social knowledge? To pose both synchronic and diachronic ques­
tions is to first ask "what sort of device" literature is, "generally and
^Ibid., pp. 262-53. ^Ibid., pp. 263-̂ 64.
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basically," and then by what "general principles" does it transform " its
ÿ
State in the course of development?**
**Generally and basically,*' literature as social knowledge is an
**ever-organized entity which accommodates its schemas to external reality
8as it assimilates the reality to its schemas.” Granted the validity of
this hypothesis, this means, according to the first part of the statement,
that literature's basic state is that of organization, the "tendency for
all species to systematize or organize" their structures "into a higher- 
9order structure." Analogically, literature certainly qualifies on the 
basis of organization because as far back as the Sumerians, some five 
thousand years ago, it emerged as a "species" from the ballad dance; and 
as an integrated structure of content and form, organized by a verbal med­
ium, it was— even then— a coherent reflection of certain aspects of the 
concrete world.
In turn, the second part of the statement posits that literature's 
basic process is that of adaptation (accommodation and assimilation).
Again, using the example of the ballad dance, the primitive form in which 
literature had its inception and "up to which all forms of literature ulti­
mately may be t r a c e d , i t  can be asserted that literature came into be­
ing naturally and necessarily in early civilization as part of a ritual 
dance. This, indeed, was adaptation. Man fraught with questions about 
himself and his world was looking for answers; he found these answers in 
literature, and it became for him his science, his entertainment, and his 
religion. In short, literature modified its schema of imitation and
^Ibid., p. 262. ®Xbid., p. 263 ^Ginsburg and Opper, pp. 17-18.
10 ...Richard Green Moulton, The Modern Study of Literature (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1915), p. 12,
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accommodated it to external reality. With the ballad dance as its genesis, 
literature advanced in three broad and inclusive ways: it was first a com­
munal activity; it next became the product of the anonymous bard; and, fi­
nally, that of the individual author. Thus, literature, as seen through
the collective mind, does have the "basic equipment of the knower at any 
11stage," the functional invariants of organization and adaptation which 
have ordered its development as a social knowledge.
The general principles by which literature changes from one concep­
tion to another in the course of its development— the diachronic question—  
is of course tied to its process of adaptation. To be sure, it has had a
long history of assimilation and accommodation in its "subject actions per- 
12formed on reality,” explained in a quite general way just previously, as
having begun as the ballad dance— what Richard Green Moulton calls "liter- 
13ary protoplasm — and advanced to the time when it became an original arti­
fact created by an individual author. Subsequently, it found its way into 
every nation and culture and has become an integral segment of that society's 
institutions and beliefs.
But can the diachronic question be applied to English literature 
and to the Anglo-American literature of the New Criticism— the literature 
with which this research is concerned? Ostensibly it is only in terms of 
the evolution of these two literatures that an answer to this question can 
be forthcoming. Therefore, the place to begin is England, the time, the 
period of Neoclassicism, beginning with the seventeenth century. For this 
was the time when criticism in the modem sense was putting down its first 
roots; it was also the time when the pragmatic theory oriented most critical
^^Flavell, p. 262. ^^Ibid,, p. 263. ^^Moulton, p. 12.
132
views. Now, adaptation at this time was primarily a matter of imitation: 
Neoclassic thought, after two centuries of egocentric perception, tended 
to remain “unstable and discontinuous," with "no system-in-equilibrium, 
with which to order, relate, and make coherent a world" in which Middle- 
Age traditions, native traditions, and those of the ancients overlapped 
in their views as to the nature of literature; in fact, any equilibrium 
attained in regard to literary assumptions was a moment-to-moment affair, 
for "successive changes" pulled critical thought "this way and that, draw­
ing it "into flagrant contradictions with earlier"^^ premises. And to the 
critics of this period, who believed that all powers of poetic invention 
came through sense perceptions, with emphasis on the work and its attri­
butes as it was leveled at the audience, imitation was the way to frame 
reality and thus deal with it. .Hence emphasis was on imitation: imita­
tion as fancy (sense impressions selected and arranged) and imitation of 
classic writers as models. These narrow, restricted views, which per­
vaded Neoclassic thought, were focused therefore on the result rather than 
on the means to the result, on the product rather than the process.
By the nineteenth century, however, the Romantics had disequili- 
brated the quasi—equilibrated state that Neoclassic conception had at­
tained, and the poet, not the audience, was now the center of literary 
concerns. For the writer-critics of this period had extended their field 
of application, their views on literature, even though they still retained 
in their speculations the attributes of literature— imitation, content 
and form, function and value— to which the Neoclassicists had subscribed. 
But the focus now was on transformations rather than states : literature
was seen as a dynamic process of the imagination— Coleridge's "middle
^Slavell, p. 158
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quality" between a "thought" and a "thing"; emotion superseded neoclassi­
cal nature and reason, making the poet and his mental faculties the corner­
stone of all literary speculations; and, poetic invention resided in the 
mind and feelings of the poet. The poem now was more than a mere product; 
it was an organism in action. Moreover, the lyric in the eighteenth cen­
tury, which had taken precedence over the epic and tragedy of sixteenth— 
and seventeenth-century thought, remained in the nineteenth century the 
principal genre; but rather than the eighteenth-century notion of the poet- 
nature dualism, it was conceived of as an organism— all parts related to 
one another and each part related to the whole-— emerging as it were from 
the creative imagination.
And, finally, building upon the structure of organic form in litera­
ture— the lyric in particular, and Samual Taylor Coleridge specifically, 
with his conception of the poem as a union and balance of opposing elements, 
the New Criticism of the late twenties in England and that of the thirties 
and forties, on up to almost the sixties, in the United States was to sup­
plant the nineteenth-century stance, wherein the poet was the element em­
phasized, and divert it to the objective theory of thought, with the work 
itself as the element which ordered all precepts.
Thus the thought of the New Critics as well as that of the Roman­
tics is a system-in-equilibrium, a"structure d'ensemble."^ Their con­
ceptions "[decentered and moved toward construction and reflection.
Both schools held the poem to be a structure of interrelated elements.
Hence, the emphasis is on process as opposed to a passive state of imita­
tion, But they differ in respect to the elements of the structure and
15George Watson, The Literary Critics (Baltimore: Penguin Books,
1962), p, 119,
^^Plavell, p. 212. ^^Ginsburg and Opper, p. 151.
their operation. For the Romantics believed that the elements— sense per­
ceptions, fancy (sense perceptions arranged in a pattern), will, and imagi­
nation work together in the poet's mind to produce the poem. The opera­
tions have to do with a concrete object— the poet, who manipulates these 
elements for an effect. He is a part of the operation and his part is out­
side the poem itself. In this respect their stance takes an extrinsic ap­
proach to literature. The New Critics, on the other hand, take an intrin­
sic approach: the elements, for them, are such abstract entities as words,
figures of speech, rhythm, rhyme, plot, point of view, etc. These work 
together independently, inside the poem, opposing and neutralizing one an­
other in an attempt to become reconciled. The work itself is the operator 
and operation in one. But it is worth emphasizing that both the Romantics 
and the New Critics saw the poem as a matrix which remains constant in that 
it can incorporate the various compensating changes which result from a 
transformation and which transmit such intangibles as attitude and tone 
to the reader by the inverse relationship that exists between them.
It might be said, then, for English and Anglo-American criticism, 
equilibration by adaptation has been a process of critical development, 
"whereby states of disequilibrium are succeeded by states of greater equi­
librium.”^^ Moreover, in the critic's changing conceptions of literature's 
nature "there has been a progressive reorientation of perspectives, rethink­
ing of fundaments, and continuous search for new and broader frames of ref—
19arence from Aristotle" through Johnson, through Coleridge to the New Critics, 
and to the present-day, ongoing attempts to come to grips with literary 
problems. In every age, as literature has been scrutinized, there have 
been subject actions performed on reality. Adaptation not only has been
18 19Ginsburg and Opper, p. 175. Flavell, p. 256.
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essential, it has been inevitable in the progression of literary concepts: 
from the pragmatic to the expressive to the objective theories of litera­
ture, and each theory, like the "chambered nautilus," laid down structures 
upon which the next theory could build its chamber of thought.
Stage-Dependent Theory 
Where the synchronic and diachronic question of the stage—inde­
pendent theory leave off, the stage-dependent theory begins. This theory
. . .  divides the ontogentic span into three major epochs, called 
periods, with various subperiods, stages, and substages within 
these. It should be recalled that the sequence of these de­
velopmental steps is thought to be invariant while the chrono­
logical age at which each occurs is definitely not.20
In his book The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget (1963), John H.
Flavell specifies the age limits of these major epochs and entitles them
as follows: "Period of Sensory-Motor Intelligence (0-2 years). . . .
Period of Preparation for and Organization of Concrete Operations (2-11
years). . . . [and] Period of Formal Operations (11-15 y e a r s ) , P i a g e t ,
however, in his strategy of examining a knowledge form, bypasses the first
epoch (the sensory-motor period) as a period for comparison and proceeds
directly to the second major epoch, dividing it into what he refers to as
pre-operational and concrete operational, and from there to the third epoch.
p. 264.
21The age limits noted here are, of course, according to Flavell, 
pp. 264-65. Piaget in Psychology of Intelligence (Totowa, N. J, : Little­
field, Adams & Co., 1966), p. 123, lists the "four principal periods, fol­
lowing that characterized by the formation of sensori-motor intelligence," 
and for these periods states what he believes the age—span of each to be.
By and large, the age limits he sets for the individual periods agree with 
those of Flavell; however, his concept of the limits lack the definitive 
quality of Flavell's (a finality which note 20 of the text [ see supra ] per­
haps anticipates). For example, in speaking of formal operations, Piaget 
says: " . . .  from 11 to 12 years and during adolescence, formal thought
is perfected. . . . "  (Here, it might be well to again point out, that con­
sensus does not exist among authorities regarding the age limits of formal 
thought).
136
the formal operational period.
This study, therefore, using Piaget's historicodevelopmental 
model, will consider the pre-operational, the concrete operational, and 
the formal operational periods according to the broad constructs of phe­
nomenism and egocentrism, the former as it "gives way to a progressive
22construction" and the latter as it is "replaced by reflection." match­
ing each stage of individual thought with a period in literary critical 
thought•
Comparison between Pre-Operational Thought 
and Neoclassical Literary Thought
Beginning with the pre-operational period of cognitive develop­
ment in the individual, the period which is marked by the beginnings of 
language, or symbolic function, and representation or thought, the child's 
thought is characterized by three principal behaviors: phenomenism, ego­
centrism. and stability. Using as points of comparison these behaviors, 
which show an early phenomensim moving toward but not quite reaching con­
struction and an egocentrism marked by a number of ancillary behaviors, 
which in turn affect stability, parallels will be dravm betwen pre—opera­
tional thought in the child and literary thought in the Neoclassical per­
iod of English literature.
Phenomenism is a characteristic of the pre-operational child which 
allows him to understand only what is immediate and apparent; he "is con­
fined to the surface of the phenomena he tries to think about, assimilat­
ing only those superficial features which clamor loudest for his atten—
23
tion." Analogous to this limited, restricted kind of thinking are the 
concepts held by Neoclassic literary critics— namely, that all critical 
distinctions and statements concerning literature should be grounded in
ZZpiavell, p. 256. ^^Ibid., p. 157.
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the needs of the audience^ needs being interpreted of course as moral,in­
struction and pleasure. In these terms, then, literature was a product 
to supply these needs; and if there were those who maligned it, then lit­
erature should he defended.
For several reasons they felt called upon to justify its worth.
One reason, and perhaps the most compelling, was the need to disqualify 
the Puritan indictment of literature's nature. The Puritans, who had re­
vived the earlier distrust of art, and of the drama in particular, now con­
demned poetry. Taking the position Plato had assumed two thousand years 
earlier when he banished the poet from his ideal republic, they reiterated 
his charges: literature was trivial, useless, and false; hence, like Plato,
they could accord it no place in the culture of sixteenth-century England.
It could do nothing, they charged, but harm: it catered to idle ways and
trivial occupations, and worst of all, provoked sin and debauchery.
A second reason for vindicating literature was to rectify the vague
and confused conceptions which still survived from medieval traditions,
fortified in turn by post—classical and patristic doctrines; for
. . .  poetry, according to that teaching, was but the handmaid of 
theology or philosophy, it was a branch of logic, it was versified 
rhetoric, it was no real art but merely vain and trifling. . , . ^
Apart from these reasons, however, there was another reason of a
more positive kind, one that Sir Philip Sidney felt obliged to defend.
J. W. H. Atkins in his book English Literary Criticism: The Renascence
(1947) discusses this reason. He writes:
Men were led, because of the new courtly ideals . . .  which now 
animated society, to inquire into the meaning and significance of 
poetry and to claim for it a worthier place in the intellectual
2^ ■..
J. W. H. Atkins, English Literary Criticism: The Renascence
(London: Metheun & Co., 1947), p. 103 (Hereinafter referred to as the
Renascence.)
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life . . . there had come a livelier snese of the value of the 
poetic art, even though as yet that sense was i n a r t i c u l a t e . ^5
These reasons, then, called forth a number of apologies to justify
poetry and proclaim its value. Among the most noteworthy were “Richard
Willis* De re poetica disputatio (1573), the earliest Elizabethan apology;
Thomas Lodge’s Defence of Poetry (1579); and Sir Philip Sidney’s An Apology
for Poetry (1595),“ the “first piece of literary criticism in English that
is literature . . . “ These were definite attempts "to respond to a very
26real and widely-felt contemporary need; . . . "
Thus, more interested in getting results, in establishing litera­
ture’s worth, than in understanding the process of its operation, these 
men of letters, like the pre-operational child, who can think about only
surface features, centered on what was immediately pressing, what, in other
27
words, “ clamored loudest for [their] attention." They were, in fact, 
hemmed in by a phenomenal field which bore a causal relationship to such 
stricturing characteristics as egocentrism and stability.
Egocentrism, then, deriving from phenomenism, is another property 
of the child between two and seven and includes a number of behaviors char­
acteristic of pre-operational thought. This characteristic prevents him 
from taking any viewpoint other than his ot-m, or from thinking about his 
own thought— what Piaget refers to as his “prise de conscience.“ For ex­
ample, “he is unable to reconstruct a chain of reasonings which he has 
just passed through; he thinks but he cannot think about his own think­
ing.*’̂ ® He cannot think about what another is saying or adopt the other's 
point of view because his limited field of application, of mobility, and
25 26
Ibid., p. 102. Ibid., pp. 138, 103.
^^Flavell, p. 157. ^®Ibid., pp. 256, 156.
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of stability allow him only to center on his own talk and his view­
point, Thus he is a victim of centration— the tendency to attend ” a 
single striking feature of the object of his reasoning to the neglect 
of other important aspects, and by so doing to distort the reasoning.
The child is unable to decenter, i.e., to take into account features 
which could balance and compensate for the distorting, biasing effects 
of the single centration” and is subject to a kind of reasoning that Pia­
get terms t rans duc tive, a reasoning that "proceeds from particular to par-_ 
ticular."
Centering on one salient element of an event, the child proceeds 
irreversibly to draw as a conclusion from it some other perceptu­
ally compelling happening-^
Transductive reasoning, in turn, has the specific characteristics 
of what Piaget calls juxtaposition and syncretism, the former being a state 
of reasoning which "fails to see any relation among the parts of a whole, 
and the result is that they are seen as discrete and unrelated to each 
other"; and the latter, a state of reasoning which "perceives a whole or 
the common relationships, but fails to recognize the differences within 
the whole,"
In other words, since the child cannot focus simultaneously 
both on the differences among things and on their common re­
lationships, he is apt to see either a succession of unrelated 
events (juxtaposition) or a conglomerated whole (syncretism).
Both types of distortion result from the same deficiency of 
thought.
Numerous instances of egocentric thought are present in the views 
some Neoclassicists held concerning literature. An outstanding example, 
characteristic of this age, was the way literary theorists concieved of 
content and form. For them content— the meaning, or message, and the
29 30
Flavell, pp. 157, 160, Ginsburg and Opper, p. 112.
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subject matter was one thing; whereas, form, the organizing principle 
which for them included technique and style, was another. Like the child 
who is unable to think simultaneously about several aspects of a situation 
and see their relationship, the critic-writers of this early period in Eng­
lish criticism juxtaposed form and content; that is, "you decide what you 
want to say, and then, profiting by the example of your greatest prede­
cessors, decide on how to say it." This is a mechanical view of litera­
ture's structure and leads to the kind of criticism that speaks of "'a
31bad book, but so well written. . . .
A more specific illustration involves syncretic thought. Sir
Philip Sidney in his An Apology for Poetry sets up a classification of
poetic genres in an attempt "to show what is valuable in its various 'kinds.'"
Atkins calls the reader's attention to "his illogical classification and
to the limitation of his test . . .  to moral Instruction." Here pastoral
poetry is "the lowliest of the 'kinds'" because it "treats of the evils
of tyranny or the beauty of the simple life." Obviously, for Sidney a
form that presents these two aspects in an elther-or capacity rated low
as a source of moral instruction. Between the pastoral and epic poetry,
which is the highest form because in it "heroic and moral goodness are
32most effectively portrayed," the forms of elegy, iambic, satire, comedy, 
and tragedy are similarly positioned with the one criterion— the effective­
ness of the "kind," whatever it may be, to reach the reader and effect his 
moral condition. Thus, mainly because of the Puritan complaint against 
. the licentious nature of poetry, Sidney apparently "pressed" to find a
31David Daiches, Critical Approaches to Literature (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1956), p. 67-.
32Atkins, The Renascence, pp. 121, 122.
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value (a reason) for each poetic "kind" and ordered them in such a way 
that the reader with a tarnished virtue would have a ready-made scale by 
which he could be selective and read for edification.
Flavell, in speaking of. the nature of pre-operational thought,
comments on syncretism:
. . • the child’s reasoning is syncretic; a multitude of diverse 
things are inchoately but intimatedly co-related with a global, 
all-encompassing schema. . . . Since almost anything can be "caus­
ally" related (by juxtaposition, of course, rather than true caus­
ality) to almost anything else within the syncretic whole, the ^3 
child tends, when pressed to do so, to find a reason for anything.
Considering Flavell’s statement, this particular illustration of Sidney’s
classification qualifies as a case of syncretic thought.
Another characteristic of pre-operational thought for which paral­
lels can be found in Neoclassical thought is that of "states, and transfor­
mations,"^*^ or "stability." Concerning this characteristic, Ginsburg writes:
Throughout development the child moves from states of a lesser 
to those of a greater degree of equilibrium. . . . Piaget describes 
this progression in terms of strategies and the probability of 
adoption of a particular s t r a t e g y . 35
The "water-level p r o b l e m . a s  Flavell speaks of it, is an illustration
of how the child applies these strategies. First (strategy 1), the child
"[focusses] on a single dimension, say the heights of the columns of liq-
quid." This strategy, being the most simple and the most striking is "based
on static states of the environment and not on transformations between the 
37states." This satisfies him until the "liquid is poured into an extremely
^^Flavell, pp. 160-61. ^^Ibid., p. 157.
^^Ginsburg and Opper, p. 173. ^^Flavell, p. 158.
^^Ginsburg and Opper, p. 174.
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short and wide beaker." Now, with the "salience of the stimulus" in this 
second event, which "forces itself on the child's attention," and the fact 
that "he feels 'a lack of satisfaction about always using the same solu­
tion when it is not accompanied by certainty,'" "[he] adapts strategy 2, fo­
cussing on w i d t h s . B u t  this is not a satisfactory solution— there is 
still the matter of the heights of the liquid. Thus strategy 3 becomes
. . .  an oscillation between the two dimensions- At one time 
the child centers on heights, at another on widths. He still 
focusses, however, only on states, and the result is inconsistency 
in his responses. If he focusses on heights, he is led to assert 
that one beaker has more to drink; if he focusses on widths, he 
concludes that the other beaker has more to drink. But . . . when ' 
the child oscillates between heights and widths, he begins to see 
that one does not change without an inverse change in the other. In 
other words, the contradictions which the child experiences in 
strategy 3 lead to a fourth solution. The child becomes aware of 
the transformations, that is the pouring from one beaker to the 
other. Now his strategy is to coordinate the two dimensions, to 
relate them to the transformation, and this leads to successful 
conservation. With the attainment of conservation he has acquired 
a high degree of equilibrium.39
Although conservation is not an attribute of the pre-operational 
child, Ginsburg's explanation illuminates this process of "sequential . 
probability" by which the child moves from one stage to the next, experi­
encing conflicts which result in disequilibrium but which eventually lead 
to a state of greater equilibrium and"periods of incomplete understanding 
of reality are followed by periods of greater understanding,"^*^
Similarly, inconsistencies in ideas and responses to certain lit­
erary matters are present in the major Neoclassicists who followed Sidney. 
Samuel Johnson serves as a good example of inconsistency in that he puts 
himself in the ambivalent position of attempting to coordinate his 
theories of imitation and literature's function as didactic instruction.
In his book Critical Approaches to Literature, David Daiches speaks of
^®Ibid., p. 174. 3®Ib±d., pp. 174-75. ^°Ibid., p. 175.
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this stance as "Dr. Johnson’s dilemma," and says:
. . . critics who maintained that the function of art was to 
imitate human nature and who at the same time demanded that 
art be morally instructive were caught up in another kind of 
. dilemma if they were honest enough to admit that human nature 
as we know it in real life is far. from edifying. If poetic 
justice does not prevail in life as it is and men in their ac­
tual lives are far from models of moral perfection, how can one 
at the same time imitate nature (which to the seventeenth and 
much of the eighteenth century, meant human nature) and lead 
your readers to the paths of virtue: Dr. Johnson, who had no
illusions about life as it is and men as they are, at the same 
time praised Shakespeare for knowing and imitating human nature 
and blamed him for not having sufficient poetic justice in his
plays.41
Dryden, too, may be accused of wanting it both ways, since he em­
braced both theories.
Another position on which neither Dryden nor Johnson made him­
self clear was on.the issue that Daiches refers to as "instruction and 
recognition." Daiches questions whether recognition is really instruction 
or merely illustration. In speaking of Dryden, and his definition of a
play as a "’just and lively image . . . for the delight and instruction of
the reader’," he says,
. . .  if Dryden meant that the function of drama was to delight 
and instruct by providing lively images of human nature in action 
under testing circumstances, to delight cannot have supposed to 
come from recognizing what we already know about human nature if 
at the same time the play is to instruct us in human nature, 
which is to say, to tell us what we did not know before.
Dryden evidently viewed literature as a form of knowledge- But is know­
ledge attained through illustration to be construed as new knowledge?
With Johnson there is the same problem. He too considered literature as 
knowledge, a means of instruction, and that achieved by illumination and 
illustration. But "Johnson is clearer," Daiches says, "than Dryden on the
^^Daiches, p. 68. ^^Ibid., pp. 74, 75-
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question of whether what we learn about human nature is new knowledge or
simply a lively illustration of what we already know."
It is in essence [he states] what observant and thoughtful people 
already know, though often conveyed through examples of a kind 
hitherto unknown to the reader. Imlac insists that the poet must 
study all kinds of men of different ages and countries; the poet, 
that is, must have a greater store of particulars through which 
to illustrate the known generalities. . . . Recognition, even 
through unfamiliar examples, is not, however, instruction, and it 
would be difficult to obtain from Johnson’s criticism any notion 
that the didactic effect of literature lies in its teaching us new 
things about human nature. [Shakespeare’s! plays would give in­
struction to a hermit, because he has lived removed from the world 
and is therefore ignorant of it; to the reasonably observant man 
who has lived in the world Shakespeare would provide, through 
lively and pleasing fictions, illustrations and confirmations of 
what he knows human nature to be l i k e . 43
Thus, for both Johnson and Dryden the poet, illustrates by an imi­
tation of general and human nature. Still, "Johnson criticized Pope’s 
view that wit in poetry consists in presenting ’what oft was thought but 
ne’er so well expressed,’ arguing that it ought to be newly thought." In­
deed, Johnson does vacillate. On the one hand he insists that "great poets 
are known by the way in which they reveal and illustrate recognizable hu­
man nature"; on the other hand, he feels that "they also in some way in­
struct us in aspects of human nature we had not known before."
The fact is, neither Dryden . . .  nor Johnson is very explicit 
on this issue, and both of them seem sometimes to talk as 
though the poet provides new exploration of the human situation 
and at other times as though he simply illustrated [sic! effec­
tively and convincingly what we know to be true.
Seemingly, Dryden and Johnson want it both ways: they see litera­
ture as imitation of human nature and at the same time as moral instruc­
tion. They recommend an imitation of life when life is not a model of 
edification and offers more often than not little moral illumination or 
instruction; for the "spectacle of men behaving as they do is not conducive
pp. 84-85. p. 87.
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45to moral uplift." They focus on two states, first on imitation, then 
on instruction, never coordinating the two theories. Their strategy is 
strategy 3 of the pre-operational child when he oscillates between the 
heights and widths of the water-level problem.
But they, like the child of pre-operations, are operating on 
reality with a limited amount of experience, maturity, and social trans­
mission, or guidance, as they pertain to literature . . . and with only 
moment—to-moment equilibrations. These limitations are to be expected, 
however. For English criticism at this time was young and up to this time 
had been mainly of a kind called legislative (a criticism that prescribes 
the rules for writing) rather than theoretical or descriptive. These major 
critics, then, were the first in English criticism to ponder the questions 
of literature and attempt to produce answers, and this with no guidance 
other than the neoclassic tradition which legislated imitation and instruc­
tion as cardinal precepts, inconsistency and contradiction notwithstanding. 
Indeed, the seeming ambivalence of Johnson and Dryden becomes understand­
able in view of the times in which they lived. Richard Moulton comments 
on this fact: " . . .  it is injustice he says to such as Johnson . . .
to measure [him] by [his] views of literature— which are in part the pro­
duct of [his] times—  . . .
Nevertheless, their theories, opposed as they are, are incommensu­
rate and preclude transformation, unless, as Daiches suggests, "one holds 
the optimistic view that the world as it is provides an edifying and improv­
ing exhibition.Johnson, he states, did not have this kind of opti­
mism.
^^Ibid., p. 87. ^^Moulton, p. 326. ^^Daiches, p. 87.
. 146
Similarly, Dryden and Johnson vacillate as to the position 
they take on ’’instruction and recognition." "Both poetry as explora­
tion and poetry as providing recognition, as cognitive and as illustra­
tive, seem to be included in their views." The former forces itself on 
their attention while they are attending the latter. Recognition of old 
knowledge cannot be new knowledge, however; the terms are also incommen­
surate and cannot be reconciled. But the contradictions which Dryden and 
Johnson experience in their vacillation-oscillation activity do not be­
come related to the transformation process and an ultimate conservation 
until in the next period when the focus shifts to the poet and his expres­
sion. John Keats (1795-1821), Romantic poet of the nineteenth century, 
exemplifies the strategy that follows strategy 3 in the water-level pro­
blem when conservation is attained. He "[writes] in one of his letters" 
that "’poetry . . . should strike the reader as a wording of his own high­
est thoughts, and appear almost a Remembrance,'" This statement is to 
bring recognition and instruction together so that a reciprocity exists 
and one compensates for the other. Daiches explains:
Keats’ phrase "amost a Remembrance" is suggestive because it in­
dicates that there is a middle ground between recognition and new 
knowledge and it is on that middle ground that imaginative litera­
ture operates. If, therefore, "a just and lively imitation of hu­
man nature" delights and instructs us, the delight is not simply a 
matter of recognizing examples of what we already knew to be true, 
nor, on the other hand, are we "instructed" in what we had never 
known before: there is a kind of recognition at work, but it is 
only apparently recognition— it is new knowledge, operating through 
an impression of the f a m i l i a r . 48
Although "a claim for poetry as conveying a special kind of aware­
ness which, while new, comes with the force of recognition, is never ex- 
49plicitly made" by Neoclassic pragmatists, still Johnson, in.his life o 
Gray, does indicate— despite his emphasis on the illustrative aspect of
^^Ibid., pp. 75, 87, 76, ^^Ibid., p. 88.
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Cray's style— that some such notion has crossed his mind. He -writes:
VThe Church-yard abounds with images which find a mirrour in 
every mind, and with sentiments to which every bosom returns 
an echo. The four stanzas beginning Yet even these bones, are 
to me original; I have never seen the notions in any other 
place; yet he that reads them here, persuades himself that he 
has always felt them . .
Here, there is a new note; the emphasis moves away from recognition in the 
first sentence to the "’almost a Remebrance’" of Keats in the second. "We 
can recognize what we had not previously known. I*7hen we see new knowledge 
rendered in the special way the poet employs we see it both as new and as 
familiar, and our reaction combines recognition with i n s i g h t , L i k e  the 
pre-operational child who finally notices the pouring from one beaker to 
the other, who now focuses attention on the operation rather than on the 
two states, Johnson has come close to relating his two constructs to the 
transformation and is approaching the stage of conservation.^^
These parallels argue for the limited thinking of the Heoclassi- 
cists as well as the similitude that exists between their illogical, ambi­
valent views and the unstable, phenomenistic thought of the pre—operational 
child, Flavell says of the child at this level,
, , • he has no stable, enduring, and internally consistent cogni­
tive organization, no system-in—equilibrium, with which to order, 
relate, and make coherent the world around him.
But through maturation, experience, social transmission, and "equilibrium—  
52state—'monents*" along the way, he comes closer and closer to a state of
50Daiches, p, 88.
51Dryden, too, in his view of nature being subject to change and decay, 
as a process which the poet imitates (see supra. Chapter 2, p. 34), came 
close to the organic view of the nineteenth century, wherein nature was seen 
as fluid and changing. In this respect, therefore, he, like Johnson, was 
approaching conservation,
^^Flavell, pp. 158, 263.
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true equilibrium. This statement can also be made of the critical thought 
during this period; for the critic-writers were concerned with literature 
as a product and the results it could effect— concerned with its absolutes, 
with literature as an object of existencies and attributes, with questions- 
concerning its nature, its function, and its value, all as they affected 
the audience and elicited the proper response. Their focus was on states, 
not transformations. And like the child who is feeling his way toward 
logical thinking but is constantly deceived by the perceptual appearance of 
things, their answers wavered between "imitation and instruction," between 
"recognition and instruction," wanting in each case, to have it both ways, 
unable to find a middle ground between the two theories. But again, like 
the child who established structures that become the foundation upon which 
later structures build, the Neoclassicists bequeathed concepts they them­
selves had inherited. For just as the Piagetian view that "no structure 
[in individual development] is radically new, but each one is limited to 
generalizing this or that form of action abstracted from the preceding 
o n e ,"53 so too does this general conception of continuity hold true for the 
evolution of literary criticism. The Neoclassic pragmatists drew on the 
ancients and the theory of imitation so that
through most of the eighteenth century, the poet's invention and 
imagination were made thoroughly dependent for their materials—  
their ideas and 'images*— on the external universe and the literary 
models the poet had to imitate; while the persistent stress laid on 
his need for judgment and art . . .  held the poet strictly respons­
ible to the audience for whose pleasure he exerted his creative 
ability. Gradually, however, the stress was shifted more and more 
to the poet's natural genius, creative imagination, and emotional 
spontaneity, at the expense of the opposing attributes of judgment, 
learning, and artful restraints.54
53Ibid., p. 240.
H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp; Romantic Theory'and the 
Critical Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 21-
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And with this shift to the poet as the center of all critical considera­
tions, certain concepts which oriented this earlier literary period were 
abstracted and integrated into the new totality which defines the next and 
more conceptually sophisticated period.
Comparison between Concrete Operational Thought 
and Romantic Literary Thought
Just as the Neoclassic critics were influenced by the ancients and 
their theory of mimesis, so too were the critics of the nineteenth century 
affected by ancient thought. However, the influence which caused their 
thinking to be radically different from their predecessors came from a dif­
ferent source in antiquity, a source much later than Plato or Aristotle or 
even Horace. Captivated by Longinus, the first-century Greek and his 
theory of the sublime, they rejected the "attributes of judgment, learning, 
and artful rest ra in t ,a l l  as they pertained to the audience, and gave 
their complete allegiance to the poet— a natural genius, creatively imag— 
nitive and spontaneous. Thus, the final cause of literature for them was 
not the external universe, nor was it the audience— it was the poet and his 
feelings. In these terms, then, their attention was on the "psychology of 
creation," not on the eighteenth—century "psychology of communication."
This shift in focus from audience as the final cause of literature to the 
poet as the wellspring of all creative invention suggests perhaps that the 
critics of this period were attempting to discover a more logical explana­
tion for the origin of the literary phenomenon.
55For Longinus and his theory of the sublime see supra. Chapter 2, 
p. 35, n- 33.
^^Abrams, p. 21.
^^Daniel G, Hoffman and Samuel Hynes, eds-, English Literary Criticism: 
Romantic and Victorian (Net7 York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963) , p. 12.
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Like the concrete operational child at this stage who is "free 
from the pull of immediate perception," who can "range forward and backward 
in space and time on the mental level," and thus has greater mobility, whose 
thinking processes, permanent and stable, demonstrate reversibility, these 
nineteenth-century theorists of the Romantic period had attained a greater 
equilibrium. Still the attainment of this higher equilibria! state did 
not cause them to discard all literary principles of the past; in fact, 
many they assimilated and many they accommodated to the changes in the environ­
ment, an environment being increasingly dominated by science and its de­
mands that all aspects of knowledge be subjected to the dictates of empi­
ricism and positivism. And in this process of adaptation, like the child 
of concrete operations whose new freedom is won only in the presence of 
"concrete existing objects and people,” the critics of this new age could 
operate cognitively in but one way— in terms of the external and concrete; 
and for them the raison d'etre of literature was in the mind and the sensi­
bilities of the poet, an element external to the work itself.
To show, then, that in this period of concrete operations that in­
dividual as well as nineteenth-century collective cognition has moved from 
phenomenism to construction and that egocentrism has yielded to reflection 
when concrete Objects are present, the parallels explored will be on the
basis of those characteristics which describe equilibrium: "field of ap—
59plication," "mobility," and "stability,"
Ginsburg explains these major characteristics by contrasting per­
ception, the directing force of pre-operational thought, with classification, 
a thought process attained at the operational level. "First he says
^%lary Ann Spencer Pulaski, Understanding Piaget; An Introduction 
to Children's Cognitive Development (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 53-54.
59Ginsburg and Opper, p. 173.
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there is the field of application of the equilibrium. This relates to the 
objects or properties of objects which the person acts upon." Perceptu­
ally, it is the field of objects that the child can "apprehend visually af 
a glance." But with classification this field of equilibrium becomes im- . 
measurably extended. "It involves the extension (the list of members) of 
the particular class under consideration. This list may . . . contain a 
variety of objects, [Thus] the greater the field of application, the more 
powerful is the equilibrium-"^*^
Now, compared to the Romantics, who espoused the expressive theory, 
the Neoclassicists, like the child who is bound by his perceptions and can 
see only states, were limited in their field of application. For them, 
literature must be an imitation of nature that will instruct and delight, 
and content and form were chosen accordingly, the former for its instruc­
tive value, the latter for its correlative delight. The Romantics, on the 
other hand, for whom the poet and his mental faculties were first princi­
ples, classified these faculties into understanding and reasoning (or fancy 
and imagination, respectively, as Coleridge spoke of them; they, there­
fore, were able through classification to extend their field of application, 
an extension which resulted in a theory that removed literature from a 
static and sterile state— as simply a product (the Neoclassical view) —  
to one dynamic and active, a highly integrated product of the poet's mind 
in creative operation— a "spontaneous overflow of powerful f e e l i n g s . O r  
as Coleridge would say, "neither a thought nor a thing, but . . .  'a middle 
quality* between the two." Indeed, Coleridge, like the child of concrete
61William Worsworth, "Preface to the Second Edition of the Lyrical 
Ballads," in Criticism: The Manor Texts, ed. by Walter Jackson Bate (New
York: Hareourt. Brace & Co., 1952), p. 337.
®^Watson, p. 119.
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operations, looked at both sides of the equation. He maintained in his 
view of literature a double view; he was able to view a poem both as a 
poem and as a process of the mind, an organism with all parts working in 
conjunction with an integrated whole. No longer were form and content 
juxtaposed; technique was spontaneous, emerging simultaneously with in­
sight. And this broadened view of literature as an expression of the 
poet, constructed on the Neoclassical concepts of a poem as a product for 
the benefit of the audience, allowed the Romantics to formulate a more in­
clusive, more dynamic, more logical system of thought.
The second characteristic of equilibrium is mobility,
which is defined in terms of the spatial and temporal distances 
that separate the person and the elements of the above mentioned 
field. The greater these distances, the more mobile the equili­
brium, or the more flexible the mental operations necessary to 
cover these distances.
Now, perceptual mobility, characteristic of the pre-operational child,
"is restricted; the spatial and temporal distances between the elements 
of the immediate visual field are small and call for a relatively limited 
number of mental activities. Xn like manner, the mobility of the Neo- 
classicists was restricted. The poem for them was simply there, was 
merely a static reflection of nature— good or evil, foolish or wise— to 
delight man because it could furnish so much instruction. With the Roman­
tics, however, perceptual mobility became mature classification in that 
they believed that a representation of objects not present was possible 
through the imagination, which "co-existing with the conscious will" 
emancipates memory "from the order of time and space" and "dissolves.
^^Ginsburg and Opper, p. 173.
64diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate." Or, as Wordsworth af-
65firmed, through "emotion recollected in tranquillity." And, interest­
ingly enough in the last stanza of his poem "I Wandered Lonely as a 
Cloud" Wordsworth demonstrates this mobility, this transcendance of time 
and space, by remembrance of a past, experience now recalled in a dif­
ferent place. The lines read.
For oft,. ichen on my couch,! lie 
In vacant or in pensive mood 
They flash upon that inward eye 
Which is the bliss of solitude;
And then my heart with pleasure fills 
And dances with the d a f f o d i l s . ^ 6
Finally, stability, the third characteristic of equilibrium, is 
defined "by the person's capacity to compensate by actions or mental oper­
ations for changes in the elements without disturbing the whole previous 
structure." Perceptual stability, which characterizes the pre-operational 
child, is "partial and limited," so much so that"if new elements are in­
troduced into the visual field, perception is changed," It will be recalled 
that Neoclassic thought focused on the attributes of literature— imitation, 
instruction, recognition— and like the child and the "water-level problem" 
was restricted by its perception, so that it experienced the process of 
"sequential probability," suffering "conflicts along the way"^^ and never
advancing beyond strategy 3— the vacillation-oscillation activity as it
pertained to "instruction and imitation," on the one hand, and "instruction
64
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria. in Criticism; The 
Major Texts, ed. by Walter Jackson Bate (New York; Harcourt, Brace & Co., 
1952), p. 387.
^^Wordsworth, p. 344.
66   ...Arthur M. Eastman et al,,eds.. The Norton Anthology of Modern Poetry 
(New York; W. W. Norton & Co., 1973), p. 585.
^^Ginsburg and Opper, pp. 173, 174,
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and recognition” on the other. Thus conservation was not reached and the 
conflicts of this ambivalence were never reconciled. Its reasoning re­
mained transductive, resulting in distorted and inconsistent views.
But mature classification is another matter.
In classification . . . the introduction of new elements does not 
destroy the system. The structure easily incorporates the new 
elements and does not change.
Now just as the ability to classify characterizes the thinking processes of 
the concrete-operational child, so too does it characterize the theoretical 
thought of the critics of this second period. They, and Coleridge in par­
ticular, saw the ideal poet as one who
. . .  brings the whole soul of man into activity, with the subor­
dination of its faculties to each other, according to their relative 
worth and dignity. He diffuses a tone and spirit of unity, that binds 
and (as it were) fuses each to each, by that synthetic and magical 
power, to which has been exclusively appropriated the name of 
imagination. This power first put in action by the will and under­
standing [fancy], and retained under their unremissive, though gen­
tle and unnoticed controul . , . reveals itself in the balance of 
reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities; of sameness, with 
difference; of the general, with the concrete; the idea, with the 
image; the individual, with the representative; the .sense of novelty 
and freshness, with old and familiar objects; . . •
With this view the poetic process is a hierarchical structure of the poet's 
mental faculties— the will and fancy subordinate to the imagination. And 
through the work of the imagination, the structure easily incorporates 
"discordant qualities" and remains intact. Moreover, the imagination com­
pensates by its "synthetic and magical power," binding and fusing the op­
posing elements into the original structure.
Thus, through classification, the phenomenism of the pre-opera— 
tional child which limited him to surface features as he perceived them 
has given way at the concrete—operational level to a concrete cons truction.
68 69Ibid., p. 173. Coleridge, Biographia. p. 379.
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And the egocentrism of his earlier years, which prevented him from adopt­
ing another’s point of view and exercising a "prise de conscience,”^ has 
at the concrete level of operations yielded to reflection— but a reflection 
that takes place only in the presence of concrete reality. Thus at the con­
crete-operational level, classification enables the child to widen his 
field of application, his mobility, and his stability, characteristics of 
equilibrium which transfer him beyond the boundaries of perception. 
Similarly, through classification, .the.egocentric and phenomenistic thought 
of the Neoclassicists yielded to construction and reflection with the Ro­
mantics. The imagination, having first been put into action by the will 
and understanding, or fancy, "brings," so Coleridge believed, "the whole 
soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each 
other, according to their relative worth and d i g n i t y . A n d  like the con­
crete-operational child, who can think and reflect on his past cognitions 
so that they lose their distortions and what was apprehended as states now 
becomes "knowing" through transformations, the imagination "dissolves, dif­
fuses, dissipates, in order to recreate"^^ and representation of objects 
not present becomes possible. But just as this attainment of construetion 
and reflection is possible only in the presence of concrete, existing ob­
jects for the individual at this level, so too is construction and reflec­
tion in Romantic thought dependent on externals— in this case, the poet 
and his faculties. For this thought is still representative thought, not 
hypothetico-deductive, which emerging at the formal operational stage al­
lows the individual to be independent of externals and thus autonomous 
in his cognition— just as in the twentieth century the work of literature is
^^Flavell, p. 236, n. 15. ^^Coleridge, Biographia, p. 379.
^^Ibid., p. 387.
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seen by the New Critics as autotelic, as a structure of unity, self-ordered 
by its context of words.
Comparison between Formal Operational Thought 
and Literary Thought of the New Criticism ■
In this period of individual cognition, there is a distinct shift
in thought from the realm of what is real, what is here and now to what
is possible; from what has been concrete-representational thought to pro-
positional thought, or as Piaget puts it "hypothetico-deductive” thought.
Inhelder and Piaget state that the "most prominent feature of [this kind of]
thought is that it no longer deals with objects directly but with verbal 
73
elements.” Flavell, more specifically, explains this change. He says 
that both the second major epoch of development, the Preparation for and 
Organization of Concrete Operations, and the third major epoch— Formal 
Operations— culminate in an "equilibration of internal, symbolic-represen­
tational operations.” They differ, however, in "the kind of internal oper­
ations which get equilibrated.” The internal operations for the second 
period are
. . .  first degree operations whose content is concrete reality 
itself; these operations consist of classifying this reality, 
serially ordering it, denumerating it, and so on. For the third 
[period], on the other hand, it is second-degree operations whose 
content is not the raw extemae, but the aforementioned first de­
gree operations themselves. By operating upon these, treating them •. 
not as realities but as conditionals which are grist for free con­
ceptual manipulation, representational thought has taken a new and 
important turn; it has become hypothetic—deductive, oriented towards 
possibility as the supraordinate term and towards reality as the sub­
ordinate term. The structures which serve this new orientation are 
no longer groupings but lattices and groups, in particular the group 
of four transformations [piaget’s INRG model] and the lattice of 
all—possible combinations [Piaget’s 16-Binary Operations model].
Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking: From
Childhood to Adolescence, trans. Anne Parsons and Stanley Milgram (New York: 
Basic Books, 1958), p. 252.
^^Flavell, pp. 265—66,
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Similarly, in English, and now American, literary thought there 
has been a transfer of orientation. The poet and his faculties, as the 
defining emphasis for the expressive theory of Romantic criticism, has 
been supplanted by the poem itself as the touchstone for orienting all 
speculative assumptions under the objective theory, the theory expounded 
by the New Critics- For them, the poet and his feelings are outside the 
work Itself (they are analogous to the concrete reality, "the raw extemae,” 
that Flavell describes as the content for the first-degree operations of 
the individual at the concrete level of operations); whereas, the poem, as 
an organization of experience, is a structural unity, which functions as 
an integrated whole, each part related to every other part and all parts 
related to the whole. It, like the adolescent who no longer requires con­
crete objects for the operations he performs, has autonomy, is independent 
of all externals. And this autonomous whole which these twentieth-century 
critics see as having structures, along with the instruments they have de­
vised to study literature's syntactic and semantic nature, bear an analog— 
cal relationship to Piaget's matrix of four transformations— the INRG group. 
In view of this relationship, then, parallels will be drawn between the 
operations of this INRG group and the operations of a literary form (the 
lyric poem in particular), as conceived by the American New Critics,, who 
evolved their instruments of speculation from the Anglo-American critic 
I. A. Richards via Coleridge.
According to Piaget's INRC group, there are "four rules by which
75the adolescent manipulates or transforms functions." These trans­
formations are identity (̂ ) negation (N), reciprocity (R), and correla-
^^Ginsburg and Opper, p. 196-
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tion (C). Three of these transformations— identity, negation, and reci­
procity— are within the ken of the child at the concrete-operational level 
(but the reciprocal relation is called a half-lattice, since at this stage 
of thought there is no transformation to.cancel R as cancels ̂ ) . They 
are elements of the grouping structure which allows him to classify and 
order serially. The transformation known as correlation, however, is 
unique to the adolescent and makes up the fourth element of the model that 
depicts his structural cognition (this additional transformation extends 
the half-lattice ̂  to a complete lattice and cancels R as ̂  cancels .
Now the elements of both the grouping (concrete operations) and the group 
(formal operations) pertain to the individual’s ability to reverse opera­
tions. But his reversibility at the concrete-operational level differs 
from reversibility at the formal-operational level, and the difference 
rests on the word function* Reversibility "in the case of the [concrete- 
operational period ] means that operations on concrete objects may be re­
versed; in the case of the Iformal-operational period ], operations on hy­
pothetical propositions (functions) may be reversed.(Italics mine.)
"The INRC group constitutes a good description of at least one im­
portant component of [the adolescent’s] cognitive organization." Within 
this group
. • • the four transformations N, Ry. and form the elements of 
a group under the operation of multiplication or combination. First 
of all (the composition requirements), the multiplication of any two 
or more of these four transformations is equivalent to . . • the sol­
itary application of some one of them.
Thus, NRC — ̂  is equivalent to, or yields the same results as, "NR =
IN = N, W  = R, IRC = N, NRCN “ N, and so on."
p. 199.
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No matter what sequence of transformations are performed, the 
final result is always equivalent to the action of some single 
one of them. The other group properties also hold: N (RC) =
(NR) (associativity) ; the identity element is 1 (thus ^  = N,
IR = R, etc.); and_each element is its oivn inverse (thus NN =
1 » M  = i. etc.)
Flavell gives the example of a snail on a board and the four ways 
in which the snail can be moved, whether it does the moving itself or the 
board is moved. The snail can move in a left-to-right movement to a cer­
tain point on the board; it can then cancel or annul this action or opera­
tion by a right-to-left movement back to his original position. Or, the 
movement can be executed in another way by the snail remaining immobile on 
the board and'the board being moved left-to-right and then right—to-left, 
returning the board to its original position and thus inversing the action 
performed on the board. The snail, therefore, is moved physically in four 
ways, whether it performs the operation or the board being moved implements 
the operation reciprocally.^® The INRC group, then, is a model Piaget de­
ploys to support his concept of reversible operations, a system which en­
tails the double reversibility of negation (the literal undoing or cancel­
ing of an operation) and reciprocity (the restoring of equilibrium in a 
compensatory manner without undoing the original operation). Ginsburg 
sees the INRC group as "an attempt to specify the rules which the adoles­
cent uses in manipulating or transforming functions
The implementation of the INRC group as a model of rules that the 
adolescent uses in the manipulation or transformation of functions, then, 
will serve the purpose of this section, which is to establish parallels 
between the operations of the INRC group and the operations of a literary 
form. It will serve the purpose in that the application of Piaget's
^^Flavell, pp. 219, 216. p. 217.
Ginsburg and Opper, p. 196.
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theory of the manner in ■which this group functions to the creative action
of a poem as this action is conceived by the American New Critics will
allow the writer to describe its functions syntactically, semantically,
80and metrically. Accordingly, it may be stated that the transformations 
of syntactic, semantic, and metrical functions that take place in the con­
text of a poem as it attempts to emerge as a "unit of sensibility"^^ is 
analogous to the transformations of cognitive functions that the INRC 
group describes.
For examplej Ransom’s and Tate’s speculative instruments as well 
as that of Brooks strikingly parallel the INRC group of transformations 
in the sense that each instrument considered individually presents a ma­
trix in which reversible operations are at work. Ransom, in getting at 
his structure-theory describes what he calls the organic act of poetry—  
the "meter-meaning" process. Here, at the outset, two entities are at 
work, each, in its own right, endeavoring to stay intact as the operation 
moves forward. One is the "determinate meaning," or H"; the other is 
the "determinate sound," or "D M," in order to maintain its orig­
nal state, attempts to "un-determine" and, by the same token, "D
as unyielding as tries to "un-determine" "^M." obviously, each
has to give if it is to sustain as much of its original state as possible,
with the result that one becomes "indeterminate meaning,” or M," and
82the other "indeterminate sound," or ’{I ̂ ." Consequently, in this give-
®^John Crowe Ransom, however is the only critic in this group whose 
speculative instrument takes meter into account.
^^Murray Krieger, The New Apologists for Poetry (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1956), p. 47.
®2john Crowe Ransom, The New Criticism (Norfolk, Conn.: New Di­
rections, 1941), pp. 297-304.
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and-take process, both poetic factors diminish each other (negation), 
while at the same time each holds a substantial part of its effect con­
stant (reciprocity), calling into play, therefore, a double reversibility. 
And this double action, wherein meaning surrenders part of its logic to 
the rules of meter and meter varies its rules somewhat for meaning; not 
only produces "_I M" and _S" but also leads to "irrelevancies"— that is,
all the particulars that the poet comes upon as he manipulates the language.
84
But at the same time that this "struggle" is taking place, with
meaning being altered to meter and vice-versa, when one is being undone
by the other and the essence of each is being neutralized, so that irrele—
vancies are being produced, there is something happening at a new level
of compensation, negating the effects of reciprocity or neutraliziation on
85the determinates of meaning and sound. "Texture," b o m  of the irrele­
vancies with which "the imagination . . . has become engaged" correlatively 
transforms the structure (thé meaning), giving body to its skeletal frame-
Eansom in The New Criticism, p. 303, explains: "A given word
will probably have synonym. The order of words in a phrase may be varied.
A transitive predication may be changed to a passive; a relative clause to 
a participial phrase. . . .Epithetical adjectes and adverbs may be in­
terpolated, if they will qualify their nouns [sic], and very obviously." 
Similarly, the poet considers what liberties he can take with the phonetic 
effect— the juggling of rhyme, of meter, of choosing this word over that 
for the sake of its sound— all decisions being made, of course, as they 
congrue with meaning.
84Krieger, p. 82.
®^The term texture, according to Alex Preminger, Frank J. Wamke, and 
0. B. Hardison, Jr. in Encyclopdeia of Poetry and Poetics (Princeton: Prince­
ton University Press, 1965), p. 853, "is the valuable element of poetry, since 
the structure exists for its sake rather than the reverse. It includes all 
the logical, heterogeneous detail which differentiates the poem from a prose 
statement. The detail is characterized by its concreteness and particularity. 
Furthermore, it is essentially irrelevant ot the structure [the meaning, 
message, or paraphrase]."
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work. Ransom explains this last transformation of correlation, this last 
step of "indeterminacy":
But the important stage of indeterminacy comes [he says] , 
in the experiment of composition, when the imagination of the 
poet, and not only his verbal mechanics, is engaged. An "irre­
levance" may feel forced at first, and its overplus of meaning 
unwanted because it means the importation- of a little foreign 
or extraneous content into what should be determinate, and limited; 
but soon the poet comes upon a kind of irrelevance that seems de­
sirable, and he begins to indulge it voluntarily, as a new and 
positive asset to the meaning. And this is the principle: the
importations which the imagination introduces into discourse 
have the value of developing the "particularity" which lurks in 
the "body," and under the surface of apparently determinate situ­
ations.
To summarize. Ransom's palpable description of the poetic process details 
a succession of transformations as the poem works to come into‘fruition.
The development of metrical content [he states 3 parallels 
that of meaning. As the meter un-determines the meaning and in­
troduces Z M, so the meaning un-determines the meter and introduces 
"variations," or _I S_. . . . so that the two structures advance simul­
taneously if not by the same steps, and every moment or so two steps 
finish together, and two new steps start together . . .
And at this point Ransom explains how the poem arrives at its consummation:
But with the phonetic effect considered for itself alone we find 
the poet developing for his meter, which is the regular phonetic 
structure, its own texture, which consists in the metical varia­
tions. He is driven into this course by considerations exactly 
the same, except in reverse, as those we have seen compelling him 
to develop within the meaning a texture of meaning. The latter 
was forced upon him by the necessity of adapting his meaning to 
the meter; and this is forced upon him by the necessity of adapt­
ing his meter to the meaning. T-Jhen he cannot further reduce his 
meaning to language more accurately metrical, he accepts a "last 
version" and allows the variations to stand. These variations of 
course present the contingency and unpredictability, or in one word 
the "actuality" of the world of sound. Many phonetic effects are 
possible really; and here a foot or a phrase holds stubbornly to 
its alien character and is not assimilated to the poet’s purpose.
In our habit of reading much into the poem, it seems to be fatal 
not to read the ontological consideration.
And in a concluding remark, he comes back to meaning and comments on the
eventuation of this transforming process:
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But probably we all have greater actual interest in the 
■meaning than in the sound. Therefore it is convenient to say 
that the phonetic effect serves as a sort of texture to the 
meaning. This is to assign to the meaning an ontological addi­
t i o n .
■ Ransom, thus, sees the poetic process as organic— a transforming
of the "2 M" ("determinate meaning") and the ’|D ("determinate sound") into
a unique creation by reversible operation;, with "possibility as the supra-
87ordinate term and reality, the subordinate term," Analogically, the poe- . 
tic matrix is to the INRC group what the aesthetic process is to the hypo­
thetico-deductive, /
Allen Tate’s instrument of "tension" compares favorably to Ran­
som’s, "with ’intension’ meaning something very close to Ransom’s ’tex­
ture.'"^® Although in his technical criticism of certain poems Tate touches 
on the effects of meter in the working out of a poem, meter is not one of 
the factors in his theory as it is for Ransom. "Tension," as Tate defines 
it, "is the full organized body of all the extension [denotation] and in­
tension [connotation] that we can find in it." With his theory of tension, 
Tate believes there are two problems: the first is to keep extension intact;
the meaning coherent, never sullied by vague referents, as in James Thomson’s 
poem "The Vine" (explained in Chapter 2, pp. 94—95); the second problem is 
to apply intension without invalidating extension— that is, the connotative 
value comes in but not at the expense of having to "forget the firm denota­
tions of the terms [explained in Chapter 2, pp. 95-971,"®^
^̂ Ransora, The HeW Criticism, pp. 314, 316—17, 318,
®^Flavell, p. 265.
88 /Rene Wellek, Concepts of Criticism, with an Introduction and ed. by 
Stephen G. Nichols, Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 62.
Allen Tate, On the Limits of Poetry (New York: William Morrow
& Co., 1948), pp. 83, 81.
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Thus, figurative language (intension) does not annul extension, 
but neutralizes it, adding extra dimensions to the language— something 
that direct language (extension) cannot do, since it has one meaning and 
one meaning only. More explicitly, extension is the literal statement on 
■which intension by "the complications of metaphor" builds. But the inten­
sion that builds never "invalidates" the meaning; no matter how heavy, how 
rich the overlay of intension, the extension, or denotative meaning, "will 
be coherent,” And always, "the dissenting ambiguities at the intensive end 
of the scale" must be taken into account because of the insight they pro­
vide over and beyond the literal statement. A transforming process takes 
■ place, therefore, in which the extension remains, yet becomes qualified or 
neutralized as the poem accumulates more intension- And as a result of 
this overlay of intension, the poem becomes increasingly denser, richer, 
and more refractory of the particular world. In fact, a good poem, as 
Tate defines it, is coherent at every step along the way and "is a unity
90of all the meanings from the furthest extremes of intension and extension," 
Finally, the bipolar elements of extension and intension are 
fused in the matrix. And although there is no double reversibility, since 
intension never dimishes nor negates extension (a poem in which this hap­
pens is a failure in connotation), there is the reversible operation of 
reciprocity wherein intension neutralizes extension, thereby holding its 
effect constant; yet, at the same time, it lifts extension beyond libera­
lity to a new fullness of conceptualization. As Tate remarks, Andrew Mar­
vell’s poem "To a Coy Mistress” is more than the surface argument of 
carpe diem. It is this too, of course— the meaning at the extensive end
®°Ibid., pp. 83, 82.
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of the scale— but it is more than this: it is "the conflict of sensuality
91and asceticism" and the choice that the dualism imposes.
For Tate, then, "tension means the integral'unity of a poem, a 
unity which results from the successful resolution in the work of the con­
flicts of abstraction and concreteness, of general and particular, of
92connotation and denotation." And this matrix of relationships brought 
into harmony by the reciprocal action of intension upon extension gives 
the poem an autonomy much like that of the adolescent whose thought pro­
cesses have reached the formal level of operations (for which the INRC 
group is a model) and are freed from dependence on concrete reality. Hence, 
it too is independent of externals and functions under its own power, its 
power of words working together in a context.
Cleanth Brooks, the last critic to come under consideration, like 
Ransom and Tate, also espouses the organic theory of literature and has 
devised an instrument that parallels Piaget's INRC group. But according
to Rene Wellek, he more than Ransom and Tate "has grasped more clearly
93, ... the organic point of view" and cornés more expressly from the direc­
tion of Coleridge. In fact, he claims Coleridge’s theory of counterac­
tion as support for his aesthetic. Krieger states that Brooks bases "his 
concept of irony" on "the following passage from Coleridge":
" . . .  the imagination reveals itself in the balance or recon­
ciliation of opposite or discordant qualities; of sameness with 
difference; of the general with the concrete; the idea, with the 
image; the individual, with the representative; the sense of nov­
elty and freshness, with old and familiar objects; a more than 
usual state of emotion, with more than usual order. . . ."94
^^Ibid., p. 83.
-^^William Flint Thrall and Addison Hibbard, eds., A Handbook to 
Literature, rev. ed., rev. and enl. by C. Hugh Holman (New York: Odyssey
Press, 1960), p. 484.
^^Wellek, p. 62. ^^Krieger, p. 47.
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But Coleridge notwithstanding. Brooks has his ideas of the
poetic process. In one of his writings, John Crowe Ransom fancifully 
describes it:
For Brooks the poem exists in its metaphors. The rest of it is 
negligible. He goes straight to the metaphors, thinking it is 
they which work the miracle that is poetry; and naturally 
he elects for special notice the most unlikely ones. Hence 
paradox and irony, of which he is so fond. Now if you count 
little ones with big ones the two figures must be about as 
ubiquitous as any we have;.they are easy to find once you are 
searching for them. It is a paradox when you find something 
which in its bearing looks both ways, pro and con, good and 
bad; irony when you have something you thought was firmly es­
tablished in the favorable sense, as good, and pro, but dis­
cover presently that it has gone bad for. you, and is contra; 
the one is a pregnant ambiguity, the other is disappointment 
where you had least reason to expect it.^^
Now Ransom’s explanation is lightly put, but it serves as a way to
understand how a poem works (at least how Ransom thinks Brooks conceives
of the process) and how its structure, as seen from the organic point of
view compares with the INRC group.
If a poem has its inception and existence in metaphors (Brooks 
maintains that "the essence of poetry is metaphor. - . .") and if a poem, 
as defined by Brooks, is "a simulacrum of reality," dramatic, not logical 
(and Brooks insists on this), and is furthermore a symbolic action and a 
structure of attitudes— if it is all of these, and if the metaphor that 
Brooks finds most intriguing is paradox, then the place to begin is with 
paradox and a situation transformed by paradox, because this is the stuff 
of reality, is "[toughminded]”^® and worth commenting on. To begin then 
with paradox and a situation, a paradoxical situation would introduce into 
the context ambiguity and a complex of incongruities. Thus, the context.
John Crowe Ransom, Beating the Bushes (New York: New Directions,
1952), p. 160.
96Clean th Brooks, The Well Wrought U m  (New York: Reynal & Hitch­
cock, 1947), pp. 223, 194, 229.
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which began with idea (situation) and paradox, .has by this time grown com­
plex as it has taken in ambiguity and its attendant incongruities. And if, 
as Ransom says, "you count little ones with big ones," the poem has become 
a matrix of language relationships, telescoping from paradox and enriching 
the whole.
More explicitly, however, paradox, as the crucial metaphor, has 
created a context of two ideas; one idea will be conveyed in a logical 
sense, whereas the other, by contradiction, will deliver the shock; these 
two ideas, discordant, yet inextricably bound, will remain in the context 
as vital forces— one "pro" and one "con"— and because they are incongruous 
elements, enigmatic and irresolvable, they will lead to the third element 
ambiguity* Now, this has become a complicated affair both semantically 
and structurally: three interrelated elements (paradox, situation,
ambiguity) bearing one upon the other and, at the same time, upon the con­
text— a palpable whole which receives from each element some part of its 
character, thereby becoming activated and textured. But there is more to 
the process than this. There is the final action on the part of the con­
text, by which the fourth element irony is introduced: For just as the
elements— situation, paradox, ambiguity— enrich the context by their 
character, so too does the context reciprocate, reflecting, as it were, 
on each element, giving back to it some part, of its new and heterogeneous 
character. And so irony ("the general term . . .  for the kind of qualifi­
cation which the various elements in a context receive from the context, 
as the incongruities and union of opposites are recognized) comes into
97Ibid., p. 191.
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being and gets-structured into the poem as the poem’s supreme attitude. The
poem thus becomes ironic itself and invulnerable to ironic contemplation.
Now to take this process into account is to see relationships and
transformations as they function within the emerging poem. But in terms
of the purpose herewith it is also to see a comparison— that is, to see
parallels between the operations of poetic creation as Brooks conceives
of them and those of formal-operational thought as Piaget conceives of
them. As for relationships, "Piaget distinguishes between two kind of
98
relations between events — causal and implicative." But these two re­
lations may also apply to the poetic process described herein and be dis­
tinguished, so that what may seem to be causal may rather be implicative. 
For example, in the paradox-ambiguity matrix there are what may be called 
elements (ideas and paradox) and attitudes (ambiguity and irony). Now 
the elements in the matrix may seem to cause the attitudes; that is, para­
dox may seem to lead to the final effect of irony (the supreme attitude) 
if it is first seen as leading to the attitude expressed as ambiguity, and 
ambiguity can be seen as leading to irony. But this is a roundabout path 
and an understanding of these intricacies depends on an understanding of 
paradox and how it works.
Paradox is tricky; it works by indirection. It is defined as "a 
form of tension found in a statement [ or a situation ] which on one level 
is logically absurd yet on another level implies a reasonable assertion."'
But, as Stephen Minot phrases it, " . . • the tension is created by up-
99setting only one type of assumption: logic." Furthermore, what it is
98Flavell, p. 259.99
Stephen Minot, Three Genres: The Writing of Poetry, Fiction,
and Drama, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 
389, 221.
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as a literary device is a paradox in itself; for it takes a literal state­
ment or situation and manipulates it so that there is no truth in it; yet 
there is some truth in it. And as a literary tool it gives a multi-di­
mensional level of meaning emphatically, concisely, and affectively to an 
idea that cannot get this same treatment at a literal level. For example 
consider the paradoxical lines from Richard Lovelace*s poem "To Lucasta, 
Going to the Wars*': "I could not love thee. Dear, so much / Loved I not
honor more."^^^ On a literal level the content of this line is concerned 
with a man’s love for a woman. Logic is defied in this statement in that 
much love for woman cannot be reconciled with more love for honor. The 
truth (and truth is what provides insight and what gives depth and reso­
nance to a literary work) that resides in the lines is revealed by bring­
ing two contradictory ideas together and attempting to resolve their dif­
ferences- But before this operation can be implemented and the opposing 
ideas brought into harmony, ambiguity, which introduces uncertainty and 
perplexity arises (how can a love that "loves honor more" be a love that 
loves a woman "so much"), calling for the union of these discordant ideas. 
Irony (the term for the qualification the context gives to its elements) 
obliges. It recognizes the incongruities in the situation, sees that 
despite the conflict, there is truth in the statement or situation— a 
truth more profound than that on a literal level; namely, true love im­
plies honor and vice-versa, for only a man who is true to his principles 
and ideals can know true and lasting love. Moreover, because the per­
sona in the poem feels a love for and a responsibility to his country 
and puts his country before personal desires and because he puts honor
100Laurence Perrine, Literature: Structure, Sound, and Sense,
2nd ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), p. 650.
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before personal desires, he is capable of a true, a pure love— one that 
is worthy, one that would put the loved one before personal desires.
Thus, through the insight that irony provides, opposites are reconciled 
and truth is revealed subtly and indirectly. And since it is the diverse 
elements provided by paradox that irony recognizes in the context, it 
would seem that paradox does cause irony.
But the relationship is more subtle than this. It is implicative.
Piaget asserts that the relations between mental states . . .  
are implicative rather than causal and just as in logic one 
would sav-that (A = B ) + (B = C) implies rather than causes 
(A = C)
one might in this case say (paradox = ambiguity) + (ambiguity = irony) im­
plies rather than causes (paradox = irony). Hence, paradox implies ambi­
guity and ambiguity implies irony, thus paradox implies irony. If, then, 
the relations between mental states in an individual and the relations be­
tween the elements-attitudes in a poetic matrix are compared, a parallel 
exists between the functions these elements-attitudes perform in their 
manipulation of the context and the functions the INRC group perform in 
their manipulation of propositional thought, seeing that relationships 
imply transformations and vice-versa.
Paradox, then, in its implicative relationship to ambiguity and 
irony has a transforming power that directs the action in a poem. As it 
manipulates the literal statement or situation, it Introduces heterogeneous 
and conflicting ideas into the context— that is, logical absurdity and reason­
able assertion unamicably yoked: what was literal is now figurative;
what was transparent and lifeless is now opaque, dense, and vital; what 
was simple is now rich in its complexity. Thus the figurative has annulled
^^^Flavell, p. 259-
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the literal, density and vitality have annulled the thin and sterile, 
and richness has annulled that which x̂ as bland. The original state of 
the context— identity, or 1— has been negated by paradox-— negation, or ̂
— hence, _IN = \N. But at the same time that paradox has been undoing 
the original state _I, its negating action has also been working recipro­
cally. It has— by the tension its diverse elements have introduced—  
increased the semantic quality of the context, layered it with nuance 
and innuendo, thus compensating for the clarity and directness it has 
removed— hence, NR = Beginning with paradox, then, the txfo transfor­
mations N and^ have so far been introduced, with the subsequent qualifi­
cation of the context and the subsequent implication of ambiguity.
Next, ambiguity appears. As an attitude, it increases the tension 
even more. This time, however, the tension stems from the aura of perplex­
ity and uncertainty that enshrouds the context. Thus, with the appearance 
of ambiguity, the context is transformed again, negating the reciprocal 
operation of paradox by correlation— hence, RC = Ĉ. For even though the 
poem, as experience has— through the efforts of paradox— grown increasing­
ly sensuous and therefore more affective, it has not as yet reached con­
summation. Ambiguity has worked as a solitary operation on paradox 
R and its reciprocal power, and the contradictions that paradox If in­
troduced into the matrix have yet to be reconciled; in other words, the 
context has yet to qualify its various elements by recognizing their in­
congruities and objectively accepting them. This job remains for irony.
Irony, however, neither transforms the context by tension iior by 
multiple levels of meaning nor by a solitary application of some one of 
the four transformations, as has been the case up to now. Rather, irony.
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Structured into the context by this time as the supraordinate attitude, 
looks back on the tension introduced by paradox and ambiguity and resolves 
it— first, by objectively recognizing its existence in the poem, and, sec­
ond, by accepting it with control and detachment. And thus a truth is 
apprehended. Furthermore, the operation that irony performs combines all 
the transformations: it> brings negation and reciprocity together into a
whole— hence, NRC = NRC = because the poem has emerged and the ori­
ginal state of the context has changed, just as the original thought of 
the adolescent changes upon perceiving all the possibilities inherent in 
an operation. The poem has transcended its original state and has been 
brought into equilibrium. Irony, having come into the context, has be­
come the qualification the context gives to its various elements (Brooks's 
definition of irony). As the objective, detached agent of the context, 
it looks back, it takes in all the parts, recognizing each incongruity as 
it presents itself. And since it has stood off and contemplated, it can 
recognize the diversity in the experience, can apprehend the truth of the
experience, and can accept the essence of truth that paradox guarantees—
namely, that life is this way— complex and enigmatic. Hence, irony uni­
fies the poem as experience, bringing it to terms with reality. This is 
why it brings negation and reciprocity into a whole. Irony, in this sense, 
may be understood as the unifying principle of the four transformations 
NRC = 2" Here, X stands for the "real" identity of the poem, the culmina­
tion of the four transformations into a "poem of inclusion," Brooks’s
idea of a "good" poem.
Thus, the creative action of a poem— as Brooks describes it— does 
possess the operations of double reversibility that Piaget recognizes in
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adolescent;thought,-albeit its process of reversibility, as in all literary 
process, does not have the kind of relational patterning wherein its hypo­
theses can be proved or disproved. Nor does it require it. For verifia­
bility is not possible in a literary transformation;, and verification is 
not what counts. T-That is important is the soundness of the relational 
pattern that the hypothesis of possible meaning is founded on.
This comparison between the INRC group of formal operations and 
the literary thought of the New Critics brings to a close this general ana­
lysis modeled after Piaget's historicodevelopmental theory, wherein paral­
lels were sought between individual cognition in the periods of pre-operational 
and operational thought and the collective literary cognition of English and 
Anglo-American critics from the sixteenth century through the twentieth.
But a brief review of the complete analysis might at this time be profit­
able: The first part of the analysis, using the Piagetian constructs
of phenomenism and egocentrism, attempted to show that Neoclassical critics, 
oriented by- the pragmatic theory of literature, were limited in their think­
ing and conceived of literature as a product rather than a process. There­
fore, like the pre-operational child, who is perception—bound and comes 
to terms with reality through representation and imitation and focuses on
states rather than on transformations, thus never "giving way to con-
102struction and . . • reflection," the Neoclassicists also focused on litera­
ture's static attributes and existences and failed to perceive the process 
underlying the nature of literature.
Next, the second part of the analysis presented the cognitive 
thought of the individual at the concrete-operational stage and that of
p. 256.
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the nineteeuth—century Romantics, who espoused the expressive approach to 
literature. The constructs used to compare these two periods were those 
concepts Piaget uses to describe equilibrium— namely, field of application. 
mobility, and stability. With these constructs, then, as points of com­
parison, the discussion pointed out parallels on the basis of classifica­
tion (as opposed to perception), positing that just as classification en­
ables the child at the concrete level of operations to expand his field 
of application as it applies to thought, to increase his mobility as far 
as space and time concepts are concerned, and to gain stability of thought 
processes by focusing on transformations rather than on states, so too 
does it apply to the Romantics. Per they, too, by classification, extended 
their field of application; that is, they incorporated the static concepts 
that the Neoclassicists held about literature as a product with their theory 
of literature as both a product and a process of the poet’s mind and feel­
ings— in short, the theory of imagination. This theory increased mobility 
of thought, in that the poet could by classification move forward and back­
ward in time and space, in that a representation of objects not present • 
was possible through the work of the imagination. And, again, the.theory 
increased stability, since at this time the poem was seen as an organism; 
a whole in which, by means of the imagination, conflicting qualities could 
be reconciled and the structure remain intact.
And, finally, for the third stage of both periods— the period of 
formal operations for the individual and the period of New Criticism in 
the present century— Piaget’s theory of the INRC group was applied. This 
theory described the formal thought of the adolescent, whereby he thinks in 
terms of possibility first and reality second and uses the functions
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of thought that the INRC group specifies. The concept'emphasized in this 
comparison was Piaget’s "double reversibility"^^^ concept of formal-opera­
tional thought. This model, which is a matrix of transformations, corre­
lates with the speculative instruments of certain New Critics— -Ransom’s 
"texture-structure," Tate’s "Tension," and Brooks’s "paradox-irony" theo­
ries, all of which treat literature as unites of semantical and syntacti­
cal relationships. In fact, these instruments, which see literature as - 
an organism, an entity within itself, exhibit the characteristics of the 
INRC group.
The preceding remarks all apply to Piaget’s stage-dependent theory. 
This theory, however, was preceded by his stage—independent theory, which 
served as a model for making a more general comparison between the human 
cognizer and literature. As a theory it asks two questions: the
synchronic and the diachronic. The synchronic question asks "’Ifhat sort 
of device’ is the human cognizer, not at any particular stage, but basic­
ally and generally?" The diachronic question, on the other hand, asks 
’’What are the general principles by which the subject . . . changes his 
state in the course of human development?" These questions were asked of
literature, and it was found that literature as social knowledge, like
104the human cognizer, is an "ever-organized entity" which assimilates real­
ity to its schemas and when this is not possible accommodates its schemas 
to external reality; and that, again like the human cognizer, it has the 
general principles by which it changes from one conception to another in 
the course of its development, as these changes, of course, are tied to 
the process of adaptation. It wa,s thought appropriate in view of the 
chapter’s purpose to present this line of thought first. But both
^°^Ibid., p. 218, pp. 262-63.
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theories illuminate literature and provide insight into the problems that 
critics have encountered since Plato first labeled poetry false, trivial, 
and useless, and Aristotle asked "What is it?" and proceeded to take it 
apart. Flavell in speaking of the contributions of the stage-dependent 
theory states:
. . . Piaget’s detailed picture of cognitive development in child­
hood provides us with a historical frame and perspective within which 
to view.the adult. This is an important but seldom discussed proper 
function of any developmental theory. Just as there is a sense in which 
one.cannot understand contemporary America without knowledge of its 
history, there is a sense in which one cannot catch hold of adult hu­
man behavior without knowing, from what and through what this behavior
e v o l v e d . 1 0 5
By the same token, we cannot grasp contemporary literary criticism and 
theory without knowing from what and through what it evolved. Thus to 
know how literature has been conceived through the ages helps in its appre­
ciation and understanding today.
lO^ibid., p p .  4 1 1 - 1 2 .
CHAPTER V
MOVING FROM PERCEPTION TO THINKING IN LITERATURE 
A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO LITERATURE 
THROUGH PIAGET'S INRC MATRIX
John Keats writes that "we come into the world as pure potential­
ity or 'Intelligence' and we acquire a 'Soul' or 'sense of identity' 
through 'Circumstances.'" Thus the human cognizer with his God-given po­
tential "evolves a soul or identity through experience." William Nords- 
worth, a Romantic like Keats, through his poetry tried "to show the spir­
itual significance of the w o r l d . T h e  combination of these two attitudes 
is essentially what literature is all about. Its value is not to learn 
about it, but through it, to evolve a soul and educate the heart; and in 
the process become more fully human. To know literature, therefore, is 
to know life and to acquire an autonomy equal to the challenges that life 
metes out both now and in the future. One avenue to an understanding of 
literature by which life can be experienced vicariously is a cognitive ap­
proach offered by the Curriculum Study Center in English, Florida State 
University, Using this guide as a model, this chapter will present an 
approach to literature which, like that of the guide " ,  . . is an
^Robert Langbaum, The Modem Spirit (New York; Oxford University
Press, 1970), p. 18.
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attempt to postulate an approach to literature study embodying the spirit
2of Piaget's theories. . . . ”
According to Piaget, perception and thought are not the one and the 
same. The individual may learn by perception alone or he may transform 
his perceptions into conceptual structures which enable him to think. And 
thinking depends on reversibility. Therefore, for learning to take place 
the learning context must be reversible, and it ”is reversible when it can 
be restructured within the mind without losing its essential equilibrium.
In other words, learning takes place when the learner is able to (I) per­
ceive, (2) restructure his perceptions into a relational pattern or multi­
ple relational patterns.”^
The transformational processes which make up actual thought pro­
cesses are, according to Piaget, a matrix of four structuring processes: 
identity, inversion, reciprocity, and correlation. Piaget uses the formula 
”NRC (the symbol including all the processes except identity) = I (Iden—
City)."*
But these processes which make up the matrix are expressed in 
terms of mathematics and logic. Thus, it is necessary to translate these 
teinns into literary terms, or to find their equivalents or near equivalents 
in terms of literary jargon. This was attempted in the aforementioned 
Florida study. This chapter, building on the concepts presented in the 
Curriculum guide, will pursue them in more detail. However, before ex­
ploring the equivalency of terms some comparisons between mathematics and 
literature should first be drawn: Reversibility in mathematics is based
2Curriculum Study Center in English, Florida State University, 
"Curriculum III: Cognitive Processes,” An Approach to Literature Through
Cognitive Processes, Tallahassee, Fla,, 1963, p. 9. (Typewritten)
3lb±d., p. 7. ^Ibid., p. 9.
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on its "built-in capability of proving or disproving most of the hypothec
5ses which are a product of mathematical thought." Mathematical thought, 
in other words, is verifiable. Its principles are reversible, are flexi­
ble. For example^ 5 4-5 = 54-5, or 4 4- 6 = 5 -b 5 or 10 = 5 -f- 5 or 25 = 5 
because of the inverse operation of 5^ = 25. But literature's reversibi- ■ 
lity is not based on relational patterns that can be verified— that is, 
the act of organizing the details of a poem into a relational pattern 
that will yield a "hypothesis of possible meaning" (e.g., a decision 
about the tone of a poem, or the theme) is not a verifiable hypothesis.
But "the degree to which the hypothesis is valuable is not relative to
its verifiability. Rather its worth rests on the soundness of the rela-
6tional pattern which is perceived to underlie the hypothesis." In other 
words, to the extent that an idea is based on the data of the Selection—  
namely, facts clearly implied by the poem, those within the confines of 
the poem, "not an assumptions supplied from [one's] own experience"^— this 
would be verificiation. And this "structuring of relational patterns, whe­
ther in mathematics or literature, is still born in Piaget’s thought ma— 
trix."®
Now, for the equivalents in literary terminology that are com­
parable to the language of mathematics and logic.
Identity, the first transformational process of the Piagetian ma­
trix, is signified in logic by the = sign. For example, "a = b. means that
^Ibid., p. 7. ®Ibid.
^Laiirence Perrine, Literature: Scructure, Sound, and Sense. 2nd ed.
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), p. 108. (Hereinafter referred to
as Literature)
^Curriculum Study Center in English, "Curriculum III: Cognitive
Processes," p. 7.
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^  *is identical’ with In literature, then, since identity is the ma­
terial with which all transformations begin and end, it may apply to the 
literal facts or images of the selection— poem, short story, whatever*
As an example, consider the following poem~by William Blake entitled ' 
"London":
I wander thro’ each charter’d street.
Near where the charter’d Thames does flow.
And mark in every face I meet
Marks of weakness, marks of woe. 4
In every cry of every Man,
In every Infant’s cry of fear.
In every voice, in every ban.
The mind—forg’d manacles I hear. 8
How the Chimney-sweeper’s cry 
Every black’ning Church appalls;
And the hapless Soldier’s sigh
Runs in blood down Palace walls. 12
But most thro’ midnight streets X hear 
How the youthful Harlot’s curse 
Blasts the new born Infant’s tear.
And blights with plagues the Marriage hearse. 16
Here, the instructor might ask a student, "How would you describe 
the tone of this poem?" The student might answer, "It sounds bitter, cy­
nical, pessimistic." Now to return this question-answer to the termino­
logy of logic, it could be said that ̂  stands for the teacher’s question 
and for the student’s answer. Thus the relationship between the two 
is expressed as the identity a = b , or in the example here tone = bitter, 
etc. But this identity at the first level could be transformed into other 
relational patterns for a fuller interpretation of the question. The ques­
tion—answer session might continue as follows:
9
Ibid., p. 8.
^^Stanley A. Clayes and David G. Spencer, eds., Contexts for Com­
position, 2nd ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), pp. 214-15.
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Teacher: If the tone is bitter, cynical, pessimistic, how did you
arrive at this conclusion? Is it just the way the poem 
makes you feel, or can you support your answer?
Student: The poet talks about "weakness," "woe," different cries
and the "Soldier’s sigh"; then he uses such words as "curse," 
"blasts," "blight," and "plagues," words that make every­
thing sound hopeless.
Teacher: So you are saying that you think everything sounds hopeless?
Student: Yes, and I think Blake thought everything was pretty had.<
Teacher: Oh, so you’re talking about Blake’s attitude?
Student: Yes, that’s the way he feels, and the way he tells it
makes us know how he feels.
Teacher: t-Jhen you say "the way he tells it," then, you are talking
about the words he uses to describe it?
Student: Yes, he doesn’t like what he sees, so he’s bitter
and cynical, and that’s the tone of voice he would 
probably have.
Teacher: Fine. Then we could say that tone shows a writer’s
feelings or attitude about something just as tone of 
voice shows whether you are happy or sad or angry.
But no one can hear his voice, so he has to choose words 
that show how he feels.
Student: (nods his head) . . .  But we choose the words that show
how we feel, too, don’t we? When my Dad gets mad, his
words sure show how he feels!
This discussion, then, would be an extension of the structural
relationship already established by the first identity- The thinking 
process would have moved from one identity to another: tone = bitter.
etc. = bitter, etc. = images that suggest bitter actions b o m  out of 
bitter attitures ("curse," "blasts." "blights") and images that connote 
dismal, unfavorable conditions ("cry," "sigh," "woe"). The process has 
produced two identities, and the hypothesis inherent in the discussion 
has been supported by returning to the facts of the poem. In fact, it has 
moved from the process of identity into other structural relationships that
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will be touched upon later. In some cases, however, the procedure would 
not go beyond the first identity; since at times, a deeper analysis is not 
necessary. For example, the identification of Blake as a pre-Romantic 
poet might suffice without pursuing the structure to a deeper level.
Inversion, the second process, implies negation. It is a struc­
tural relationship that invokes meaning through the juxtaposition of op­
posing elements. In arithmetic, it is the inverse relationship between 
addition and subtraction, between multiplication and division. Likewise, 
in literature an inversion is the relationship between incompatible ele­
ments, and when this is perceived by the reader, he feels the sharp con­
trast. Quite often, particularly in the poem, these strongly opposed 
notions are set side by side in a grammatical construction, resulting in 
an emotional effect (an effect, incidentally, neither experienced in mathe­
matical transformations nor aimed for, as it is in literature).
In this poem, which is a bitter satire on such institutions as 
the church, the state, and marriage, Blake indicts the society of his time 
in two ways: First, through irony of situation, by describing the condi­
tions, harsh and unmindful, imposed on a society that submits to the laws 
and mores of its institutions ("mind forged manacles"); this description 
sets up the opposing elements of what as against what should be. Thus 
the irony; thus the inversion. His second literary device, by which he 
culminates the indictment, is the use of the oxymoron ("a compact paradox 
in which two successive words seemingly contradict each other."^^)- In 
line 16, the two words "marriage" and "hearse," syntactically combined, 
form an oxymoron that details a society in which not only marriage but
11 ? Perrine, Literature, p. 743.
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the source of life itself is contaminated ("Blasts the new born Infant's 
tear") by the social evils that produce a harlot. Thus through the strik­
ing image of the marriage conveyance as a "hearse"— in which two words 
with contradictory associations ("marriage" = beginning of a fruitful union 
and "hearse"=finality, death) are placed side by side— he finalizes the 
irony that has up to this point pervaded the poem. The structured rela­
tionship produced by the oxymoron has the effect of jolting the reader 
when he conceives its design, thereby underscoring the truth of the poet's 
prediction.
But how is a student led to transform such a detail into meaning? 
Or, in literary language, how is he brought to understand this image as 
the transcendental irony?
Assuming that the discussion has moved from the poem's tone, prev­
iously identified, to Blake's attitude concerning the discrepancy between 
life in London and what it should be (irony of situation), and now a com­
ment has been made about the oxymoron, the teacher might ask the following 
questions;
Teacher : Tfhat would a "marriage hearse" be?
Student: A hearse takes the casket or coffin to the cemetery.
Teacher: But what about the word "marriage" that describes it?
Student: Blake probably was talking about the carriage the married
couple got in after they came out of the * church.
Teacher: But these words are side by side. Why did he have the word
"Marriage" describe a "hearse"? Isn't that an odd way to
speak of the carriage that a wedded couple is riding in?
ÏThy do you suppose he put them together and what——combined 
this way— do they suggest?
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Student: Well he must have been saying that the harlot cursed the
wedded couple with plagues, so the marriage was already 
dead and was riding in a hearse. Putting it at the end, 
after all the bad things he's talked about, seems to show 
how terrible everything is. And it stands out with two 
words so different in meaning together like that.
And so, assuming such a discussion could have transpired, the student would
have conceived the pattern of details and would have transferred it into
an inverse or ironic relationship.
Any. number of literary devices would be examples of inversion.
Paradox, for one, gets its effects through the positioning of elements that,
at first thought, are opposed to each other logically. It startles the
reader— this inverted way of thinking or speaking— and by its absurdity
emphasizes the truth. Emily Dickinson says in one of her poems, "My life
12closed twice before its close," and the reader’s first reaction is "How 
can this be? You can’t die twice before you die!" Intrigued by this am­
biguity, he continues and finds that the poet is speaking of having twice 
experienced either the death of a loved one or the separation from a loved 
one, which to her was the same as having died herself. The opposing ideas 
linked together syntactically form a pattern that the reader recognizes 
as an incongruous, or in other words, an inverse or paradoxical relation­
ship -
Another type of inversion is satire. It implies ridicule and, 
like sarcasm, employs irony as a tool. It applies to written literature 
rather than speech and has as its aim the righting of some wrong or the 
improvement of human nature. Tension is established in satire "by play­
ing an exaggeratediview of characters, places, or institutions against
Laurence Perrine.Sound and Sense: An Introduction to Poetry,
3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969), p. 110.
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the reasonable view.** Thus there is the differentiation that inversion
projects. For example, the following lines illustrate the use of satire
as an inversion:
Look at him there in his stovepipe hat.
His high-top shoes, and his handsome collar;
Only my Daddy could look like that,
And I love my Daddy like he loves his Dollar.
In these lines of fairly light verse, William Jay Smith creates tension
**in the contrast between the apparent tone of sentimental tribute and the
13actual tone of cutting protest.**
Two other examples of inversion and types of irony are overstate­
ment and understatement. Both of these tilt the balance in a relationship. 
One by overstating, as the name implies, and the other by understating. 
Overstatement, or hyperbole, is simply exaggeration to achieve effect. In 
his poem **I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud,*' Wordsworth gives an exaggerated 
report of a visual perception when he describes the daffodils as stretch­
ing . . in never-ending line / Along the margin of the bay. **̂  ̂ This ex­
aggeration was his way of emphasizing their great numbers, a scene so vivid 
that as the poem concludes, he relives the experience in retrospect. Under­
statement, on the other hand, is the asymmetrical relationship of elements 
which is established by saying less than is intended. When Jonathan Swift 
says, **Last week I saw a woman flayed, and you will hardly believe how much 
it altered her person for the worse,*' he is stating what is literally true, 
but by deliberately underplaying it, he gives it a force it would otherwise
13Stephen Minot, Three Genres: The Writing of Poetry. Fiction and
Drama. 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 91, 92.
14Arthur M. Eastman et al., eds., The Norton Anthology of Poetry. 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1970), p. 585.
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lack, Laurence Perrine, in commenting on these devices says: "It is para­
doxical that one can emphasize a truth either by overstating it or by under­
stating it,”^^ or, as might be added, b y‘saying the opposite of what is in­
tended, as in verbal irony. Thus, the .student of literature who is concep- 
tive, who can structure his thinking in terms of inverse relationships es­
tablishes a special understanding between himself and the writer and, more 
than that, discovers an extra dimension in his reading,
A final type of literary inversion is contrast. It is used to 
make one element stand out against another for the purposes of clarity, em­
phasis, and emotional impression. It is always a necessary part of irony, 
but irony is not always a part of contrast; that is, contrast plays an im­
portant part in character delineation by making one character stand out
from another; it also functions effectively in establishing mood of tone 
in a selection. Writers of fiction have employed it profitably in both 
ways, Nathaniel Hawthorne, in particular, comes to mind. For him contrast 
was an important architectural device that began with imagery and swelled 
into a kind of cosmic symbol. Since much of his writing was preoccupied 
with the theme of man’s sinful nature, such images as shawdows and light 
played through much of his work, coming to stand for the qualities of 
good and evil. In terms of poetry Alfred Lord Tennyson’s poem, "The Eagle” 
displays two fine examples of the formal use of contrast.
He clasps the crag with crooked hands;
Close to the sun in lonely lands.
Ringed with the azure world, he stands.
The wrinkled sea beneath him crawls;
He watches from his mountain walls.
And like a thunderbolt he falls.
^^Perrine, Literature, pp. 658, 651, ^^Ibid., p. 555,
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The first example of contrast in this poem is concerned with the formal 
arrangement of images. For instance, the first stanza ends with the image 
*'he stands," as opposed to the image "he falls," ending the second stanza. 
And so, the first image is canceled out by the second. Also, related to 
these images are other images peculiar to each stanza- Those in the first 
stanza are static images— "clasps," "close," "stands"— which show the eagle 
in a realm of silent splendor. Those in the second stanza are more dynamics 
The sea "crawls," the eagle "watches," the thunderbolt "falls"— an image 
whose force can almost be felt. Thus stationary images in the first stanza 
are set against moving images in the second. In a sense, the first scene 
is annulled by the second. Certainly a pattern of details cast in an in­
verse frame.
The second example of contrast has to do with the poem's point of 
view. The first stanza presents what is seen with the eagle as the point 
of focus, that seen from the narrator's point of view; the second stanza 
is from the eagle's point of view, what he sees beneath him. Thus the 
formal pattern of this poem enables the conceptive reader to move vicari­
ously into the eagle's experience as well as that of the spokesman.
The third transformational process— reciprocity— in contrast to 
inversion, implies the balance of similar elements; it "expresses symmetry." 
In literature this explanation would bring to mind the broad term metaphor 
with its subsets personification, simile. and allegory. Since formal 
thought seeks to establish equilibrium, the recognition of figurative struc­
tures and an understanding of how they operate could contribute signifi­
cantly in moving the learner toward this goal. Because the student who 
perceives patterns in the details of language, who is aware of recurrences
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and similarities, has freed himself from functional rigidity, has freed 
his creativity— in short, his mind is able to take sudden leaps from one 
plane of experience to another. Indeed, imagination, the first general 
property of formal thought, perhaps, is the faculty of mind that is capa­
ble of picturing or "imaging" absent objects as if they were present (Pia­
get's "subordination of reality to possibility")^^— a faculty which is a 
prime requisite in handling the metaphor, .
But to explain the reciprocal structure of the metaphor: a meta­
phor is created when item A— that which is being discussed on a literal 
level— is compared with item B— that from a level of experience beyond 
literal concern. Items A and B need be similar in only one small way.
The more they differ, the more removed they are from each other— except 
for the one small difference— the more they startle. Thus, they have two 
parts: (1) the literal, which is called the tenor, and (2) the figurative,
which comes from a different, removed level of experience, called the ve­
hicle. In the ordinary metaphor, both tenor (the basic sense, the subject 
matter under consideration) and vehicle are expressed, and the tenor takes 
a temporary ride in the vehicle of another idea, object, image, or emotion. 
To illustrate: "He was a lion in bat.tie," This statement creates a meta­
phor in which the tenor is He (the subject under consideration) and the 
vehicle is lion. Thus, He takes a temporary ride in the image lion. And 
when the literal is compared to something from a removed level of ex­
perience, such as lion, the reader "images" the man. He, fighting fiercely, 
rapaciously, courageously, as a lion would fight.
Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking: 
From Childhood to Adolescence, trans. Anne Parsons and Stanley Milgram 
(New York: Basic Books, 1958), pp. 134, 254.
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As. an example of how a student might transform by metaphor the 
details of a poem as he perceives them into a structure of symmetrical re­
lationships, consider the poem "Dr. Sigmund Freud Discovers the Sea Shell," 
by Archibald MacLeish. This poem employs an extended personification (sub­
set of metaphor) to compare the abstract concept science to a saint.
Science, that simple saint, cannot be bothered 
Figuring what anything is for;
Enough for her devotions that things are 
And can be contemplated soon as gathered.
She knows how every living things was fathered.
She calculates the climate of each star.
She counts the fish at sea, but cannot care
Why anyone of them exists, fish, fire or feathered.
Why should she? Her religion is to tell 
By rote her rosary of perfect answers.
Metaphysics she can leave to man:
She never wakes at night in heaven or hell
Staring at darkness. In her holy cell 
There is no darkness ever: the pure candle
Burns, the beads drop briskly from her hand.
Ifho dares to offer Her the curled sea shell!
She will not touch it!— knows the world she sees 
Is all the world there is! Her faith is perfect!
And still he offers the sea shell . . .
What surf
Of what far sea upon what unknown ground 
Troubles forever with that asking sound?
What surge is this whose questions never ceases?
The teacher might start the discussion by saying, "We know that a com­
parison. is being made here: MacLeish says that science is a saint. Now, 
if science is a saint, and science is what he is talking about— his sub­
ject— how many ways is the comparison highlighted? To answer, the student
might respond by listing the details in the poem which are associated with
18Perrine, Literature, pp. 613—14.
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,"faith is perfect." Thus, in understanding how these images reinforce the
metaphor and allow the two planes of experience— the scientific and the
metaphysical— to merge, he would be transforming by reciprocity: Science
= saint = the metaphor. The image saint (vehicle) and those properties
ordinarily associated with a saint and her world are in the poem acting
as the many vehicles which carry science (tenor), the literal concept, on
a temporary ride. During the ride, meanwhilej the reader imaginatively
recognizes similarities between the properties of the saint that the poem
mentions and those that he must call to mind independently as characteristics
expressive of a scientist. He might hypothesize and deduce as follows:
If science is a saint, then science or a scientist should have properties
similar to those of a saint, and the properties they have in common should
reveal qualities common to both. Furthermore, he might set up a table
such as the following:
Properties of a Scientist — Properties of a Saint
Scientific inquiry = Religion
Zealous application = Devotions
Equipped laboratory = Holy cell, pure candle, beads
Experimental problem = Rosary of " . . . answers"
Hypotheses to be tested = " . . .  heaven or hell"
Supported hypotheses = Faith
Dedication and validity = Dedication and purity
Reasoning thus, the student is organizing the details of the poem into re­
lational patterns that are structurally sound in terms of his hypothesis.
And when he submits to MacLeish’s personification of science, he recognizes 
the power of the metaphor to give body and form to an otherwise abstract 
concept, and he is operating by reciprocity.
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The final- transformational process in Piaget’s matrix is correla­
tion. In a sense, correlation, like identity, is a necessary part of in­
version and reciprocity. The identification of the details are first per­
ceived, then this perception moves into a pattern which may be inverse or 
may be reciprocal. When the identity is structured into one of these re­
lationships, it necessarily becomes a correlation. "For the purposes of 
literature study, correlation can be considered, "as the structuring of re­
lationships between separate c o n t e x t s . I t  is a kind of thinking that 
goes beyond the separate relationships and overrides or encompasses them 
all, much like the term metaphor or analogy or irony is a term that is 
broad and at the same time narrow. But back to correlation— it is a trans­
formational process which can be viewed in several distinct ways:
First, correlation can be the relationship between separate con­
texts of the same whole. It can be, for instance, the relationship be­
tween the title of a selection and some image or detail in the selection. 
Take MacLeish’s poem, the title refers to the conch shell with its many 
convolutions as being symbolic of the chambers of man’s mind (Freud’s 
id, ego, and superego). The image, the "curled sea shell," and the title, 
then, form the structural relationship of correlation and work together 
as a symbol. Or, the correlation could be conceived hypothetically as im­
plying a fusion between Freud’s model of the mind (certainly an abstract 
entity), a non-living image, and the image of the living sea shell. Hence, 
a cosmic metaphor.
Second, correlation can be outside the selection. For one thing, 
it can be more than the connections between separate contexts (title and
19Curriculum Study Center in English, "Curriculum III: Cognitive
Processes," p. 13.
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image) and the selection as a whole. MacLeish*s poem is pitched at the 
quarrel that has existed for centuries between the humanities and science, 
between those disciplines that deal with metaphysics and those that demand 
verification. , The poet sees science as caring not the least **why any one 
of them exists, fish, fire, or feathered" and contemptuous of any world 
but "the world she sees,** valuing only what can be **gathered** and counted.
In this sense, he sees science as a saint, glorifying her purity and holi­
ness to the point of smug complacency; yet, blind to the fact that the 
concerns of man— his questions— are those that neither science nor any 
other form of knowledge can resolve. 1-Jhen the student conceives these re­
lationships and is struck by the inadequacy of science— the all—powerful—  
to deal with the intricacies of human nature; when he, as a human being, 
appreciates his individual inscrutability, and is touched; then, he is en­
gaged in the transformational process of formal thought called correlation. 
Moreover, this vicarious participation, this **imaginative entry*'^® into pos­
sibility is an example of structuring correlations so that the personal, 
at-the moment experience can move from the question **’t'7hat do I feel?’*' 
to "’What can be felt? Tfhat are the feelings of all mankind, all living 
life?” * In this kind of learning-feeling situation, the learner "moves
from egocentficity to agape, from the narrowness of his own perceptions
21
to the breadth of everyone’s" Or, to quote Inhelder, he experiences a 
"decentering which makes possible the true beginnings of adult work."
^^Richard WilXis and Iren Willis, "The Fine Arts Program," in Teacher’s 
Manual for Adventures for Readers: Book One, classic ed., edited by Elizabeth 
C. O'Daly and Egbert W. Nieman (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1958),
p. 306.
22Inhelder and Piaget, p. 343.
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Finally, correlation can be the structuring of relationships be­
tween or among seemingly diverse, yet related, forms. It can be the com­
mon thread as it is conceived in say, three poems: For example, the sub­
ject of death as it is presented in Walt Whitman's "Joy, Shipmate, Joy," 
William Cullen Bryant's "Thanatopsis," and Emily Dickinson's "I Could Not 
Stop for Death." Or it can be the correlation a student might find be­
tween two paintings. Andrea del Castagne's The Youthful David and Andrea 
Montegna's Judith and Holofemes might be worthy of consideration, since 
each subject in the paintings has decapitated his adversary to save his 
people. This exercise can even be extended to include the Biblical ac­
count of David and Goliath and the apocryphal Book of Judith in order to 
compare the subjects as depicted by the two artists with those of litera­
ture. An art form from music, from art, from literature can also be a com­
bined consideration. Opportunities for this type of correlation are in­
finite. From varied perceptions of discrete forms, a student "may be 
able to structure correlative relationships which enable him to express 
himself more intelligently on one of these contexts because of the concept­
ualization which the others within the relational pattern have provided.
Formal thought is characterized by two general properties: (1) it
constitutes a combinatorial system, and (2) it subordinates reality to 
possibility. The novelist, the writer of short fiction, the dramatist, 
the poet— each tries all the combinations, each relinquishes reality to 
possibility in the attempt to create. Thus, to bring students to an appre­
ciation of the "greats" in literature and their creations, the teacher 
should help students transform their perceptions of the surface quality
23Curriculum Study Center in English, "Curriculum III: Cognitive
Processes," p. 14.
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of literature into deeper meanings by offering them opportunities for 
practice in applying the problem-solving approach to their learning, where­
by they can learn to question and hypothesize. And if they are afforded
the opportunity to operate, as Piaget would say, on a "hypothetico-deduc—
24tive" level, they will, no doubt, become quite comfortable in Piaget’s 
matrix of four transformations.
A cognitive approach to the study of literature is a correlation 
itself. It structures relationships between separate contexts— logic, 
mathematics, and literature— and in the operation transforms figurative 
language, which is considered by many a technical, abstruse aspect of 
literature study, from a static, abstract concept to one concrete and pal­
pable.
24Jean Piaget, Strueturalism, trans. and ed. Chaninah Maschler 
(New York: Basic Books, 1970; Harper Torch Books, 1971), p. 136.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
The problem, the major purpose, and the related purpose of this 
research have resulted in the following: (1) an introduction to,the study,
(2) a history of English and Anglo-American literary criticism from the 
sixteenth century to the twentieth, based on four approaches to literature—  
the mimetic, the pragmatic, the expressive, and the objective, (3) a gen­
eral review of Jean Piaget’s concepts as a genetic epistemologist, (4) a 
comparison whereby parallels were established between the collective thought 
of literary theorists as it changed in its conceptions of literature’s na­
ture from one period to the next and the cognitive thought of the individual 
as it changes from one developmental period to the next, and (5) a cog­
nitive approach to literary study based on Piaget’s INRC model of higher- 
thought processes.
The fourth item— the comparison— is the part of the research that 
pertains to the first hypothesis, which postulated that literature when 
put in a historical frame will show advances in the way it has been con— . 
ceived by literary critics that parallel advances in the cognitive develop­
ment of the individual. Based, then, on Piaget’s stage-dependent theory 
and the evolution of critical thought as set out in the history, it has 
been shown that there has been a steady progression in the collective thought 
of literary criticism from phenomenism and egocentrism to construction and 
reflection, a movement that is analogous to the progression in thought of 
the individual founded on the same constructs. Piaget, according to
195
196
Gisnburg and Opper, in examining a knowledge form looks for these parallels, 
and even though "he does not always find a perfect fit between the two," be­
tween ontogenesis and sociogenesis, "he does nevertheless find a number 
of similarities in the mechanisms of development."^
Therefore, in respect to. what Piaget has accomplished in using 
this strategy and the hypothesis formulated, it would be well at this 
point to briefly review what the historicodevelopmental method applied to 
literature has revealed, what "similarities in the mechanisms of develop­
ment" have come to light.
With the first period of critical thought— the "Neoclassical— and 
the first stage of ontogenetic development-.-the pre-operational— the most 
obvious mechanism central to both is their "intense egocentrism, charac­
terized by phenomenalistic thought which concentrates on the superficial,
2or peripheral aspects of reality. . . Preoccupied with surface fea­
tures, they both are unaware of the processes which underlie the object of 
their concentration. The child can handle objects, knows their properties, 
and can discover some of the attributes of objects and figures* He can 
establish the spatial relationships of objects, can find his way in fami­
liar surroundings, and can perform certain actions or transformations on 
his environment. Nevertheless, he focuses on states, rather than on trans­
formations, and he is interested in results and not the process that ef­
fects the results. In the same way, the Neoclassicists dealt with litera­
ture. They put it in a frame by defining it as an imitation of the con­
crete world. Having labeled it thus, as an object merely there, they could 
discuss its attributes and existences: its content was Aristotle’s world
1Herbert Ginsburg and Sylvia Opper, Piaget’s Theoryyof Intellectual 




of "things as they were or are, or things as they are said or thought to
3be, or things as they ought to be." Its aim was to instruct arid to please; 
instruction came with the content and pleasure came with the form, both 
static concepts, juxtaposed in their relationship. And since the Neoclassi­
cists centered on the audience as the element that oriented all literary 
principles, they saw literature as performing actions on the environment, 
of transforming it. In fact, the raison d'etre of all literature was to 
edify the reader by the instruction it offered. Thus, they, like the child, 
were interested in results— the effect on the reader. They were unaware 
of the process of literature and saw it as a product. Hemmed in by their 
phenomenal field— the belief that the audience was the touchstone of all 
considerations— their conceptions of literature could never rise above a 
sterile, restricted view.
With the Romantics and the concrete-operational stage, however, 
the mechanism that relates them is the progress they both achieve in mov­
ing from phenomenism to a concrete construction, from egocentrism to re­
flection, but reflection only in the presence of concrete, existing objects, 
wherein the process, or the operation, receives the focus. The concrete- 
operational child can classify things, order them, or perform a series of 
mental operations on them; he has also at this point become aware of the 
transformations he can perform on objects, albeit this awareness is not 
fully complete. His thought is reversible, and by classification he has 
extended his field of application, has accelerated his mobility, and has 
acquired stability. The same equilibrial properties can also be attributed 
to the Romantics, who were directed in all literary concerns and distinctions
^Aristotle Poetics in Criticism: The Major Texts, ed. by Walter
Jackson Bate (New York: Harcourt. Brace & Co., 1952), p. 36.
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by the poet and the process of his creation. Their concept of imagination 
and the organic theory of literature enabled them to extend their field of 
application, become more mobile as a system in equilibrium. They believed 
that the poet’s mind could be divided into understanding, or fancy, and 
reason, or the imagination, with the latter uniting the particular of under­
standing with the universal of reason. This classification allows them 
to incorporate all the characteristics the Neoclassicists ascribed to litera­
ture— the product of fancy— and add to them the imagination, the synthe- 
sizing agent that "brings the whole soul of man into activity."^ Thus, 
their ensemble of objects was expanded to include not only the product of 
poetic fancy but also the process of imagination.
Another property of equilibirum possessed by the Romantics was mo­
bility. With their idea of the imagination, the perceptual mobility of 
the Neoclassicists became mature classification- Through the imagination, 
they believed that the poet could transcend time and space, representing 
objects not present; that is, by its "co-existence with the conscious will," 
the imagination could " emancipate " memory from the order of time and space" 
and by "[dissolving], [diffusing], [dissipating]" the sense impressions 
of memory could "recreate-"^
The third property of equilibrium characteristic of the Romantics 
was that of stability, the property that allows the introduction of new 
elements without destroying the whole. Again, it was the imagination and 
its unifying power that kept the structure intact. By its powers to bind 
and fuse, it synthesized all discordant elements within the creation so 
that the structure remained whole: organically related, form arose out
4Samuel Taylor Coleride, Biographie Literaria, in Criticism: The




of the properties of content. And the pleasure taken in the whole was 
equal to and led up to by the pleasure taken in each of its parts.
Thus poetry for the Romantics was the "spontaneous overflow of 
6powerful feelings," a process or operation of literature, which imitated 
the true reality— the process of nature— dictating its function and justi­
fying its value. They probed "more deeply and more extensively into the 
object of their cognition"— the process and the product, the creative act 
and the creation— and "phenomenism gave way to a progressive construction," 
as they restructured the Neoclassical concept of imitation and saw its in­
ception as an utterance, a reflection of the poet’s mind as he programmed 
sense impressions and fancy through the imagination; and the egocentrism 
of the Neoclassicists was supplanted "by reflection"^ as they searched their 
oivn thinking and more nearly approached the true nature of literature.
And, finally, with the period of the New Criticism and the stage of 
formal operations, the mechanism that correlates them is the relinquish­
ment of reality to possibility, the orientation of thought from concrete 
elements to verbal elements, and the INRC group that serves this new orien­
tation. For the adolescent the INRC group describes the rules by which 
he transforms functions, 2  standing for identity, for negation, for 
reciprocity, and for correlation. These transformations allow him to 
think in terms of possibility— that is, propositionally— so that he can 
reverse operations either by negating or destroying the operation or by 
keeping the operation intact by compensation. In manipulating his think-
William Wordsworth, "Preface to the Second Edition of the Lyrioal 
Ballads," in Criticism; The Major Texts, ed. by Walter Jackson Bate (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952), p. 344.
7John H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of /Jean Piaget, with 
a Foreword by Jean Piaget (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1936), p. 256.
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ing he operates within a whole, both beginning and ending with identity.
He works with conditionals, and verbal elements are his medium of thought.
Similarly, the New Critics see literature, the work itself, as an 
autonomous whole, as a unit of relationships requiring no externals, no 
concrete reality for its consummation. Words work together semantically 
and syntactically; they oppose and complement one another, creating a ma­
trix both opaque and complex,.sensuous and rich, in which dramatically 
structured attitudes test ideas and harmonize their conflicting elements. 
The poem, is, like the INRC group, a matrix of transformations manipulated 
by opposites which in the poem are reconciled: the ’'structure-texture*'
trope in which "determinate meaning" (structure) opposes "determinate me­
ter," ending in a structure of "logical irrelevancies," or "texture"; the 
"tension" trope in which "extension" (denotation) and "intension" (conno­
tation) are reconciled in a poem of "tension" and the "poem of inclusion," 
directed by paradox and unified by irony. Thus, for the New Critics, the 
poem, like adolescent thought, is a structure of relationships, subordi­
nating reality to possibility. Beginning with identity (jC) and ending 
with it, verbal elements are also its medium, its conditionals, its strat­
egy, no less. The concrete construction of the Romantics becomes formal 
construction for these twentieth-century critics: poetry has its soucre
in a structure of words, words that interact dramatically and dynamically 
into an organized experience;that is "both an object understood and an ob­
ject loved"^; concrete reflection on the true nature of literature yields 
to formal reflection, and they find their answer in the poem itself.
8Richard Foster, The New Romantics (Bloomington: Indiana Univer­
sity Press, 1962), pp. 139—40-
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The mechanisms of development between the cognition of the individ­
ual as he moves from the period of pre-operations to concrete operations 
to formal operations parallel those of collective critical conception as 
it has evolved from the Neoclassical period to the Romantic period to the 
period of New Criticism. The phenomenalistic and egocentric thought with 
which both the individual and the collective mind of criticism began has 
yielded to first a concrete construction and reflection and finally to re­
flection and construction of a formal nature. Thus literature for the peri­
ods specified has changed progressively since it began in Neoclassic times, 
and the advances it shows parallels those of the individual in his on-going 
struggle to equilibrate. Piaget’s strategy of comparing social knowledge 
and individual knowledge to a number of subject-matter areas bears out this 
phenomenon of progression. In like manner, applying Piaget’s historicode­
velopmental strategy to literature has shoim the same progression.
The final part of the investigation relevant to this chapter— the 
conclusions and implications that this research has for literary instruc­
tion— pertains to the second hypothesis: namely, that literature con­
sidered from a historicodevelopmental view will furnish implications for 
its instructions.
One conclusion that emerges from this study that has implications 
for literary instruction in high school and college may be stated as fol­
lows : It is the theories of critics concerning the nature of literature
and its creative process which have accumulated over the centuries that 
make up the structure of literature as knowledge, not literature, the art 
form- Moreover, this structure of knowledge, which contradicts the experi­
ence of literature— as an aggregate of theoretical postulations— is in es­
sence theoretical criticism, or literary aesthetics, and as an organized
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system of thought, offers a means of study by which literature can be ana­
lyzed on the basis of the elements which constitute its nature, that is, 
its essence (imitation, expression, structure), its form and content, and 
• its function and value. It is what Northrop Frye speaks of in his Anat­
omy of Criticism (1957) as an "intermediate form of criticism,"
the development of . . . which would fulfill the systematic and 
progressive element in research by assimilating its work into a 
unified structure of knowledge, as other sciences do. It would 
at the same time establish an authority within criticism for the 
public critic and the man of taste.
But the implication of an "intermediate criticism," Frye pointed out is
. . . that at no point is there any direct learning of literature
itself. Physics is an organized body of knowledge about nature, 
and a student of it says that he is learning physics, not nature.
Art, like nature, has to be distinguished from the systematic study 
of it, which is criticism. It is therefore impossible to "learn 
literature"; one learns about it in a certain way, but what one 
learns, transitively, is the criticism of literature. Similarly, 
the difficulty often felt in "teaching literature" arises from the 
fact that it cannot be done: the criticism of literature is all
that can be directly taught. Literature is not a subject of study, 
but an object of study . . .
Criticism, rather, is to art what history is to action and philo­
sophy to wisdom: a verbal imitation of a human productive power
which in itself does not speak.^
Frye argues his point well, and his remarks along with the afore-
stated conclusion have implications for the instruction of literature—
namely, that criticism should be at least one subject of study in the lit­
erature program rather than limiting the study of literature solely to 
its bibliography, which "sees literature as a huge aggregate or miscellaneous 
pile of discrete ’works.* Clearly, if literature is nothing more than this, 
any systematic mental training based on it becomes i m p o s s i b l e , A n d  what
9Northrop Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism; Four Essays (Princeton, 
N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 11—12.
p. 16.
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happens is that the "discrete" selection is viewed extrinsically as the 
handmaiden to history or psychology or some other discipline. Now, this 
extrinsic approach to literature, which turns "to the conceptual framework 
of the historian for events and to that of the philosopher for ideas, 
has .been the one emphasized in high-school English literature programs, 
according to Dr. James R. Squire, Executive Secretary of the National 
Council of Teachers of English, and is one that he would like to see sup­
erseded by an approach which takes a close look at the text, an approach
that would sustain a view of criticism as the knowledge form and make it 
12a subject of study.
This broad implication, of course, subsumes other implications, 
ones that would necessitate change and impose obligations on the teacher 
of literature and those who direct its implementation. First, the teacher, 
as the most concerned, would need to reexamine his objectives in terms of 
literature’s purpose in the English curriculum by asking himself the fol­
lowing question: "Is the study of literature an end in itself or should
13it 'fire students to read widely and well?'" And if literature study 
is to foster "'literary taste,'" and develop the "lifetime habit of read­
ing that supposedly is the business of the English t e a c h e r , — an answer
11
Ibid., p. 12.
12In Chapter One of this research, a need for more effective in­
struction in literature was expressed by a national study (Project English 
NCTE), which in the sixties investigated English programs in 168 of the 
"better" high schools across the nation, and it specified that an intrin­
sic approach be taken to literature, wherein emphasis would be on, as Dr. 
Squire puts it, "the close reading of texts," rather than on "superficial 
coverage and talking about texts." (See supra, pp. 1-2.)
13James R. Squire, "National Study of High School English Programs: 
A School for All Seasons," English Journal 55 (March 1966): 288.
^^Robert Karlin, Teaching Reading in High School (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, Co., 1964), p. 172.
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that any teacher would be hard put to deny— then the teacher who subscribes 
to this philosophy is faced with the responsibility of helping students 
develop an appreciation for literature. Robert Karlin believes that it 
Is up to the teacher to "foster in his students . . .  a ’set of aware­
ness’ before any reading begins." In his text Teaching Reading in- High 
School (1964), he writes:
If students are to derive the maximum appreciation from the reading 
of literature, they must be alert to the author’s purpose and to the 
author’s style and be ready to muster their analytical skills.
In other words, students must become critics in their own right— a not
impossible task if the teacher possesses the necessary skills to guide
them.
This conditional, therefore, leads to the final obligation of the 
teacher: A teacher of literature— and Dr. Squire maintains this view—
should become informed about modem textual criticism and "translate his 
knowledge of critical approaches to the classroom.
These obligations are a challenge to the dedicated teacher, partic­
ularly in these times when reading in the classics and the best of modern 
writing is an assignment imposed rather than an experience chosen. However, 
were criticism the subject of study and literature the object, undoubtedly, 
quality literature— the literature that can bear scrutiny— would be appre­
ciated for the art form it is, and students— enlightened and aesthetically 
fulfilled— would read. To know literature, then, is to know power; power 
to judge and power to enjoy. "For Literature is an edifice as many-towered 
and as spirit—lifting as any cathedral man has sent skyward. (’We see the
^^Ibid., p. 171. ^^Squire, p. 288.
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shape from start to finish,* writes Virginia Woolf. 'It (the book) is a
17bam; a pig-sty, or a cathedral-*)"
Another conclusion which speaks to the instruction of literature 
is closely related to the first hypothesis. It proposes that just as 
literature shows advances in the way it has been conceived by literary 
critics that parallel advances in the cognitive development of the indi­
vidual so too does the individual show advances in the way he conceives 
literature that parallel advances in his cognitive development. In other 
words, literary concepts in the individual progress from phenbmenistic and 
egocentric concepts to ones marked by construction and reflection, and in 
this progression conceptual structures of literature are laid down at each 
developmental stage. In Piagetian terms this proposition addresses thé con­
clusion to the diachronic question: "l-That are the general principles by
which the subject . . .  changes his state in the course of development?"^^
To answer this question in respect to literature the following statement 
is posited: Across a childhood of continuous experiences with literature,
the child by the process of adaptation builds discontinuous concepts about 
literature so that he realizes a progressive equilibration of these con­
cepts as he moves from one stage of development to the next.
But just as this progression is sequential in the cognitive develop­
ment of the individual xTith the various stages (pre—operational, concrete- 
operational, formal operational) preceding one another and laying down 
structures on which the next stage builds, so too is this the case in the
17Edna Johnson, Evelyn R. Sickels, and Frances Clarke Sayers, An­




individual’s development of concepts in literature. His first experiences in 
literature, therefore, must be based on a simplistic type of literature, where­
in the fundamental elements are free of complexity (action and conflict 
are swift and direct, characters are one dimensional— good or evil, setting 
is limited in description for the purpose of orientation, and theme is clear- 
cut)-, as are the aspects of style (form, language, emotion, and tone). These 
experiences in literature must come first— before he encounters a sophi­
sticated literature that is based on the same fundaments, albeit more com­
plexly treated, with a more complex style.
Thus, in. order to understand how the building of conceptual struc­
tures in literature takes place it is necessary to (1) examine what types 
of literature the child is exposed to at the pre-operational period of de­
velopment and (2) to observe how the specific fundaments of literature 
along with its style, embodied in these early types, in their simple state, 
produce conceptual structures of literature which become incorporated in 
successive concepts at the operational level to build new and higher forms
of equilibrium— "’higher”’ in terms of the ’equilibrial properties of field
19extension [ field of application ], mobility . . .  and stability . . . "
The field of extension, or application, for the pre-operational 
child is limited to the early forms of literature such as Mother Goose, 
nonsense verse, fable, and folk or fairy tale.^® (And xfith these forms 
his mobility and stability are similarly limited). These have the univer­
sal elements of literature— "TVhat happened [action and conflict], and to
19Ibid., p. 263.
^^Realistic fiction for the child at this level is not included 
here because in the literature that does not originate from the oral tra­
dition the universal elementsof theme, setting, character, action are not 
so clearly and concisely outlined— a sharpness crucial to the understanding 
of these elements at a more sophisticated level.
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. whom [characterization ], and where [setting plus such concepts as
revelation (theme), humor, rhyme, melody, and the multiple dimensions of
language- With Mother Goose,,then, the child at this level begins- This
earliest "delight" of childhood
is the datm of humor, nonsense, and imagination; the quick awareness 
of the multiple wonders of the world; and a first appreciation of the 
bite and beauty of words- To all these kingdoms Mother Goose is the 
key.22
Indeed, Mother Goose includes all the fundaments of literature and style. 
"What drama is packed in this brief abrupt verse: Miss Muffet and the
spider"; "Tom, Tom, the piper's son, / Stole a pig and away he run";
"what mirth and merrymaking : Hey, diddle, diddle, / The cat and the fid­
dle . . "what kindness and cruelty: If I had a donkey that wouldn't
go / Would 2  heat him? Oh no, no met ̂  man with bandy
legs; / . . . 2  tripped up his heels and he fell on his nose, / /" "l-That 
a parade" of people and animals: the dairy maid, the doctor, the barber,
the king; dogs, cats, ponies, hens, mice. "What a world in miniature that 
touches upon even the greatest themes: romantic love, and the inevitabi­
lity of fate and character: Bobby Shaftoe's gone to sea / . - . He'll
come back and marry me, / . -,." "Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall, / Humpty 
Dumpty had a great fall: / . . - And, finally, "the very essence of poe­
try is here; the recurring miracle of phrase that evokes such images of 
pure delight as to reverberate through the mind, echo upon echo. As fair 
as _a lily, as white as ̂ ' swan // The boughs do shake and the bells do 
ring . - . ,"23
2^Johnson, Sickels, and Sayers, p. 1141.
p. 4. pp. 3-4.
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Much of Mother Goose, however, is more than this. It is nonsense
for the child's entertainment, Tfhat could be more incongruous than a cow—
of all barnyard animals— jumping over the moon? "It is the.juxtaposition
2Aof deed with disposition that produces the nonsense." And nonsense ap­
preciated and loved with Mother Goose carries over into a particular genre 
that the child of pre-operations encounters which is specifically labeled 
"nonsense verse." Edward Lear started the tradition in England with his 
Book of Nonsense (1846). Mother Goose was his source: his ear had •
caught the melody and manipulation of words and sounds; his inner eye 
had glimpsed the absurdities in character and deed that rollick across its
pages. "He took to this form like a duck to water, making it his o^m and
producing hundreds of limericks, each with its drama of triumph or frustr­
ation, as abrupt, sharp, and hilarious as Mother Goose herself."
There was a Yong Lady whose nose
Was so long that it reached to her toes;
So she hired an Old Lady, whose conduct was 
steady.
To carry that wonderful nose.
So sings Edward Lear. Inventive language, melody and rhyme, incongruous 
elements— all elements of nonsense are here, and "in this world of nonsense, 
young children find themselves happily at home* It is a world they under­
stand because it mirrors the shifting boundaries between the real and the
25impossible which exist in their own minds."
Piaget, in commenting on the meaning of reality for the child,
says :
24.Ibid., p. 45.
^^Johnson, Sickels, and Sayers, pp. 44, 63, 46.
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reality for the child is both more arbitrary and better regu­
lated than for us. It is more arbitrary, because nothing is impos­
sible, and nothing obeys causal laws. But whatever may happen, it 
can always be accounted for, for behind the most fantastic events 
which he believes in, the child will always discover motives which 
are sufficient to justify them; just as the world of the primitive 
races is peopled with a wealth of arbitrary intentions, but is de­
void of chance.
And subsumed under this particular brand of reality described by 
Piaget are also the fable and the fairy tale. But the fable for children 
is suspect:
Some educators question the suitability of fables for children, 
forgetting perhaps that while children shun moralizing they are draivn 
to morality. The drama of the fable, the animal characters, and the 
quick flash of its single illustration of a truth— these hold the 
attention of children. Fables are like small, bright pebbles picked 
up from the shore, stored in the pocket as reminders of past exper­
ience, and held in the mind when needed.
What better way could the adult instill attitudes of respect and recog­
nition for the youngest child in the neighborhood or the smallest child in 
the class than through Aesop’s fable "A Lion and a Mouse.” In this story 
a lion who lets a mouse go (amused all the while at the suggestion the 
mouse makes in pleading for his life that some day he may be able to help 
the powerful lion) is later saved by the mouse when he gnaws the ropes of 
the hunter’s net in which the lion is caught, thus helping the lion to 
escape. Then the lion "acknowledges that little friends [ may] prove 
great friends.” Is this not a "bright pebble” of experience that could 
be "held in the mind until needed”?^^ And is this not an introduction to 
the element theme, the discovery of which often produces difficulties for 
the adult in a more mature literature?
^^Jean Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, trans. 
Marjorie Gabain, 2nd ed, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1932), p. 212.
27Johnson, Sickels, and Sayers, pp. 99-100.
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Now, the same attitude of protecting the child from certain forms 
of literature, of delaying their introduction until the child "[has] come 
to a knowledge of [his] oxm reality in the world" also carries over to the 
folk, or fairy, tale. Lewis Mumford discusses this matter in his book 
Green Memories, "an account of the childhood of his own son who was killed 
in the war"; a childhood that had been exposed to only that which was im­
mediate and visible, "that is, to grownups"; a childhood in which the 
"factual and pragmatic was expressed in . . • education," but this stress 
on reality as the adult perceives it "did not banish some inner world of 
terror, the existence of which the boy confessed, when he was grown. 
Mumford writes:
"Surely, the minds of children are full of memories and forebod­
ings that anticipate and reinforce the more tangible threats 
of inhumanity: the wildest folk tale, the most brutal fairy
story, do fuller justice to their reality than a factual account 
of a walk to school; and we fooled ourselves when we thought that 
any antiseptic efforts of ours to keep the germs of fantasy from 
incubating could banish the child^s sense of the mysterious, the 
inscrutable, the terrible, the overx^helming. In repressing this 
life of fantasy and subordinating it to our own practical interests, 
we perhaps made it take more devious forms, or at. lest gave the 
demonic a free hand without conjuring up any angelic powers to 
fight on the other side. We did not get rid of the dragon: we only
banished St. George.
Thus Mumford acknowledges the mistake of withholding the fairy 
tale from children, particularly children who live in a century that has 
suffered "two wofid wars, such degradation of human dignity as man had 
never before known, and the mushroom-shaped cloud shadowing the universe." 
Their world is a world of violence that they will come to know inevita­
bly— if not by first-hand experience— through films and television. In
^®Ibld., p. 123. 2®Ibid.
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their text Anthology of Children's Literature (1970) the editors point 
out that
it is well to remember that what is read for oneself, without ex­
perience of horror, is never as vivid as that which has been given 
the unconscious emotion of the spoken voice. If the storyteller 
cannot describe the fate of the first two little pigs without 
crunching bones, the tale is not for her. To read horror 
may even fulfill some need, to know symbolically what the threat 
may be. To hear it brings it closer to reality; but to see it, in 
pictures, is to define it too clearly and to shut off the protection 
of only half, knowing.
Knowledge of evil is a necessary knowledge and vicarously acquired les­
sens one’s vulnerability to its demonic forces. The fairy tale, then, 
which deals with an order of the world, an "original world" which is knoxm 
"loosely through one’s perceptions and m e m o r i e s , o n e  that science 
cannot explain, can serve as a buffer, as "food for the tenderest sto­
machs.
And children get exquisitely lost in the order of the fairy-tale
world. They read and listen to folk tales, "never tiring of the elemental
themes and the images of magic."
Sometimes the insatiable hunger endures through years of childhood, 
until at last the child emerges into a new maturity, free of the 
golden spell, laden with pollen, like an inebriate bee. From his 
reading of the folk tale, the child gains a yea-saying faith in the 
ultimate goodness of life, a recognition of the threat of evil in 
the world and even in himself, with magic weapons to conquer it. He 
gains the habit of wonder; a robust sense of humor; the ability to 
find enchantment in the most common day, and the power to thrust his 
imagination beyond himself and the limits of ignorance.
^°Ibid.
^^John Crowe Ransom, The New Criticism (Norfolk, Conn.: New
Directions, 1941), pp. 280-81.
^^Sir Philip Sideny, An Apology for Poetry in Criticism: The
Major Texts, ed. by Walter Jackson Bate (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.,
(1952), p. 90.
33Johnson, Sickels, and Sayers, p. 122.
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Thus, the fairy tale, like the fable, nonsense verse, and nursery rhymes, 
has the universal elements of literature, seeds planted in the first years 
of a child’s literary experiences.
To be sure, these first types of literature to which the child is 
exposed are static in concept, with their stereotyped characters, themes, 
and actions, especially as they are seen in the fairy tale, where
everything is clear . . . One knows exactly where to place 
one’s sympathy. The issues are soon stated, with no unnecessary 
subtleties of emotion, no bewildering wavering between cause and 
effect. Everyone acts according to his nature, and the stories 
move in strong, direct action to the always expected end, where 
the good comes to glory and joy, and evil is punished as befits it, 
with primitive symbols of suffering.
Yet, these stereotyped concepts match the cognitive development of 
the pre-operational child, who at this stage focuses on states and thinks 
transductively and whose field of application, mobility, and stability are 
partial and limited. However, at the operational level— concrete and formal—  
the learner has increased his field of.application, accelerated his mo­
bility, and attained stability. He has moved from phenomenism and ego­
centrism to construction and reflection, so that now he apprehends the 
elements of more adult literature. He incorporates the stereotyped con­
cepts of fairy tale, fable, nonsense, and nursery rhyme, ones he was com­
fortable with at the pre-operational level, into the more obscure concep­
tual structures of myth, epic, fantasy, fiction, drama, and poetry at the 
operational level. This process can be demonstrated by touching upon such 
elements of literature as plot, characterization, setting, theme, nonsense, 
and language and showing how experiences with these elements, met in Mother 
Goose, nonsense verse, fable, and fairy tale, at the pre-operational level
^^Ibid., pp. 122-23.
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prepare the reader for the same— but more complex— elements met in litera­
ture at the operational level.
Plot development of fiction and drama at the operational stage has 
been nourished on the fast-moving action of nursery rhyme, fable, and folk 
tale, an action which is dramatically carried forward with a minimum of 
episode and an economy of detail. However, unlike the action of these 
earlier forms, whose events follow a time order, the action in plot is built 
upon cause and effect and an arrangement of scenes, which may or may not 
observe a chronological sequence. An understanding of plot, therefore, re­
quires reversible, thought processes. Thus, having, been exposed to the less 
sophisticated forms at the pre-operational stage, the learner, who has fol­
lowed the swift unfolding of their episodes, is ready at the operational 
stage to apprehend the development of plot whether it has a linear, a flash­
back, or a frame-story (a story within a story) arrangement of scenes, 
where in the case of the flashbacks and frame-story the arrangement requires 
the reader to move forx'̂ ard and backward in time and space. He has this 
ability because at the concrete level he senses the logic of classes and 
relations— elements of the grouping— and at the formal level, the group 
of four transformations, systems.of thought highly mobile.
As for characterization, these early forms, the fable and fairy tale 
in particular, also prepare the operational cognizer for the complex charac­
ters he meets in sophisticated literature. Characterization is implicative 
of a few characters in the short story, as it is in the tale, but numerous
characters in the novel, characters which depart from the "impersonal”—
35as—  ”X” characters of the fable, whose function is to exemplify a.virtue
35May Hill Arbuthnot, Children and Books (Chicago: Scott, Foresman
& Co., 1947), p. 257.
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or folly, or from the typed characters of the tale, who are completely 
good or completely bad. For example the consumate cruelty exemplified 
by the giant of the English fairy tale "Mollie T-fhuppie" is the consum-- 
mate.cruelty of Captain John Silver in Robert Louis Stevenson’s Treasure 
Island— but with a difference; for this pirate, although clever, cruel, 
and treacherous, "is redeemed from being completely despicable by his 
courage and his ebullient spirits." "As fascinating a villain as ever 
dominated a tale," he is "real," flesh and blood, "who, having in him the 
element of greatness, is nevertheless a traitorous b r i g a n d . H e  is a 
complex character with more than one facet to his personality, whereas 
the giant in the tale "Mollie Whuppie" has but one dimension to his 
character— cruelty. Naturally, as a personality, he stirs no ambivalent 
feelings. Nor should he; for only one side of him is revealed. The giant 
is a character from a simplistic kind of fiction; whereas, John Silver is 
a character from sophisticated fiction. With him the reader can identify, 
since at the operational level his thought is reversible, allowing him to 
conserve. He, unlike the child of pre-operations whose thought lacks stabi­
lity, can glimpse the whole personality of Silver, a personality which is con­
sistently evil, a character trait that is not destroyed despite the in­
troduction of such admirable character traits as courage and exuberance,
In fact, it is the working together of the opposing traits within the 
matrix of Silver’s personality that makes him the most unforgettable pi­
rate of all literature.
As in characterization, nursery rhyme, fable, and folk tale also 
build conceptual structures for the scenes and settings the operational
^®Ibid., p. 390.
reader encounters in fiction, drama, and poetry. I4hereas settings and 
scenes are simply touched upon in the nursery rhyme ("Little Jack Homer, / 
Sat in the corner") and dealt with economically in the fable and fairy 
tale (a bridge, a castle, a forest, with interior scenes seldom elaborated), 
they are developed in great detail in adult-forms of literature and serve 
as devices of symbolism, contrast, and irony, emotion-arousing devices 
which reinforce theme or characterization, or both. In other words, scenes 
and setting can do more than simply orient the reader (their primary func­
tion). They help to establish the mood or tone of a selection so that the 
emotional aura, enshrouding the work, orders the reader's expectations 
and attitudes. A good example of this function is the structure of scenes 
in Shirley Jackson’s short story "The Lottery." The first scene is almost 
pastoral. It bespeaks of the good fellowship and innocent pleasure, of a 
quiet village in contemporary New England. The last scene, however, be­
comes one of savagery and violence, when a woman is stoned to death to 
satisfy an ancient fertility ritei Each scene-— the first and the last—  
calls forth feelings in the reader, but ones antithetical to each other; 
the fact that they are structurally opposed is what gives the story its 
effect of horror and revulsion, thus reinforcing the story’s theme of 
man’s innate violence and his need for a scapegoat. The operational reader, 
whose thought processes are reversible, thereby increasing the equilibrial 
properties of field extension, mobility, and stability, can appreciate 
Jackson’s technique: her use of contrast to highlight the barbaric nature
of a "civilized" society. A literary inversion such as this is a rela­
tional pattern that is within his power to grasp. In short, because at 
the pre-operational level he was exposed to setting and its primary
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function in nursery rhymes, fables, fairy tales of orienting the reader to 
listener, he is capable when he meets this element in more adult selections 
to incorporate its primary purpose with a secondary, more aesthetic purpose.
Theme, which can give the operational thinker difficulty in some 
stories,is also a literary concept, whose roots go back to the fable and 
fairy tale. The fable, with its economic illustration of a single truth, 
stated directly, familiarizes the child of pre-operations with the revela­
tory, ethical aspects of literature, with the intellectual as well as the 
emotional. At the operational level, then, when he can deal with many 
possibilities, having already become accustomed to the moral quality of 
literature, in which one truth is illuminated, he is prepared to parti­
cipate in the many truths,that often ray out from the central theme of 
a quality story or poem.
And just as theme is strong in the fable, so too is it a forceful 
element in the folk, or fairy, tale. Its themes " . . .  have to do with 
winning .security, earning . . .. a place in the world, accomplishing impossi­
ble tasks, escaping from powerful enemies, outwitting wicked schemes and 
schemers, and succeeding with nonchalance."^^ Jack in his story of the bean­
stalk outwits the giant, just as Mollie ifhuppie gets the better of her giant 
in the tale by the same name. And Cinderella— the fairy godmother notwith­
standing— earns her place in the world. The themes of fairy tale and fable 
are the themes of life; they are the same themes that pervade literature 
at the operational level. But in the simplistic forms the themes are clear 
and robust; whereas in fiction, poetry, and drama they become subtle and 
less blatant, operating on the basis of suggestion and requiring much of 
the operational reader— that is, he must understand the overtones of multi—
37Arbuthnot, p. 226.
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dimensional language (imagery, figures of speech, connotation and denotation) - 
and must search for clues in order to generalize or form hypotheses of possi­
ble meaning. Because his thought is reversible, however, he is equipped to per­
form these operations:• he can perceive form, meaning, and relational patterns, 
types of thinking for which the child of pre-operations has no structures.
For example, in a revelation—type story, such as James Joyce's "Clay," 
the operational thinker perceives the pitiful plight of Maria, an old maid 
about whom no one really cares, when she spends Hallow Eve with her brother 
Joe and his family; he perceives her fate— to remain unloved, an object of 
pity— through the innuendo—packed dialogue and the reactions of the other 
characters to her; moreover, he, not Maria, has the revelation, because she 
sees herself as attractive and well-liked by everyone. Short bn action 
and long on theme, a story such as this will have meaning only for a reader 
of formal operations, one who can work with the.possibilities inherent in 
a story such as "Clay."
And, finally, the nonsense of Mother Goose and nonsense verse, like 
the other early forms that the pre-operational child enjoys, prepare the 
reader at the operational level for fantasy in fction, a genre that al­
lows the writer "to suspend a law of nature or to create a marvelous being 
or machine or place, "that grants him "his impossibility," his "'Let's sup­
pose,'" but " demands probability in his treatment of it-"^^ Thus, it is 
a genre that sets out the rules of its logic at the beginning of the story—  
rules that the pre-operational child never questions because of the "real­
ity" he has ordered into his world by symbolic representation- Therefore, 
when the reader of concrete or formal operations meets Lewis Carroll's
^^Laurence Perrine, Literature: Structure, Sound, and Sense,
2nd ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), p. 325.
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Alice and her world of rabbit holes and looking glasses, he is able to 
cope with the concept of logical illogicality; he recognizes it for what 
it is and is amused. For he has met it at an earlier age in riddles and 
rhymes: "Little Nancy Etticoat, / With a white petticoat, / . . . The
longer she stands / The shorter she groins" And in the verse of Edward
Lear and countless others, as meaning is juxtaposed with sound in a logi­
cal disorder of confusion.
Nonsense also prepares the reader of operational thought for such 
abstract notions as irony, a term which always implies some sort of dis­
crepancy or incongruity, and paradox, wherein logic is defied on the lit­
eral level but reinstated on the figurative level. These concepts provide 
tension and pervade the quality literature of the adult. In fact, all 
"good" poetry as well as imaginative prose has the tension that irony and 
paradox insure. The operational thinker can handle language that operates 
on two levels, such as irony and paradox, for the same reasons that he is 
able to understand other literary concepts that require operational thought 
processes; that is, his sense of inversion allows him to grasp the relation­
al patterns implicative in irony and paradox just as his sense of compen­
sation yields to the recriprocal relationship that exists between metaphor 
and the literal statement.
The literature that the child first meets— nursery rhyme, nonsense 
verse, fable, and folk tale— and in which he so enthusiastically indulges, 
embodies the universal elements of literature that answer the questions:
What happened? To whom? TThen? l-There? Now, these elements like the lit­
erary concerns of theme and language are simplistically conceived. But 
in their simple directness they afford the child experiences with literary
Johnson, Sickels, and Sayers, p. 28.
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concepts that serve him later when he encounters the more complex forms 
of the novel, short story, fantasy, drama, and poetry, plus the complexi­
ties of a multidimensional language. In other words, the early forms of 
literature build conceptual structures which he incorporates in subsequent 
concepts to build new and higher forms of equilibrium. These structures 
progrès from phenomenism and egocentrism to construction and reflection,. 
paralleling the progression that is shown in cognitive development. Growth 
in the understanding of literature, then, like cognitive growth in the in­
dividual, is a gradual, a developmental, a sequential process.
The implication this discussion has for the instruction of litera­
ture at the secondary level is clear. No approach to literature at the 
secondary level, especially the objective approach which takes a close 
look at the text, can hope to succeed if the learner has not experienced 
the early forms of literature. For if the imagination has not been nour­
ished, if the ear has not caught the sounds and rhythms of the language, 
if a consciousness of good and evil has not been awakened at a time when 
there are weapons to fight the dark powers; then the student of literature 
has not felt literature, and he has little background for understanding its 
sophisticated forms and appreciating them. Alfred TThitehead says in his 
book Aims of Education (1921):
Mere literary knowledge is of slight importance. The only thing 
that matters is, how it is known. The facts related are nothing. 
Literature only exists to express and develop that imaginary world 
which is our life, the kingdom which is within us. The literary 
side of a technical education should consist in an effort to make 
the pupils enjoy literature. It does not matter what they know 
but the enjoyment is vital.*0
Alfred Whitehead, Aims of Education (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1921), pp. 88-89.
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"How it is known" implies how literature as a creative act takes place.
.For this kind of knowledge a child's imagination, emotions, and intellect 
must be piqued and developed. This can only come about through experien­
ces in literature, whereby concepts at one stage of the child's develop­
ment incorporate those of the preceding stage, so that higher states of 
equilibrium are formed as he increases his field of application, his mo­
bility, and his stability. Therefore, it is incumbent on the English cur­
riculum to provide story telling and reading in the early grades, not only 
for the child's pleasure and benefit at that age but also for his pleasure 
and benefit at a later age when literary concepts in mature literature sub­
merge, becoming subtle, and abstract, and more difficult to apprehend.
In this day of pictorial emphasis when the visual is used in­
creasingly as a method of communication, it would seem that the 
scope of language is lessened. As far as the written language 
is concerned, the tendency is to simplify its structure, limit 
its vocabulary, and narrow its subtleties of feeling and color 
reducing it to the basic norm of everyday speech.
The imagination is in the same way being robbed of its power. Films and 
television leave children passively inactive, with their moving characters, 
painted backdrops, sound accompaniments, and mood music. Piaget finds the 
use of audio-visual methods objectionable. He writes that "too many educa­
tors have sung their praises, whereas in fact they may lead to a kind of 
verbalization of images, if they only foster associations without giving 
rise to genuine a c t iv i ti e s . " T h u s  the use of audio-visual materials such
41Johnson, Sickels, and Sayers, p. 1142.
^^Jean Piaget, To Understand is to Invent: The Future of Education,
trans. George-Anne Roberts (New York: Grossman, 1973; Viking Compass Book,
1974), pp. 7-8.
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as films and television is seen as producing ’figurative processes’
43rather than true operational processes."
Story telling, on the other hand, fires the child’s imagination. 
When he hears stories told, he comes to "build the scene and setting, with 
[his] inner eye," depending "only on the modulation of the voice and the 
words, an occasional involuntary :gesture, a change of pace, a pause —  h e . 
[has] only these to tell him how to define the threat, the conflict, and 
the resolution." Thus, "the imagination is given the bone and sinew of 
reality.l-Then he comes, then, to read for himself, he will read.
And, because he has had a plenitude of literary experiences, he will, as 
he reads,"co—create"'^̂  with the writer.
The conclusions' pertinent to this research have borne implications 
for the instruction of literature at the secondary level. The first con­
clusion posited that criticism, or the aesthetics of literature, is the 
knowledge form rather than the bibliography of literature and, as an or­
ganized system of thought, offers a means of study, a means by which lit­
erature can be analyzed. The implication to which this conclusion spoke 
recommended that criticism become a subject of study in order that students 
may become knowledgeable about the "how" of literature— the process— and 
thus acquire a greater understanding and appreciation of the art form.
This implication also included implications for the teacher, ones that 
imposed certain responsibilities upon him as the student’s guide.
The second conclusion posited that the individual develops con­
ceptual structures about literature in the same manner that he develops 
cognitive structures and that the two parallel each other in a sequential
^^Mary Ann Spencer Pulaski, Understanding Piaget; An Introduction 
to Children’s Cognitive Development (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 202.
44 45Johnson, Sickels, and Sayers, p. 1142. Karlin, p. 172.
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development, moving from phenomenism and egocentrism to construction and 
reflection, and that at each stage he builds structures which become in­
corporated in successive structures. Following this conclusion, the im­
plication addressed itself to the English curriculum. It pointed out 
the curriculum’s obligation to students in the early grades— namely, that 
it should provide students with an abundant experience in the early forms 
of literature— -nursery rhyme, nonsense verse, fable, fairy tale— so that 
an acquaintance with these precursors of adult literature may expose them 
to the universal elements of action, characters, setting, and theme as well 
as the language; then, perhaps, if they become cognizant of these elements 
as they appear simplistically, they will when they reach the secondary 
level adapt readily to sophisticated literature, where these elements take 
on complexity, and appreciate the experiences it has to offer.
Both of these conclusions and the implications they carried were 
in answer to the second hypothesis— that literature put in a historical 
perspective will offer implications for its instruction. Preceding the 
conclusions and implications was the discussion in which the first hypo­
thesis— that a historicodevelopmental view of literature will show the ex­
istence of parallels between the collective thought of critics from the 
period of English Neoclassicism to the period of Anglo-American New Criti­
cism and the cognitive thought of the individual from the pre-operational 
level to the formal operational level— was shown to be valid# The pur­
pose of this chapter has been to summarize the research, to validate the 
hypotheses, and to deal %^th conclusions and implications that evolved 
from the study. However, the study has opened more doors than have been 
noted: In showing the strong **ontogenesis-recapitulates-history strain
in Piaget’s thinking , - it has made pertinent
46Flavell, pp# 252-53.
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. . .  Piaget’s basic assertion about the relations among the major 
sciences . . .  that they form, not one or another kind of linear 
hierarchy, but a circular structure: a relationship line whose
origin is logic-mathematics which will extend to physics-chemistry, 
then to biology, then to psychology-sociology, and from there 
will close the cirlce by returning to logic-mathematics again.
For example, in this research (although Piaget does not include any dis­
cipline connected \fith the "knowledge of singular fact,"^^ such as lit­
erature, other than perhaps psychology), many knoweldge forms have par­
ticipated: logic-mathematics, biology, psychology-sociology, and litera­
ture. It would seem that no matter what the endeavor, all disciplines 
find some point of reference. Even Aesop’s well-known fable "The Grass­
hopper and the Ants" as a subject of study need not confine itself to 
literature alone. There are implications here for physics, chemistry, 
biology, sociology, psychology, and logic. Analogically, any one of 
these disciplines could be served by this simple story. This homespun 
example also has implications for éducation. A quotation from Piaget 
will best demonstrate this point. In his concern for the actual pro­
blems that education is facing today— the need for interdisciplinary 
studies— he says, "Everyone talks of interdisciplinary needs," but "the 
inertia of established systems— i.e., those that are outdated but not yet
^^Ibid., p. 260.
4 8 According to Philip H. Phenix in his paper ’-The Architectonics 
of Knowledge" (Fifth Annual Phi Delta Kappa Symposium on Educational Re­
search), Education and the Structure of Knowledge, (Chicago: Rand McNally
& Co., (1964), p. 33, "the most elemental kind of knowing" is the "know­
ledge of singular fact." It is "the immediate awareness of another being 
(or of the self) in its concrete uniqueness." "The disciplines that are 
concerned with the knowledge of singular fact are . . .  designed to por­
tray unique personal encounters." The disciplines that, Phenix lists are 
existential philosophy, existential theology, existential psychology, 
and "those elements in the literary enterprise (particularly in poetry, 
drama and the novel). . . ."
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eliminated— simply tend to create a multidisciplinary situation;. " In
respect to this problem, he believes that
what is needed at both the university and secondary level are 
teachers who indeed know their subject but who approach it from 
a constantly interdisciplinary point of-view— i.e., knowing 
how to give general significance to the structures they use and 
to reintegrate them into overall systems embracing the other dis­
ciplines, In other words, instructors should be sufficiently 
penetrated with the spirit of epistemology to be able to make 
their students constantly aware of the relations between their 
special province and the sciences as a whole.
Then to .demonstrate what he believes is the weakness in the educational
viewpoint concerning interdisciplinary studies, he states:
. . . the first lesson to be drawn from current interdisciplinary 
trends is the need to look closely at the future relations be­
tween the human and the natural sciences and the resulting ne­
cessity of finding a remedy for the disastrous consequences of 
dividing university instruction into "schools" and secondary 
schools into "departments," both of them separated by airtight 
compartments. From the theoretical point of view, psychology, 
considered a science of man, is connected without a break to 
. biology and animal psychology or zoological ethology, whereas 
mathematics, classed among the natural sciences, is one of the 
most direct products of the human brain. The theory of infor­
mation which came from the human sciences is just as useful to 
thermodynamics as the latter is to data processing and ling­
uistics.
Piaget was postulating these theories in 1948. Today in 1977—  
almost thirty years later— universities are, for the most part, still 
compartmentalized with their "schools," as are secondary schools with 
their "departments." Change comes slowly, but perhaps change comes most 
slowly with the teacher, who is essentially the key to the up-grading of 
education. Concerning the teacher and change, Piaget makes this observa­
tion:
But it would also be necessary for the minds of the instructors 
themselves to become less and less compartmentalized, something 
that is often harder to obtain from them than from their students.
^^Piaget, To Understand Is to Invent, pp. 29-31. ^*^Ibid., p. 31.
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Another door which this study has opened is the view of knowledge
as a constantly changing entity. "Perpetual evolution" is the phrase that
Piaget uses to. describe this state of flux, and in speaking of scientific
knowledge, he says:
. . .  it finds itself changed from one day to the next. As a 
result, we cannot say that on the one hand there is the history 
of knowledge, and on the other its current state today, as if 
. its current state were somehow,definitive or. even stable. The 
current state of knowledge is a moment in history, changing just 
as rapidly as the state of knowledge in the past has ever changed 
and, in many instances, more rapidly. Scientific thought, then, 
is not momentary; it is not a static instance; it is a process.
More specifically, it is a process of continual construction and 
reorganization.^^
Or as Dr. John Renner, Professor of Science Education at the University of 
Oklahoma so cogently expresses it, using terms from Piaget’s stage-de­
pendent theory to highlight his point, "î-That we think is a formal opera­
tional category of today may be a pre-operational category of five hundred 
„52years from now.
These words also speak to literary thought, past and present. The 
more current it becomes the more rapidly it, too, seems to change. And 
it, too, "is a process of continual construction and reorganization." One 
has only to review the different approaches to literature which this study 
described to see how rapidly change came in the way literature was con­
ceived once the change was made from the pragmatic approach (one that enjoyed 
a relative stability for approximately two centuries) of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries to the expressive approach of the nineteenth century. 
Similarly, the expressive view held by the Romantics was to last but a 
century before it was supplanted by the objective approach of the New
^Jean Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, trans. Eleanor Duckworth 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1971; Norton Library, 1971), p. 2*
John N. Renner, interview, Norman, Oklahoma, July 1976.
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Critics- And the New Criticism, which made its appearance in the late 
twenties of the present century, enjoyed less than thirty years of pre­
eminence on the critical scene. Now this was an exceedingly short time 
in comparison to the approaches which preceded it, and was particularly 
short in view of,the stir it created, mainly in the forties, and the 
myriad activities both pro and con that hailed its arrival. It had its 
inception in the universities with teacher-critics both in England and the 
United States, and it has done more to change the face of criticism than 
any theory up to its time. But its revolutionary effect, notwithstanding, 
it is now passé and literary criticism has continued its search. Nonethe­
less, the search has brought critics back by the way of myth criticism 
and existentialism to an approach that is essentially objective in that 
the work itself is still the principal concern.
Literary structuralism, which made its appearance in the sixties, 
is just such an approach. It emphasizes the intrinsic method over the ex­
trinsic; however, some structuralists incorporate the two- Jerry L. Walker, 
Professor of English Education, University of Illinois, says in his ar­
ticle "The Structure of Literature" (English Journal, March 1966):
Rarely in the history of English teaching has a concept been 
so widely accepted, so eloquently discussed, and so variously in­
terpreted as the structure of literature'.
Since Jerome Bruner’s pronouncement in The Process of Education (1962)
that "’to learn structure is to learn how things are related,’" there
has been an emphasis on structuralism in all knowledge forms, so that in
teaching literature today this is by far the most recommended approach-
But Walker points out that although "there is unanimous agreement ’among
teachers, critics, and students of literature* . . . .  there is consider­
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able disagreement concerning the ’things* that are involved.Neverthe­
less, among those who subscribe to literary structuralism, there are 
three distinct groups:
One group, representative of the New Criticism, contends that 
only those relationships that exist among the elements within 
the work of literature itself are significant structural con­
cerns. Another group considers that the relationships which 
exist between the work and some external factors, such as the 
writer’s purpose, his history, and his socio-cultural back­
ground are also important structural concerns. A third group, 
abandoning the search for structure within the work itself, at­
tempts to identify the elements and their relationships in a 
literary experience. All three groups propose to study struc­
ture through careful analysis; they differ in what they choose 
to analyze.
And in the seventies structuralism is still in vogue, oriented 
now, however, toward linguistics and stylistics. In the Foreword to 
Approaches to Poetics (1973). a collection of selected papers from the 
English Institute sessions in linguistics and literary study, Seymour 
Chatman explicates the different directions in which structuralism in 
literature is moving today. Within the group of papers submitted, there 
are those critics who support literary works as structures and those who 
do not.
Those who are structuralists pursue such concepts as "the distinc­
tion between closed and pluralistic texts" (texts which resolve in a defi­
nite interpretation of the meaning the work produces and those which have 
an infinite number of interpretations and do not crystallize into a locus 
of meaning) in literature and "’affective stylistics’ (a theory which re­
lates a writer’s devices in style with his personality)— to bring the
53Jerry L. Walker, "The Structure of Literature,” English Journal 
55 (March 1966): 305.
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55reader into the theoretical picture in a more genuine way" ; whereas the 
anti-structuralists, who are "not satisfied with taking literary works to 
be structures, objects, artifacts," demonstrate that "a text is not the 
simple sura of its words and syntax" but is a *speech act* in terms of . • . 
*'( * the writer who puts out imitation speech acts as if they were be­
ing performed by someone’) and in terms of a reader (who decodes by 
’build ing on his tacit knowledge of the conventions— past and present, 
actual and possible— for illocutionary acts’̂ ^)."^^ The last paper, 
"Structuralism and Literature," which Chatman describes as "the most gen­
eral and most programmitc of the group" is by M. Tzvetan Todorov.
M. Todorov [Chatman says] dares to ask for a science of litera­
ture, but even as he waves the red cape, it is clear that "science" 
is not being used in a sense that any good Aristotelian could seri­
ously object to. In terms not unlike those of René Wellek and Aus­
tin Warren, he asks that literature be approached internally rather 
than externally, and literary theory be separated from literary 
criticism (the description and interpretation of specific texts).
Noting that poetics is a millenia-old discipline, M. Todorov asks 
for a typology of discourses, so that what is peculiar to literary 
discourse may emerge in clearer contrast. As a possible path into 
this effort, he reechoes the Russian Formalist idea that global 
literary structures are in some sense expansions of local devices—  
that a plot, for instance, may be essentially an "unfolded" metaphor. 
Hence, he feels, the idea of literary endogenesis is not unfeasible.^®
It would seem, then, from the critical activities since the New 
Criticism that literary thought neither stands still nor stays in balance. 
There has been, and no doubt always will be, a "perpetual evolution," 
generated by the urgency among literary scholars to find a truer conception
English Institute, Approaches to Poetics with a Foreword and ed. 
by Seymour Chatman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 9, 10.
56
Richard Ohman in his paper "Literature as Act," in Approaches to 
Poetics, p. 82, defines an "illocutionary act" as one "performed in saying 
the sentence," one "that may be that of demanding, requesting, imploring, 
praying; its exact force [remaining]uncertain without more context."
English Institute, Approaches to Poetics, pp. 81, 9.
p. 10.
229
of literature’s nature. Their strainings toward truth are analogous
to the child at the concrete operational level for whom
. . .  perfect equilibrium is never fully achieved. Each 
period of development represents only a successively closer 
approximation to equilibrium, and even adolescent thought 
does not attain perfect equilibrium in all areas at all 
times.
The New Critics, with.their close attention.to the text so that words al­
most have a life of their own, reached a sophisticated level in their 
critical conceptions; but in this new-found equilibrium were contained the 
seeds of disequilibrium. Perhaps the New Criticism can be compared to the 
adult at the formal level of operations who lives in "a state of equili­
brated disequilibration.” For example, since the decline of the New Criti­
cism there have been a multiplicity of trends in criticism, most of which, 
in the latter years, have reinstated the intrinsic approach. This fact 
suggests that once the high equilibrated state of the objective approach 
was reached in the forties and became a system in equilibrium, criticism 
has existed and will exist in "a state of equilibrated dlsequilibration"^^; 
it will continually expand its field of application to include many liter­
ary theories and combinations of theories based on the intrinsic method, 
will extend its mobility to move from one theory to another, and will main­
tain its stability to incorporate the new theories without destroying the 
system.
Indeed, the theoretical system of literature, which sees literature 
as organic, has managed to remain relatively stable since its thought be­
came reversible with the Romantics and the expressive approach, and this
59Ginsburg and Opper, p. 178.
^^Renner, interview, Norman, Oklahoma, July 1976-
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despite myriad and divergent views that characterized the late 1800’s and 
early 1900’s before the.inception of the objective approach with the New 
Critics, And the concept of imitation that oriented the Ancients, of the 
audience that oriented the Neoclassicists, of the poet that oriented the 
Romantics— all of these and each— have remained an important consideration 
in all intrinsic approaches since their time, albeit they have not domina­
ted any theory since their time.
The aforesaid after-thoughts, conclusions, and implications conclude 
the investigation pertinent to the problem of this study: to treat litera­
ture historicodevelopmentally in order to ascertain what information such 
treatment might.yield. Essentially this last chapter bears the fruits of 
the research— namely, the conclusions, the implications, and the after­
thoughts, for the conclusions and implications make recommendations for 
the improvement of literary study and instruction, and the after-thoughts 
offer points of possible extension for research.
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